Policy analysis

Food security, nutrition, climate change resilience, gender and the small-scale farmers

Zimbabwe

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Acronyms

AfDP   African Development Bank
ASMIC  Agriculture Inter-Ministerial Committee
ASSC   Agricultural Sector Steering Committee
AU     African Union
CAAPD  Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program
CAFP   Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Framework 2012-2032
CC     Climate change
CIMMYT International Center for Wheat and Maize Improvement
CCRS   Climate Change Response Strategy
CRR    Climate change resilience
CSA    Climate smart agriculture
CSO    Civil Society Organization
DFID   Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
ECA    Economic Commission for Africa
EU     European Union
EWS    Early warning system
FAO    Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations
FFS    Farmers field school
FFBS   Farmers field and business school
FNS    Food and nutrition security
FNSP   Food and Nutrition Security Policy
FS     Food security
FTLRP  Fast Track Land Reform Program
GCF    Green Climate Fund
GCSA   Global Climate Smart Alliance
GDP    Gross Domestic Product
GEF    Global Environmental Fund
GMB    Grain Marketing Board
HDI    Human Development Index
IFAD   International Fund for Agriculture Development
IFC    International Financial Corporation
IPCM   Integrated pest control management
IPRSP  Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
IPS    Input Support Program
IWRM   Integrated Water Resources Management
LDCF   Least Developed Countries Fund
Cover photo: Fidelis Chamhazhika and Olivia Matorere of Chimanimani, Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe, March 2015. ENSURE Program
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Introduction

Why this analysis?

This Policy Analysis is part of series of country-specific studies on Food and Nutrition Security (FNS) and Climate Change Resilience (CCR) policies in the Southern African region that CARE International is currently conducting. CARE identifies advocacy as one of the priority approaches to influence broader change and scale up effective solutions. Multiplying the impact of innovative solutions that bring lasting changes, by documenting and replicating successful experiences, promoting pro-poor approaches and advocating and influencing policies are key aspects of CARE global 2020 Program Strategy.

The focus of this analysis is the implementation status of FNS-CCR in Zimbabwe, with a strong emphasis on how these policies impact other small scale and women food producers. The analysis covers both national specific policies and those policies and commitments that the Government of Zimbabwe has signed to as part of global collective efforts.

The analysis aims to become a baseline to better understand the policy gaps and implementation challenges in FNS and CCR towards women and small-scale farmers in Zimbabwe. The main purpose of this analysis is to become a useful instrument for the Government of Zimbabwe, with its extensive experience in food security, agriculture, climate change resilience, nutrition and gender, will continue to play a significant role parenting with the government and CSOs in identifying and scaling up solutions through policy

Methodology


The analysis is, ultimately, the result of the collective work of different stakeholders. The process of elaborating the analysis started by the initiative of CARE, who conducted an exhaustive desk review, covering more than 160 sources, including policy documents as well as reports, surveys, evaluations and other available documents assessing the actual implementation of the policies (see the consulted bibliography). The first draft was then review by CARE Zimbabwe, as well as by CARE International experts in advocacy, FNS and CCR.

On the XXXX CARE organized, jointly with other stakeholders, a validation workshop in Zimbabwe to review and discuss the draft analysis. Policy makers, experts and practitioners from various government intuitions, civil society organizations and the academia, discussed extensively the draft and enriched it with their comments and recommendations, which were integrated to the final version.

What is policy?

By policy, in this analysis, we understand a course or principle of action adopted or proposed by an organization in this case by the government of Zimbabwe. Hence, this analysis covers not only the higher-level policy documents (e.g. Zimbabwe Agriculture Policy), but also any relevant documents containing government’s principles of action, such as strategies, action and investment plans, programs, guidelines and other policy initiatives, as well as their implementation arrangements, including budgets and evaluation and monitoring systems. Government policies are not only reflected in the set of documents containing them, but also in the way the policies are implemented in practice.
Executive summary

Context and background

Over the last decade, Zimbabwe has experienced several unprecedented economic, environmental and political shocks and stresses. Zimbabwe political future remains uncertain and the country faces severe democratic deficits. Corruption is endemic. Civil society space for policy dialogue has increased in recent years, but remains challenging. Two out of every three Zimbabweans are below the internationally recognized poverty line, according to UNDP.

Poverty eradication through human capital development and recovering the macroeconomic stability are the main priorities of the country’s development policies, but lack of financial resources and poor governance hamper their implementation.

Most farmers in Zimbabwe are small-scale, and they face several constraints in the access to finance, inputs and markets. These limitations are even more severe in the case of women small-scale farmers.

Poorly conceived support land reform policies and inadequate funding and skills among the farmers resettled in farms previously owned by white owners, are some of the main reasons for the sharp decline in the country’s agricultural production during the last decade.

Gender inequalities have decreased, but remain significant. Zimbabwe has ratified the main international commitments towards the promotion of gender equality and women empowerment, and various legislative reforms and policy frameworks have incorporated gender mainstreaming, but financial resources for the implementation of these policies are extremely limited.

5 million people in Zimbabwe are undernourished, a figure that has remained almost constant since the 2000s. Stunting affects almost one of every three children. Climate change is already exacerbating the effects of poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition in Zimbabwe. This situation has been exacerbated by changes in climate patterns, over both the short and longer terms. The current El Niño crisis (2015-2016) has caused a severe drought across much of Zimbabwe and left 4 million in need of food assistance.

Agriculture policies

Zimbabwe’s agriculture policy framework is straightforward and coherent, and includes clear goals, budgets, measurable indicators and a well-defined monitoring and evaluation system. However, the implementation of the policies is challenging and many of the agriculture programs in Zimbabwe are failing to deliver positive results for the small-scale farmers. A combination of factors help to explain the poor results, including feeble institutional capacities; limited availability of funds; top-down approaches (with little participation of the small-scale farmers in the policy making processes); widespread corruption and elite capture of the programs.

The agricultural institutional setup is weak (inefficient and overstuffed ministry; politicized parastatal agencies) and the monitoring and evaluation system does not work well.

Budgetary allocations for agricultural development are very low. The overall national budget has been decreasing due to the economic crisis, and the percentage allocated to agriculture is well below 10%, and most of it is covering administrative costs- not operations. Mismatches between planned and disbursed budget are recurrent.

The policy framework foresees mechanisms for the participation of the civil society in the policy making, but in practice only the farmers’ unions controlled by the large agribusiness and elites have a real say in the processes.

The land reform conducted in the 2000 delivered mixed results: the access to land by the small-scale farmers improved and, to some extent their livelihoods also improved (which
may have had a positive impact in reducing hunger); but the country paid a heavy price in terms of corruption and economic crisis: there were widespread appropriation and redistribution of land resulting in overall reduction in agricultural productivity and output; and many ownership issues of the settled lands remain unresolved. A new wave of land acquisition by large investors is now taking place, often with the support of traditional local leaders, sometimes undermining small-scale farmers’ rights.

The policies to facilitate the access to agriculture inputs are not delivering well. Many small-scale farmers are not getting the inputs’ vouchers, and the efficiency of the system is controversial. Seed regulation restricts the ability of small-scale farmers to sell and exchange their own seed.

Zimbabwe has a long history of large programs supplying tractors and machinery to the farmers, often subject of corruption scams and delivering little in terms of improving the production of small-scale farmers. The latest iteration of these kind of programs (Brazilian tractors program and the Command Agriculture program) has been severely criticized.

The extension system in Zimbabwe has been downsized in recent years. Integrated water resources management is the official policy approach for irrigation, but is not really implemented. The policies to improve the access to finance by the small-scale farmers are also failing. Contract farming is now becoming very popular but requires better regulation.

The State interventions in agriculture prices have been eased in recent years but they still affect negatively consumer prices, an effect compounded by the food import embargos regularly imposed.

Climate change policies

The CC policies in Zimbabwe have a strong focus on augmenting the resilience of the small-scale farmers, although they were designed without engaging them in the process. The policy framework does not foresee the participation of the civil society in the policy monitoring and evaluation.

Lack of financial resources is a main challenge to implement the climate adaptation actions. So far, Zimbabwe has had very limited access to global climate funds, although the creation of a new donor-funded resilience building fund may change this pattern.

This lack of financial resources, and the inefficient institutional arrangements in place, undermine the implementation of the climate smart agriculture (CSA) actions. Participatory vulnerability assessments are conducted only very seldom, and, although many farmers are aware about drought tolerant seeds, the majority are not using them. Conservation agriculture practices were strongly promoted by the public extension system in the past but this has now slowed down due to the financial limitations.

The gender policy in Zimbabwe addresses the issue of CC gender mainstreaming, but a specific framework to comprehensively address gender inequalities in CC adaptation has not been adopted.

Nutrition policies

Zimbabwe constitutionally recognizes the right to food, and has endorsed all the main international commitments to tackle hunger and reduce malnutrition. Nutrition has been adopted as a development priority. The political commitment to reduce chronic undernutrition is well articulated. The country’s FNS Policy and the National Nutrition Strategy are comprehensive documents setting clear targets. The nutrition policy framework includes clear indicators which are regularly tracked. Community-based monitoring systems have been developed.

In the National Nutrition Strategy, the Government committed to allocate a budget equal to 1% of the GDP to nutrition, but the actual allocation is equivalent to only 0.3% of the GDP, so there are critical financial shortfalls in the implementation of the nutrition programs.
The nutrition policy framework provides space for the participation of the civil society in the policy making and monitoring. The SUN Movement Civil Society Network is the main coordination platform on nutrition in the country and a Food and Nutrition Security Advisory Group, where NGOs are represented, has also been established. Food and nutrition committees are operating in most provinces.

Various donor-funded initiatives are implemented in Zimbabwe to address nutrition during pregnancy and the first 2 years of life (the crucial 1,000 days), and are beginning to achieve results after years of neglect.

A Nutrition Communication for Development Strategy has been produced, and many international NGOs in Zimbabwe are integrating social and behavioral change communication activities across programs to promote positive nutrition outcomes.

Efforts on Nutrition-sensitive interventions are, on the contrary, still insufficient. Zimbabwe’s agricultural policy promotes food diversification, which has also been encouraged by the extension system amongst the farmers for many years. However, the adoption rate remains inadequate.

Progress in promoting biofortification and food fortification in Zimbabwe is limited. Better access to improved water and sanitation has a huge positive impact on nutrition, but public funding for WASH has sharply declined in recent years. Zimbabwe’s social cash transfer program has a limited coverage and is nutrition-blind.

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**Key messages:**

1. Zimbabwe’s has a comprehensive agriculture and FS policy framework. Yet, the policy implementation is not contributing significantly to improve the lives of the women and small-scale farmers.

2. The land reform improved the access to land by the small-scale farmers, but it resulted in the overall reduction of agricultural productivity and production.

3. Zimbabwe climate change policy is focus on enhancing the small-scale farmers’ resilience. However, lack of financial resources constrains the implementation of the adaptation actions.

4. Nutrition is a development priority in Zimbabwe, but funds for nutrition programs are also very limited, and nutrition priorities are not well integrated in the agriculture, WASH and social protection sectors.
Context and background

Economic context

Zimbabwe has experienced considerable economic challenges over the last fifteen years, with a sharp economic decline (36% GDP decline between 2000 and 2015), and one of the worst periods of hyperinflation in history. UN Human Development Index ranks Zimbabwe among low human development countries: 172 out of 186 countries in 2016, compared to 1998, when it ranked 130 out of 174 countries. After a brief rebound following the introduction of a multi-currency regime in 2009, Zimbabwe’s economy once again decelerated sharply since 2012 (GIIN, 2016).

The economy has increasingly suffered from lack of investment from both domestic and foreign sources. The Government currently has no balance of payments support from major multilateral and bilateral institutions or donors due to huge debt arrears of over $7 billion and an almost $2 billion domestic debt. (Manneko, 2015). Due to high production, cheap imports and the tight liquidity, many manufacturing businesses have become unprofitable and closed. In recent times, cash shortages have left the government struggling to pay civil servants their monthly salaries, leading to government to introduce bond notes. The fear of bond notes becoming a worthless currency and returning the country to the unpopular period of hyperinflation sparked continuous protests in 2016 (AI, 2017).

Hyperinflation global record

Between 2007 and the 2009 Zimbabwe experienced the worst hyperinflation ever recorded globally at a staggering 489 billion % per year. In response, most transactions shifted to US$ or other hard currencies. In February 2009, the government officially adopted a multi-currency regime, accepting the US$ and other foreign currencies, as legal tender. Zimbabwe is now experiencing substantial deflationary pressure.

According to the WB, despite near-term adverse developments, ‘Zimbabwe’s growth prospects appear to be favorable in the medium to longer run’ provided the risks and challenges associated with investment spending are addressed (WB, 2016).

Social context

"Zimbabwe is floundering, with little sign of meaningful reform and sustainable, broad-based recovery".

International Crisis Group, 2016

An estimated of 10 million of Zimbabweans (62% of the population) live below the poverty line (UN, 2016a). Rural areas are home to two-thirds of Zimbabwe’s population, 79% of the poor and 92% of the extreme poor (WB, 2016). Unemployment rate is 11%. Of those employed, some 94% are in the informal economy (ZIMSTAT, 2014). Roughly 10% of Zimbabwe’s population has emigrated due to the country’s poor economic shape (GIIN, 2016).

Social and economic indicators

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<td>Annual population growth</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>172/186</td>
<td>2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP (US$ billion)</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP annual growth</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty (less 1.25 US$/day)</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
<td>2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 5 mortality x 1,000</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI coefficient</td>
<td>43.15</td>
<td>2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender inequality rating</td>
<td>56/144</td>
<td>2016</td>
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Poor basic services continue to undermine the resilience of vulnerable people. About 2 million require improved access to water, sanitation and hygiene (OCHA, 2015). HIV remains the fifth highest in the world, at 13.7% (WHO, 2016).

The adult literacy rate for Zimbabwe population stands at 98%, in 2014, one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa (WB, 2016).
Political context

Governance deficits, political violence, human rights and rule-of-law violations are deep challenges in Zimbabwe (international Crisis Group, 2016). Corruption in Zimbabwe has become endemic within its political, private and civil society sectors. Zimbabwe ranks 163rd out of 176 countries in Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index.

Civil society

The focus of civil society organizations (CSOs) interventions in Zimbabwe has evolved from welfare provision to developmental and, more recently, to the defense of the social, economic and political rights and increased demands for democratic reforms.

The 2013 Constitution guarantees freedom of assembly and association and recognizes the role of CSOs in improving the quality of life of citizens. The post 2013 elections period saw a shift in civil society-government relations with both sides exhibiting willingness to positively engage for the socio-economic recovery of the country. For example, CSOs contributed to the development of the Zimbabwe position on the SDGs (EU, 2016).

Some CSOs are also involved in informal policy dialogue discussions with different ministries, parliament committees and local governments. However, the activities of the CSOs are still constrained by organizational fragmentation and disunity, divergent strategies, diminishing access to political elites, and the refusal to these elites to permit greater civic involvement (Aeby, 2016).

Media

Zimbabwean press is designated as “not free” by Freedom House. According to Amnesty International, some journalists face harassment, and there have been several attempts in recent years by the authorities to stifle social media (AI, 2017). Internet freedom in Zimbabwe remained tenuous (Freedom on the Net, 2016).

Overall development policy

The Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio Economic Transformation (2013–2018) (ZimASSET) foresees “an empowered society and a growing economy”, with strong focus on poverty eradication through human capital development and empowerment, employment and gender mainstreaming. CSOs were consulted in the preparation of ZimASSET.

In 2016 the Government launched the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP) 2016 to 2018. The IPRSP largely focusses on macro-economic targets, including reducing the current account deficit from over 20% to below 10% of GDP. The Strategy assumption is that better macroeconomic stability will ultimately reduce poverty levels. The IPRSP has been criticized for neglecting a social agenda: social programs have been affected by financial cuts in order to address the deficit.

In 2010, Zimbabwe passed the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act, which prohibited foreign investors owning a majority stake in any business (up to 49% equity). The Law rattled foreign investors who feared their businesses would be expropriated. Chinese companies were given special dispensation and allowed to own majority stakes in certain businesses.

External assistance

Total official aid to Zimbabwe annually is around US$ 800 Million, majority of which is focus on the social sector (OCDE, 2015). Roughly half of this official development assistance is aligned to national objectives, which was facilitated by the adoption of the results-based approach in ZimASSET (Global Partnership, 2016). ZimASSET is a cluster based Plan, reflecting the strong need to fully exploit the internal relationships and linkages that exist between the various facets of the economy (FNS, social services, infrastructure, etc.)
Zimbabwe’s Multi-Donor Trust Fund is the largest donors’ funded initiative. Managed by the WB, this US $ 145 million fund is made of contributions from 6 European countries (with...
UK and Germany as the top contributors) plus Australia. The Fund is financing large infrastructure-related projects in the WHASP and electricity sectors.

Agriculture sector context

The agricultural sector is pivotal to the economy of Zimbabwe, providing 40% of export earnings and employing 67% of the work force.

Although Zimbabwe has some 4.3 million hectares of arable land, it is estimated that less than 3 million hectares are cultivated (WFP, 2016). White maize is the main staple food, tobacco is by far the most important export crop, accounting for almost half of the agriculture exports. Other cash crops include cotton, tea, coffee, sugarcane, and soya bean.

Agriculture in Zimbabwe is mainly rain fed and is vulnerable to drought and mid-season dry spells. Livestock ownership is generally low, except for the dry regions.

In 2000 the government of Zimbabwe embarked on Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) amending the Land Acquisition Act to give the government effectively the power to expropriate land without compensation.

The intention of the 2000 FTLRP was to reallocate Zimbabwe's land more equitably. The government seized massive amounts of arable land from white Zimbabwean farmers, cancelled their title deeds, subdivided the pre-existing farms, and settled black Zimbabweans on the land. More than 14 million hectares were expropriated and distributed among more than 230,000 households (Pazvakavambwa, 2007).

The subdivision of commercial farms and settling of new farmers substantially reduced agricultural output. Between 2000 and 2008 production of maize dropped 76% (Mutenyo, 2011). Agricultural exports declined by 53% during the same period (AMID, 2012). Zimbabwe, which used to be a net food exporter to neighboring countries, turned into a country with severe food shortages (Ncube, 2015), and a net importer, importing more than 20% of its food commodities from South Africa.

The government of Zimbabwe has acknowledged that poorly conceived support policies and inadequate funding to the resettlement process, as well as inadequate skills among the newly resettled farmers as some of the main reasons for the decline in the country's agricultural production (AMID, 2012).

Average maize yields in Zimbabwe

### Agriculture indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contribution of agriculture to GDP</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>MAMID</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution to exports</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>MAMID</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution to employment</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>LFCLS</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers who are small-scale</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture land under irrigation</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>MAMID</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers accessing improved seeds</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>MAMID</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Zimbabwe used to be one of the biggest fertilizer producers in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2009, Zimbabwe produced 100% of sub-Saharan ammonium nitrate and 28% of nitrogen, phosphorous, potassium, or NPK. However, in recent times production has sharply decline due to the economic crisis.
There are approximately 240,000 commercial farmers in Zimbabwe, including 300 large-scale farmers with farms averaging 2,200 hectares in size. The number of non-commercial farmers can be estimated in at least two million.

The exceptionally poor performance of Zimbabwe’s maize sector implies the existence of (...) policies and institutions that work against progress (...) and diminishing agricultural performance relative to other countries’.

Maize Production and Marketing in Zimbabwe USAID (2016)

Following a poor 2014-15 harvest season, severe drought in 2015-16 has further undermined the agricultural sector (see box bellow on El Niño).

The small-scale farmers

Small-scale agriculture is the mainstay of the Zimbabwe economy, as it has the largest share of national populations, yields, and agricultural land. 98% of farmers are small-scale farmers, working 73% of agricultural land (FAO, 2012). Small scale farmers are responsible of 80% of the maize production (CAPF, 2012).

One of Zimbabwe’s main challenges is that the rural economy, where most of the poor live is not integrated into the main-stream of economic activity (WB, 2016). Small-scale farming is characterized by low productivity, limited access to markets and lack of competitiveness, limited extension services, frequent adverse weather and poor access to finance and inputs.

Only 7% of small-scale farm areas are under irrigation. 80% of do not have access to saving and lending schemes (Mutambara, 2016). Post-harvest difficulties lead to significant food losses: 60% of rural households store crops in unimproved facilities (ZimVAC, 2013).

Gender context

Background

Women and girls account for 52% of the population of Zimbabwe. The fertility rate is 3.8 children per woman, and average household size is 4.2.

Zimbabwe rates 56 out of 144 countries in the 2016 Global Gender Gap Report. Gender inequalities have decreased in the last decade, but remain significant. The share of women in governmental decision making positions is low: only 20% of cabinet ministers and 25% directors are women. According to a 2014 study from CARE’s project ENSURE, in some rural districts of Zimbabwe up to 90% of local decision making positions are dominated by men (ENSURE, 2014).

Girls and agricultural labour

The importance of girls to agricultural labor within rural Zimbabwe is difficult to quantify as they take over many roles which include cooking, cleaning, caring for children, sick and elderly, fetching water, digging, weeding and harvesting. They are however rarely involved in marketing or decision making activities’.

An investigation into the marginalization of adolescent girls Manase Kudzai Chiweshe 2014

Because many men migrate to towns and neighbouring countries to find work, 42.6% of agricultural households are headed by women
(FAO, 2011). Women constitute 60% of the agricultural workforce, but own only 10% of commercial farms (USAID, 2012). Women have difficulties in accessing credit, equipment and machinery essential for production, technical knowledge and expertise to produce high quality products and markets. Information about markets and strategies to penetrate those markets on a sustainable basis is a big challenge for women. (CAPF, 2012).

**International gender commitments**

Zimbabwe has made commitments towards the promotion of gender equality and women empowerment by ratifying and signing international and regional conventions and declarations on gender, including the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, that seeks to address inequalities between men and women in the sharing of power and decision making at all levels; the 1997 SADC Declaration on Gender and Development which sets a minimum target of 30% representation by women in leadership positions; the 2003 African Women's Protocol and the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, which endeavor that, by 2015, at least 50% of decision-making positions in the public and private sectors should be held by women and call on States to ensure access to productive resources including property and land for women and men in an equitable manner.

**Main national gender policies**

In many ways, the Zimbabwean government has made considerable strides in developing a normative framework to advance women’s status and rights as citizen’s.

SADC
Gender Protocol 2012 Barometer

Various legislative reforms and policy frameworks have been introduced in Zimbabwe as part of the national drive towards women’s empowerment and gender equality.

The 1980 Constitution of Zimbabwe subjugated women’s rights and gender equality to traditional norms. This was modified by the **2013 Constitution**, which promotes gender mainstreaming, calling the State to ensure that both genders are equally represented in all institutions and agencies of government at every level.

The country has in place a **National Gender Policy, 2013-2017**, whose overall goal is to eradicate gender discrimination and inequalities in all spheres of life and development.

In 2011 the Government developed **the 2011 Framework for Broad-based Economic Empowerment for Women and Communities** to guide recommended actions to increase by women’s participation in all sectors of the economy to 50%. The framework makes several important recommendations for actions in terms of access to capital, market access, resources, technology, and training. The Framework specifically identifies actions to support the growth and performance of woman-owned SMEs, including market linkages and training.

**Gender institutional set-up**

The creation in 2005 of the **Ministry of Women Affairs, Gender and Community Development (MoWAGCD)** as a national entity responsible to spearhead gender mainstreaming effort can be considered a positive development towards the empowerment of rural women. However, the capacity of the MoWAGCD officers at provincial and district level to implement gender mainstreaming effectively remains limited. MWAGCD, is severely underfunded. The budget for 2016 is only to 0.3 % of the government’s total budget, and more than 90% covers costs for personnel, with very limited funding for program implementation (USAID, 2016).

The establishment of Gender Focal Points in all line ministries supported by the MoWAGCD though capacity building programs, has been another positive output of the mainstreaming gender policy. However, ‘no accountability mechanism has been
established to determine their effectiveness (Matonhodze, 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nutrition indicators</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% people undernourished</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stunting, children under 5 yrs.</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>MICS</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasting, children under 5 yrs.</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>MICS</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underweight children under 5 yrs.</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>MICS</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaemia women reproductive age</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>DZHS</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclus. breastfeeding till 6 months</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>DZHS</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vit. A supplementation coverage</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Food security and nutrition context**

Zimbabwe is considered a food-deficit country, ranked 156 out of 187 developing countries on the Global Hunger Index, which measures progress and failure in the global fight against hunger.

5 million people in Zimbabwe are undernourished, a figure that has remained almost constant since the 2000s. However, the population has increased significantly, so the proportion of the undernourished in the total population has decreased: in 2015, 33.4% of Zimbabweans were undernourished, compared to 42.7% in 1990. This is a 22% reduction in 25 years, well below the Millennium Development Goals target of halving hunger during the said period.

Erratic rainfall, driven by climate change causes peaks in food insecurity every four to five years. The recent El Niño event brought significantly increased stress on production and caused widespread crop failures, thereby exacerbating food insecurity. By January 2017 more than 4 million people was considered foods insecure. (WFP, 2017). (see box below).

The food security situation has remained fragile and exposed to wide range of recurrent shocks over the years. As already mentioned, production and productivity of maize grain has been on decline. Household access to food is constrained by poverty, declining remittances, low productivity, inadequate employment opportunities, high food prices and recurrent weather shocks, and by economic instability, low growth, deflation and lack of liquidity. Food insecurity mainly affects southern and western border areas, where land is less productive.
Many households in the rural areas are net food buyers: they do not produce enough food to meet their needs through to the next harvest season, purchasing up to 65% of their maize from markets. Food purchases make up 56% of household expenses (ZimVAC, 2015).

Zimbabwe has highly volatile food prices, which can increase by more than 30-40% in a season (WFP, 2017). Price instability, especially during the lean season, compromises households’ ability to access adequate food year-round through markets. In the south, where due to lower productivity people rely more on markets for food, where prices can be 45% higher than elsewhere during lean seasons (FAO, 2012).

The most prominent nutrition challenge in Zimbabwe is stunting (UN, 2016). According to the 2014 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS), prevalence of stunting in children under five years of age is 27.6%. Since mid-2000s, the prevalence of stunting in children has been diminishing, but at a very slow path.

One in every ten children is underweight, a percentage which has almost not changed in the last 15 years. Children in rural areas are more undernourished than those in urban areas (ZDHS, 2010).

According to UNICEF, child nutrition in Zimbabwe is affected by a mix of factors, including inadequate knowledge among mothers and caregivers of appropriate and healthy diets, especially in the first 1,000 days of life; a weak value chain for nutrient-dense foods; poor coordination and inadequate resources for high-impact nutrition interventions; and inadequate knowledge and practices with regard to WASH and other pro-health measures, such as immunization, family planning and malaria control (UNICEF, 2016).

The price of maize has risen dramatically. Increasing prices and diminishing purchasing power have limited vulnerable farmers’ capacity to access inputs and services. More than 4 million people affected by drought are requiring emergency food and nutrition assistance (FAO Food Security Outlook, 2017).

### Prevalence of stunting and underweight (under 5 yrs.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Stunting</th>
<th>Underweight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2014/16 El Niño

Zimbabwe has been hard-hit by the effects of El Niño, experiencing a very severe drought following below average rainfall since the 2014/2015 season. 2015/2016 was the driest in the last 35 years. The drought has significantly reduced crop production and household access to food in dozens of districts, resulting in severe food insecurity and malnutrition.

Food production has halved: Zimbabwe’s maize deficit for the 2016/17 season has been estimated is estimated at 1.6 million MT, with a maize production for the 2015/16 agricultural season amounting to 50% of the five-year average.

The price of maize has risen dramatically. Increasing prices and diminishing purchasing power have limited vulnerable farmers’ capacity to access inputs and services. More than 4 million people affected by drought are requiring emergency food and nutrition assistance (FAO Food Security Outlook, 2017).
Micronutrient deficiencies are prevalent, including a 70% prevalence of anemia among children under two, largely driven by poor dietary diversity. Vitamin A deficiency affects 19% of under-fives. About 7,700 children and mothers are dying every year due to micronutrient deficiency (NSS, 2015).

Only 17% of Zimbabwean children between the ages of 6 and 23 months receive the recommended minimum acceptable diet for adequate nutrition (WFP, 2016). 48% of children less than 6 months are exclusively breastfed (DZHS, 2015). It has been estimated that cognitive growth losses in children will debilitate about 900,000 of the current Zimbabwean population of under-fives resulting in future productivity deficits equivalent to US$16 million in annual GDP (FAO 2016).

Climate change

‘Increasing climate pressures will inevitably lead to rising food prices weighing heavily on household and national budgets. Disadvantaged social groups will therefore be condemned deeper into hunger and malnutrition’.

National Climate Change Response Strategy Zimbabwe, 2014

Household-level vulnerability in Zimbabwe is influenced, amongst other factors, by inequitable land distribution, low education, poor infrastructure, gender inequality, dependence on climate-sensitive resources, poor health status, and HIV/ AIDS (Muzari, 2014). Zimbabwe has one of the most variable rainfall patterns in the world in terms of distribution across time and space, although dry spells and droughts are part of a normal cycle (Manjengwa, 2014). Climate change (CC), is already occurring in Zimbabwe. The last 30 years have seen the warmest surface temperature, reduced rainfall and more frequent droughts (GEF, 2013). Such changes have been impacting the primarily agro-based economy (RZ, 2013) undermining past development gains.

In the coming decades Zimbabwe will likely experience a decrease in total amount of rainfall, more frequent and longer mid-season dry periods, erratic rainfall distribution across the country and more droughts and floods that may recur in successive years (Brazier, 2015). These impacts are expected to increase the occurrence of crop failures, pests, crop disease, and the degradation of land and water resources (RZ, 2012), exacerbating the harmful effects of poor land-use practices, notably deforestation, soil degradation and water pollution. Areas regarded ‘excellent’ for maize will decrease from the current 75% to 55% by 2080 under the worst-case scenario (RZ, 2014). Future scenarios predict that 60% of farming households will be exposed to greater vulnerability (ICRISAT, 2016).

Most of the small-scale farmers in Zimbabwe lack adequate knowledge and training on CC adaptation and sustainable environmental practices, which further increases vulnerability and risk to agriculture and the environment. (Green Impact, 2016).
Agriculture and food security policy framework

International commitments

Zimbabwe has adopted the UN 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), committing to eradicate hunger by 2030.

The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) was initiated in 2003 in Maputo, as a continent-wide African Union initiative. Zimbabwe, as well as the other countries signing the CAADP compact adopted the core principles of pursuing an average of 6% annual agricultural sector growth at country level and allocating 10% of the national budget to agricultural development. Zimbabwe signed the CAADP Compact in 2013. These commitments were reinvigorated in 2014 in the Malabo Declaration, that introduced a further set of targets for the African Agriculture for 2025 and which Zimbabwe has also signed.

As member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Zimbabwe is also signatory of the Regional Agricultural Policy (RAP), aimed at harmonizing the growth and development of agriculture and promotion marketing and trade among SADC member States.

Zimbabwe has not explicitly yet indicated if it will subscribe the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Land Tenure, which were endorsed by the Committee on World Food Security in 2012. The guidelines define several principles including the need to ensure that investments in agriculture lands are responsible.

Main national policies

The 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe states that ‘the State must (...) encourage people to grow and store adequate food; secure the establishment of adequate food reserves and encourage and promote adequate and proper nutrition through mass education and other appropriate means’.

One of the four pillars of the ZimASSET is food and nutrition security, ‘particularly through crop and livestock production and marketing, infrastructure development, environmental management, protection and conservation, nutrition and policy and legislation’. Agriculture is also one of the seven pillars of the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2016-2018.

Zimbabwe’s Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Framework 2012-2032 (CAFP) is the main long-term policy document of Zimbabwe’s agriculture sector. CAFP main vision is to achieve “a prosperous, diverse and competitive agriculture sector, ensuring food and nutrition security significantly contributing to national development”.

The CAFP recognizes the role of women in agriculture and the challenges they face in the sector. The Framework also foresees several gender-targeted activities, such as additional resources for women’s economic empowerment in the sector, but does not explicitly mention gender integration into the overall work of the ministry.

CAFP objectives

| Assure household food and nutrition security |
| Ensure agricultural resource base maintained |
| Generate income and employment |
| Increase agriculture’s contribution to GDP |
| Provision of home-grown agric raw materials |
| Expand contribution to balance of payments |

The Zimbabwe Agriculture Investment Plan (ZAIP) 2013-218, is the middle-term translation of the CAFP, and is premised on the principles of the CAADP that are meant to enhance the agriculture sector through the facilitation of sustainable increase in production, productivity and competitiveness.

ZAIP selected indicators. By 2016...

| 50% of the farmers obtained land title deeds |
| 50% land under sustainable land management |
| 175,000 hectares under irrigation |
| 50% of farmers’ access to market infrastructure |
| 50% of farmers have access to finance |
| 100% farmers cover by input voucher system |
As we will see later when analysing policy implementation in specific sub-sectors, virtually none of these indicators for 2016 have been fulfilled.

Agriculture and/or food security are not mentioned even once in the National Gender Policy. The problems of rural women to access land, inputs, financial services and other agricultural assets are not address in this Policy.

In 2013 Zimbabwe approved its Food and Nutrition Security Policy (FNSP), a very comprehensive and well-articulated framework with strong focus on the active participation of the local communities and the right for food. Given that most of the content of this policy refers to nutrition, we will analyze it later, in the Nutrition chapter of this analysis.

**Institutional setup**

The Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanization and Irrigation Development (MAMID) is the arm of the Government of Zimbabwe mandated to provide technical, extension, advisory, regulatory, and administrative services to the agricultural sector to achieve food security and economic development. MAMID is comprised of nine departments, including the Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services; Agricultural Economics and Markets; and the Research and Specialist Services.

As many other public institutions in Zimbabwe, MAMID is not very efficient, and is heavily overstaffed (USAID, 2015). Officially, the Ministry has more than 19,000 employees, although it maybe the case that a certain portion of them may be ‘ghost-workers’ (employees in the payroll but who are not really working), which is a frequent practice in Zimbabwean public administration. In July 2016, the government announced that some 8,000 employees of the Ministry would be dismissed to reduce the salaries’ burden. This process is now ongoing.

Eleven parastatals and state enterprises are directly under MAMID oversight, playing a pivotal role in assisting this ministry, such as the Agricultural Development Bank (Agribank), the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority, the Agricultural Research Council, and the Agricultural Marketing Authority. (USAID, 2016). In principle, he parastatals enjoy greater operational autonomy than the Ministry departments. Historically the parastatals have been often playing a very political role, as they were often used by the government as an executive arm to gain popular support (DBSA, 2012). The 2016 Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper calls for overhauling these parastatals through privatization, joint ventures and commercialization.

The land reform agenda is driven by the Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement, while irrigation and sustainable-related topics, as well as climate change and forestry, are partially under the Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate.

The agriculture Sector Inter-Ministerial Committee (ASIMC) is chaired by MAMID, and includes, besides the above-mentioned ministries, also the ministries of Finance, of Economic Planning, of Investment Promotion and of Industry and Commerce. ASIMIC is the ultimate body responsible to oversee the implementation of the ZAIP.

**Donor coordination framework**

In 2007, to deal with the significant amount of aid flowing into Zimbabwe, the UN agencies formed different thematic clusters, most of which are still operational, bringing together the main International Organizations, bilateral donors and international NGOs providing assistance in each sector. An Emergency Agriculture and Food Security Sector Working Group, led by FAO and WFP brings together all the major international NGOs (including CARE) and donors working on food aid.
Agriculture and food security knowledge platforms in Zimbabwe

In Zimbabwe, FNS assessments are coordinated by a multi-stakeholder committee known as the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC). ZimVAC is a consortium of Government, UN agencies and NGOs, including CARE. These stakeholders contribute towards annual and other assessments in various capacities such as financial, personnel and technical skills. The mandate of ZimVAC is to generate information on vulnerability to food insecurity and other socio-economic factors. ZimVAC undertakes regular food and nutrition assessments, analyses and research and supports and builds national capacity for FNS, including at sub-national levels.

The Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN) was established in Zimbabwe in 2003, by the initiative of the ministries of Agriculture and the agronomy faculties of the Southern African region. FANRPAN has maintained its registration in Zimbabwe, it now has its regional secretariat office to Pretoria, South Africa where it operates as a fully-fledged international office. FANRPAN works mainly on promoting agricultural policies in order to reduce poverty and enhance food security.

The Agronomy Research Institute of Zimbabwe is one of the Ministry's parastatals, has the mandate to provide research-based technologies and technical information for supporting enhanced agricultural productivity, but currently lacks financial and technical means. There is also a Horticultural Research Center based in Marondera.

Zimbabwe has various high education institutions on agriculture, including the Faculty of Agriculture of the University of Harare, the Esigodoni Agricultural College, the Gwebi Agricultural College and the Faculty of Agriculture and Natural Resources of the African University, based in Mutare, most of which only undertake low-scale research and knowledge sharing activities.

Established more than 100 hundred years ago, the Zimbabwe Agricultural Society (ZAS) is a member-based organization which has a strong focus on large agribusiness, which manages a variety of exhibitions and expos throughout the year usually in partnerships with Associations and Farmers Unions. It also organizes the Annual National Agribusiness Conference (ANAC)

The Shashe Agroecology School is part of the La Via Campesina’s network of over 40 Agroecology schools around the world, and promotes the exchange of experiences through horizontal learning, to disseminate agro-ecological and sustainable peasant agriculture practices.

Knowledge Transfer Africa (KTA) is a Zimbabwe-based consulting organization focusing on helping organizations create environments in which knowledge can be captured, which a strong focus on agriculture.

There are also a Market Linkage Working Group; a Livestock Working Group and a Conservation Agriculture Working Group. Although the government takes part in the different working groups, it does not contribute very effectively (DBSA, 2012).

Budgetary commitments & expenditure

Budget requirements

The CAPF estimates its total budgetary requirements for the period 2012 to 2032 in 45 US$ Billion, although specific annual allocations were only indicated for the period 2012 to 2015 (ranging between 2 and 2.6 US$ Billion per year). The ZAIP recognizes that this substantial amounts can only be achieved through joint efforts between the Government, the private sector and the donors.

CAPF budgetary requirements are structured by programs. Roughly 60% of the budget is foreseen for crop specific programs (mainly input distribution), while the rest goes to non-
crop-specific support services (extension, irrigation, infrastructure, etc.).

Most of the crop specific programs' budget targets cash-crops, and particularly tobacco, which have less impact in the small-scale farmers, than the stable crops on which small-scale farmers based their food security. Promotion of horticulture, despite its high significance in terms of dietary improvement (and also as highly profitable crop) gets a relatively low proportion of the funding.

**Budget allocation**

The CAPF 2012–2032 states explicitly that 'the Government will allocate a proportion of its budget for agriculture sector development in line with the Maputo Declaration'. The CAFP contemplates dedicating a proportion of the revenue from sale of minerals to support the agricultural sector, and also to allocate to agriculture development the taxes and other chargers on agricultural imports.

In the 2000s, during the early stages of Zimbabwe's land reform, agricultural assistance constituted between 10% and 15% of the state budget, but from 2010 onwards, the country's budget allocation to agriculture has been consistently below the Maputo Declaration of 10%, ranging between 3.8% and 5.3% (USAID, 2016). Meanwhile, budget allocations for infrastructure development and social sectors augmented.

It is not only that the proportion of budget for agriculture is much smaller than the targeted 10%: the overall budget is also squeezing: the slowdown in economic activity in the last years has undermined revenue collection. The national budget is confronted with narrow fiscal space against huge operational and development requirements, which affects all sectors, including agriculture (Nyamazana, 2016). In 2016 agriculture budget was 36% less than in 2012. (Finmark Trust, 2016).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Samples of CAFP budget allocations (2012 to 2032)</th>
<th>Billion US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cash crops</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soybean</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stables</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small grains</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horticulture</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Budget structure**

The majority of Zimbabwe’s agriculture budget (often close to 80% of the total) consists of recurrent expenditure (i.e. running costs), almost two thirds of which consist on staff emoluments. Of the operational costs, the majority goes to the input and maize marketing subsidies, leaving little room for realignment of the budget to address other priority areas of ZAIP disbursements.

**Budget disbursement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agriculture budget performance</th>
<th>Million US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Often there is a huge mismatch between the foreseen budget and what was spent. That was the case, for instance, of 2013 and 2014.

**Agriculture donors**

The major donors in the agriculture sector are the EU, USAID and DFID. They are supporting a variety of programs including access to agro-inputs for small scale farmers (main component), extension services, micro-irrigation systems, provision of livestock services and alternative sources of production and income.

**Gender budgeting**

In Zimbabwe, a government core circular directs government ministries to use gender-responsive budgeting to develop their sector budgets each year in preparation for the country’s national budget, but it is still unclear from the national budget how gender-responsive budgeting is interpreted by the different the ministries, including the Ministry of agriculture (SADC, 2012). Budget allocations for gender are not systematically tracked and no assessments of budgets address how women benefit from government expenditures (Global Partnership, 2016).

A survey conducted by CARE’s project ENSURE in 2014 found out that the local representatives of the MAMID at the local levels had limited appreciation of gender issues (ENSURE, 2014).

**Policy monitoring and evaluation**

The CAFP specifies that the Government will develop ‘an effective monitoring and evaluation framework for agricultural programs’, but the document only includes indicators up to 2015. The ZAIP foresees a sophisticated monitoring and evaluation system, articulated in thematic groups and including a permanent secretariat to track the implementation and to produce reports. However, it seems that the system is not functioning well, and no regular monitoring reports produced so far.

**Transparency and civil society participation in policy making**

From the 80’s till the 2000s, government ministries and agencies did not typically consult with key stakeholders. This has timidly started to change in recent years and the government seems more open to consultation. The ZAIF stated the creation of the Agricultural Sector Steering Committee (ASSC), a consultative and advisory body, comprising representatives from the key ministries, plus representatives from farmer organizations, NGOs, chambers and other civil society groups. This committee should produce ZAIP implementation progress reports and provide input to guide the inter-ministerial committee, but in practice these tasks are not effectively conducted.

‘[In Zimbabwe] Civil Society Organizations do participate in public policy formulation but at times this participation is not meaningful due to the historical relationship of mistrust and suspicion that exists between the state and civil society, lack of requisite skills and capacity to consult its members and constituencies to forge substantive policy positions as well as inadequate access to information’.

The CAFP stipulates that the Government will facilitate the setting up of mechanisms that enhance the participation of farmer organisations in agricultural programs and that it will also improve the capacities of these organisations.

Policy issues on behalf of the farmers are mainly advocated by the two largest farmers’ unions (ZFU and ZCFU, see box bellow), and the Government often consults the draft policy documents with them. However, the role of these organizations in the consultation process is relatively minor compared with other...
stakeholders. For instance, 110 people were consulted in the preparatory process of the ZAIP, out of which, only 21 were representatives of the farmers (all of them from ZFU or ZCFU), while the rest where mainly from official institutions and international NGOs. These two organizations, in practice, represent only the interest of the agribusiness sector, and not that of the small scale farmers: Most of the ZFU and ZCFU office holders are larger farmers, so smallholder issues are neglected in their advocacy agendas (USAID, 2014).

Local small-scale farmers’ organizations (like ZIMSOFF and GAPWZ) are small in membership and do not have a strong influence, if any, on policy outcomes (DBSA, 2012).

### Main CSOs networks and alliances in the FNS sector

**Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU)**

Established in 1980, this is, in principle the umbrella organization of the small-scale farmers’ associations around the country as well as the resettled farmers. Theoretically, it has more than 1 million members, and its financial base comes from government and donor support, especially from the EU. ZFU has a strong focus on conservation agriculture. Although ZFU is favoured by the current government, it lacks the capacity to influence policy and practice. Further, and despite its membership, in practice it really represents more the interests of the large commercial producers instead of the priorities of the small-scale farmers.

**Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers Union (ZCFU)**

This Union brings together the large and middle size farmers. Its membership is linked to politicians and pro-ruling party businessmen, so it has big political influence.

**Zimbabwe Small Organic Farmers Forum (ZIMSOFF)**

ZIMSOFF represents stallholders practicing organic, traditional and agroecological agriculture. ZIMSOFF has some 19,000 small-scale farmers’ farmers’ members.

**General Agricultural Plantation Workers Union (GAPWUZ)**

This peasant movement has been called ‘the only independent union in the face of government-fueled splinter unions’.

In every province and district, there are Agriculture Sector Coordination Committees, with representatives from the relevant ministries, private sector, farmer organizations, NGOs, and district chairpersons. They relate to the Agriculture Sector Steering Committee and shall define the agriculture policy priorities at local level. In practice, they often lack the skills, funding and effective empowerment.

The 2016 formulation of the **Integrated Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper** has been, probably for the first time in Zimbabwe’s policy making, based on broad-based consultations with the civil society, engaging more than 1,500 representatives from all kinds of organizations in workshops conducted not only in Harare, but also indifferent regions.

### Place of the small-scale farmers in the policy priorities

Boosting agriculture productivity and production is the main goal of Zimbabwe’s agricultural policy, while inclusiveness aspects are less predominant in the agenda: The CAFP recognizes the significance of the small-scale farmer towards the country’s food security, however, all the indicators relate to augmenting production (e.g. ‘maize production increased by….’) , with no references to the improvement of the living conditions of the women and small-scale farmers.

ZAIP overall objective is ‘to facilitate sustainable increase in production, productivity and competitiveness’, with the main emphasis ‘on commodities that have the biggest potential for growth and impact’, while food security is, only a secondary goal: ‘In addition, ZAIP shall also target the food insecure population’.  

26
Impact of the policy implementation on the small-scale farmers

Access to land

From the perspective of the small-scale farmers, the land reform conducted in Zimbabwe in the 2000s delivered mixed results. On the one hand, and as already noted, it dramatically reduced the country’s overall agricultural production and productivity. On the other hand, it transferred land to many small-scale holders and brought them new livelihood opportunities.

Although substantial amounts of land were given to political elites most of the land was delivered to small-scale farmers. Less than 5% of the new landowners were connected to the political elites, and they got 32% of the land; while 68% of the land was transferred to ordinary Zimbabweans (CANVAS, 2016). Hence, despite the controversies surrounding the land reform, the program provided many formerly landless people with land and new livelihood portfolios (Mujere, 2011).

According to findings by an independent study, the new small-scale farmers face many challenges, but, the reform created employment and generated new economic linkages in the local economy (Mavedzenge, 2016). Cases of small-scale households whose living conditions have substantially improved as a result of the land reform have been reported in the tobacco, maize, livestock and horticulture subsectors. According to an independent survey in Masvingo province on the effects of the land reform process amongst small-scale farmers livelihoods, ‘over a half of all sampled households were either stepping up (accumulation of assets and regular production of crops for sale) or stepping out (successful of-farm diversification)’. These households were accumulating and investing, often employing labour and ratcheting up their farming operations (Scoones, 2011).

In fact, and despite all the many inefficiencies of the land reform, the proportion of undernourished in Zimbabwe, which remained stagnant during the period 1990 to 2000, started to steadily decline in the 2000s, i.e. after the reform was conducted (from 43.7% in 2000 to 33.4% in 2015). Given that, overall most of the other agriculture, food security and nutrition policies applied in the country in the last 20 years, reached limited results (if any at all). However, the potential positive impact that the land redistribution policy may have had in reducing hunger should not be underestimated. However, it seems also clear that a more efficient, targeted and transparent implementation would have reached more significant impacts.

It has been argued that the land reform had the potential to ensure radical changes to women’s ownership of land as people settled on formerly white owned farms with little patriarchal claims’ (Chiweshe, 2014). Yet, the reform in Zimbabwe mainly privileged men as primary recipients of resettlement land: overall, only 11% of the redistributed land went to women in their own right (IPRSP, 2016), this despite the fact the policy goal when the reform was conducted was a women’s quota of 40% of land allocations.

The involvement of traditional authorities in the land reform process continues to marginalize women, how accessed less land than men (Goebel 2005).

Areas formerly owned by white Zimbabweans and re-distributed to land-less black Zimbabweans.

© Juan Echanove, 2016

Environmental downsides of the land reform have been also identified, particularly in the tobacco sector, where the destruction of local forests for curing wood has been substantial (Mavedzenge, 2016).
Women access to land in customary law: The Magaya vs. Magaya case

In Zimbabwe, cultural norms and customary practices continue to take precedence over the constitutional equality provision on land (SADC, 2012). Most women in rural areas have secondary land-use rights through their husbands and farms are taken over by sons when the male head of the household dies (Chiweshe, 2014).

This male-to-son inheritance was legally validated by the 1999 Magaya vs. Magaya case of 1999, where the Supreme Court ruled that it was not discriminatory ‘for a court to rule that an African woman had no right to inherit property from her late father’ (Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, 1999).

The Law Commission of Zimbabwe is now working with other stakeholders to ensure that all laws are harmonized with the provisions of the Constitution and to eliminate these contradictions (SADC, 2016).

Ownership of the settled lands remains contested to this day, as most resettled farmers lack proper title deeds and are not able to use their land as collateral to obtain credit from financial institutions (EU, 2013). Additional unresolved issues include weak land transfer mechanisms and support institutions, inconsistent procedures of land administration, and unclear compensation models for current and future displaced farmers. One of the government’s targets for 2016 was the establishment of the Land Commission in charge of regulating and managing land acquisition and settlement. A Land Commission Bill has already been drafted for submission to the Cabinet (FAO, 2016). The government is also planning to develop a comprehensive Land Policy, to resolve all outstanding land issues, including multiple land ownership and security of tenure.

Land property issues

On top of the land capture by the politically privileged during the reform process in the 2000s, Zimbabwe has also seen, in the last few years, some large-scale Zimbabwean companies with alleged close ties to the government elites are now investing in land, forcing farmers previously resettled to be displaced, in order to pave way for the new business. There are no reliable data on the scale of the issue, but there is substantial anecdotic evidence of tensions between the affected farmers and the new investors who come with the backing of the government.

The government officials have justified these large-scale investment projects on the basis that they create employment and bring direct foreign investment, but there have been strong allegations of corruption related to this land deals.

As described on a research on the Nuanetsi Ranch Bio-Diesel land grabbing project in Mwenezi District, ‘by getting the support of political elites, the owners of the project managed to push ahead with their projects despite resistance from small holder farmers already settled on the land’ (Mujere, 2011). In another study, traditional chiefs appeared to be colluding with the investor in the acquisition process and in delaying compensation payment (Mutondoro, 2016). A third study, this time in Chisumbanje and Chinyamukwakwa areas, by Transparency International, found that because of the land deal between a private company and the Government parastatal company ARDA, the community were severely affected as they lost their access to land (Transparency International, 2013).

The displacements of small-scale settlers caused by the land grabbing processes have severely affected women. A study conducted with the communities displaced by the Chigwizi biofuel project saw that most women...
were more vulnerable to the land displacement than men as they lack a strong voice for objecting and because ‘cultural norms emphasize total subjugation to male authority in land and family law affairs’ (Mutopo, 2012).

Another study, this time in Chipinge district has highlighted how women’s access and ownership of land remain impeded by land corruption and how grabbing of land has impacted women negatively.

### Chinese agriculture investments

**Some of the Zimbabwean agricultural lands that were previously owned by white farmers and then taken over by political elites or small scale farmers during the land reform, are now being rented out to Chinese investors. Certain public Chinese companies, have become dominant players in providing business opportunities for resettled farmers, especially in the tobacco sector (Chidzonga, 2016).**

However, the economic sustainability of these investments is not yet totally clear. A major concern raised by Chinese companies surveyed in a 2015 study was the high cost of agricultural production in Zimbabwe, which may hamper the turnover of the investments (Lixia, 2015).

### Access to inputs

The **Input Support Program (ISSP)** is a subsidy scheme designed to enable small-scale farmers to access the inputs at affordable prices. The Government covers, with budgetary resources, 50% of the cost of fertilizer and maize seeds. The seed and fertilizer companies supplying the inputs are paid the full market price. The total support via this program has been increasing from US$60 million in 2010 to US$150 million in 2016, despite the overall reduction in agriculture funding.

Recently, these co-funded input distributions have been minimized in favor of the use of subsidized electronic vouchers. The e-vouchers system gives farmers the choice of the inputs they need, but they are also required to contribute to the voucher’s cost.

The program is now reaching 600,000 households, which is around one third of the total number of farming families in Zimbabwe, despite ZAIP commitment that by 2016 the coverage should be 100%.

An independent survey in Hurungwe district conducted in 2015 identified that the majority of the women do not have access to the fertilizers and improved seeds distributed by the Government (Mutanama, 2015).

> 'The government and non-governmental organizations bring some inputs like seed maize and fertilizers to assist us. The biggest challenge is that these are all taken by men. As women, we are not considered when it comes to the inputs'.

**Woman farmer**

**Hurungwe district**

**N. Mutanana, 2015**

The efficiency of the IPS is controversial: despite this substantial provision of fertilizers and high-yields maize varieties, production and productivity, has continued declining (Willems, 2014). As stated in a study on the maize sector in Zimbabwe conducted recently by USAID, ‘it can be concluded that input subsidies have failed to induce any meaningful gains in maize production’ (Mutambara, 2016).

Other studies have noted various weaknesses in the administration of the input subsidies, such as delays in distribution of inputs and inadequacy of input packages, that rendered the program less effective. The government’s involvement in input distribution through the Grain Marketing Board has crowded out private dealer networks: The input subsidy scheme forced many agro-dealers out of business, as it is no longer viable or profitable to serve the rural market (USAID, 2014).

According to Oxfam, the IPS, as well as the regulations in place, are skewed in favor of the commercial seed system and against the traditional seed banks kept by the small-scale farmers. The **Plant Breeders Rights Act**
and the Seed Act restrict the ability of small-scale farmers to sell and exchange their own seed – suffocating local markets, even though these seeds would not otherwise be available, as seed companies are generally not interested in selling non-maize, non-hybrid crops and varieties (Oxfam, 2016).

**Pro-fertilize industry policies**

The fertilizer and chemical industry was identified by government as one of four priority pillars in the Industrial Development plan for 2012–2016. To support domestic fertilizer production, the government put forward a zero tariff for raw material imports for fertilizer production, while tariffs were imposed on finished products (ACB, 2016).

To sell their own seed beyond a limited radius, farmers must go through a complicated and expensive registration and certification process – during which they have to prove that the variety in question is novel and distinct, uniform and true to type, and stable over a number of seasons (Progressio, 2009). This requirement was developed for large-scale farming, but is a major barrier for small-scale farmers.

**Access to agriculture equipment: The ‘Command agriculture’ program**

It has been said that sometimes Zimbabweans farmers 'attach more sentimental value to having a tractor as a physical asset (even mostly parked) wherein it is a symbol of agricultural modernity; a contrast to its designed purpose of increasing agricultural productivity' (Mutenga, 2014). As in other parts of the world, owning a tractor in Zimbabwe is also a symbol of status. This (plus perhaps vested interests by State officials) may explain why the distribution of tractors and other farm equipment has been always high in the agricultural policies of the country (Mukwereza, 2013).

Despite massive failures of this type of programs in the past, due to lack of extension and training, inadequacy of the equipment and corruption (see box below on the Fran Mechanization Scheme) provision of farming equipment remains a popular policy tool. In 2015 the Government secured a US$98.6 million loan from Brazil, which targeted 21,000 small-scale farmers access to agriculture machinery and equipment. It is not clear if any training on the proper use and maintenance of the machinery and equipment among beneficiaries will be undertaken. Concerns have been also raised on the appropriateness of the sizes of equipment to be supplied, as well as with the high risk of cronyism in the selection of beneficiaries, and the lack of gender integration as it happened in previous similar programs.

The latest (and much bigger) reincarnation of this type of initiatives is the so-called Command Agriculture, a program aimed at ensuring food self-sufficiency that was introduced at the start of the 2016 - 2017 farming season following the drought of the previous season. Under the program, 2,000 large size farmers (minimum of 200 hectares each), are receiving irrigation and mechanized equipment (imported from Brazil, Belarus, Russia and India) and inputs. Each of the farmers is required to produce at least 1,000 tons of maize and give five tons per hectare to government as repayment. Farmers can retain any surplus above 1,000 tons. Each farmer, on average, will get inputs for the value of US$ 250,000, so the program total cost is US$ 500 million (Chenga, 2016). The program is not funded with budgetary resources: funding has been borrowed by the Government from private banks.

However, as per independent estimations, the program funding is insufficient to reach the foreseen results, as the combined costs of installing irrigation schemes, equipment costs and inputs is great deal more than the allocated US$1,250 per hectare. (Freeth, 2016). The Zimbabwean press doubt that the interest on the program is driven by the desire to change the country’s food security situation (NewsDay, 2017), and ‘there are fears the scheme could have been over-subscribed by opportunists bent of making a quick buck’ (Chenga, 2016); as said, Zimbabwe has a serious record of misappropriation by the elites of State-sponsored agriculture mechanization programs (see box above).
The failure of the Farm Mechanization scheme

‘In 2007 the Government of Zimbabwe launched the Farm Mechanization Scheme (...) ostensibly to help the country’s newly-resettled farmers with farm implements on a rent-to-buy basis.

The reality was that a significant number of the senior political elite (...) gave themselves irrigation schemes, brand new tractors, combine harvesters and implements that genuine farmers would have given their eye teeth to have had. (…)

When it came to the politicians paying back the debt, which by this stage had ballooned to US$1.3 billion, they simply voted in parliament to write off what they each owed, passing on the debt for their misadventures to the people’.

Ben Freeth
Command Agriculture the latest “plan” to resolve Zimbabwe’s hunger problem
The Zimbabwean, 22/8/2016

In any case, what is indisputable is that the Command Agriculture program, the largest in the sector right now, is not targeting the small-scale farmers, which are not only the clear majority of the farmers, but also the ones in most need of support and whose food security situation is more fragile.

The mechanization programs have exacerbated gender inequity. Most of these programs lack appropriate processing equipment for women, and the distribution of the new equipment has sometimes shifted power from women to men. For example, while women have traditionally controlled household processing tools such as grinding stones and pestles that were used to produce peanut butter and mealie-meal, as soon as mechanization came in, the ownership of grinding mills, oil expressing machines and others shift to men (Knowledge Transfer Africa, 2017).

Extension services

Agricultural Education, training and extension are predominant topics in the CAFP, which says that ‘the Government will promote an active and demand driven agricultural education and farmer training system’, as well as to promote synergies among education, research and extension delivery services, via enhancing the capacities of the State-run extension system and also by promoting private sector participation’. The CAFP also foresees the increase in the budgetary allocation to extension services.

However, these good intentions are not really materializing in substantial improvements; although the land reform program augmented massively the number of small-scale farmers many of whom have a huge need of agricultural training due to limited previous experience in the sector) there has been a sharp decline of the public extension system owing to a combination of financial cutbacks and loss of staff (Mushunje 2005).

This has also been aggravated by the freezing of all posts at district level since 2004. Now an extension worker in Zimbabwe covers between 300 to 1,200 farmers; sometimes they have to walk up to 40 km to visit the farmers (SNV, 2015). Thus, most small-scale farmers are not accessing knowledge and new technologies that could improve their production and productivity.

The CAFP 2012-2032 says that ‘the Government will promote the enrolment of women in training to commensurate with their role in the sector’ but no action has been undertaken yet to fulfil this principle.

Research

One of the CAFP objectives is to develop an adequately resourced agricultural research system, by building the institutional and human resource capacity to strengthen research and service delivery, and promote partnerships of national public agricultural research institutions with regional and international research bodies.
Education and research were some of Zimbabwe’s strengths in the past, but public agriculture research has been severely affected by budget cuts. The Agricultural Research Council, and the different universities (which mainly operate on grant money or funded projects) have seen most of their academic personnel leave.

The University of Zimbabwe, for example, once a major hub for research on agricultural economics, has few agricultural economists left.

**Irrigation**

Access to water is a major issue for the small-scale farmers in Zimbabwe. In 2016, during the consultation process for the preparation of the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the farmers identified lack of irrigation as the top priority issue to be addressed in order to improve the food security situation of the country.

The 1998 Water Act and National Water Authority Act were based on Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) principles which should in principle benefit the small-scale farmers and facilitate their access to the water resources.

The land reform, in principle, should have broadened access to water by the small-scale farmers, but in practice irrigation water usage remained low because of the overall depression of the agriculture sector, shortage and high costs of electricity, and lack of capital needed to restore damaged or stolen irrigation equipment (Hove, 2016). The assumption of a self-financing water systems, based on a well-functioning agriculture sector, has not been realized.

The CADP pays a lot of attention to irrigation, calling for the rehabilitation and modernization of the irrigation schemes. In practice, most of the ongoing government irrigation development projects are not progressing well owing to the lack of funding (USAID, 2016). In fact, irrigation still accounts for less than 3% of the total agricultural budget (FAO, 2016), so the TAIF goal of having 175,000 hectares under irrigation by 2016 has been far to be accomplished. IWRM is now back as the official policy, but this re-emergence maybe more rhetorical than real (Manzungu, 2016).

**Price subsidies**

Until 2009, maize and wheat and to some extent, other commodities, could only traded through the Grain Marketing Board (GMB). The GMB was originally designed to maintain a strategic reserve of grains, through restricting trade and controlling a uniform price. No movement of grains was allowed, except for small quantities of farmer-to-farmer sales.

In recent years, the State intervention has been eased. Now the government guarantees floor prices for maize, wheat and small grains but does not control the trade anymore. Allegedly the producer price is based on a cost of production model that gives the farmer a reasonable return to investment. The floor prices paid through GMB cater for undersupply and oversupply situations. The Agricultural Marketing Authority monitors the agricultural market, and registers merchants and processors to take stock of their activities and provide information and advice for appropriate pricing and decision making.

This pricing strategies contributed in the past to create the current huge fiscal burden; they were not only very expensive, but also ineffective in supporting small-scale farmer’s incomes, if not actually counterproductive (USAID, 2014).

A major concern has been the poor targeting, the appropriation of the subsidies by corrupted elites, and the delayed payments by the Board to the farmers. In fact, due to financial constraints, the government regularly failed to provide funds to the GMB on time for the purchase of maize, resulted in farmers preferring to sell maize at a lower price to private buyers and middlemen offering immediate payments (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2015). Furthermore, high market prices through government minimum grain prices, above the competitive benchmarks, implied a cost push for grain processors that is
The Strategic Grain Reserve

Since 2009, the GMB has not maintained adequate levels of the Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR) and has been unable to ensure proper storage of maize, due shortage of funds (FAO, 2016). FAO has urged the Government to revise the functions and scope of the GMB, to scale down its commercial activities and focusing on its core mandate of managing the reserve.

Livestock

In the last years, there has been little willingness by the Government to support the livestock sector, animal disease control, breeding and other sources, a situation that has left a void in veterinary support and has especially affected the small-scale’s. The current regulations discourage local production and local use of raw feed materials (LMAC, 2016).

Access to finance

Cost of agriculture finance in Zimbabwe is very high and credit is generally out of reach for small-scale farmers and mostly confined to large commercial agro-enterprises.

Back in the 90’s, the Agricultural Finance Act established the Agricultural Finance Corporation, (now Agribank) and provided for the establishment of schemes to assist farmers to access financial services. More recently, the TAIF commitment that by 2016, 50% of farmers would have access to finance, has not been fulfilled: 70% of Zimbabweans are still excluded from access to formal financial services, and the proportion amongst rural populations is even higher (CIMMYT, 2015).

‘[In Zimbabwe] officially, there is a policy on agriculture finance, but it is not being implemented’.

Development Bank of Southern Africa 2012

The CAFP ruled that the government should prescribe a certain proportion of lending by commercial banks to the agricultural sector at concessional rates. But this has not happened neither, and the Zimbabwean financial institutions continue to fail to offer financial products compatible the requirements of the poor farmers (Mutambara, 2016). Even the State-sponsored Agribank lacks a specific policy to target small-scale farmers. It only has 40 branches across the country, most of them located in urban centers and a significant part of its portfolio is not even devoted to agriculture. The poor performance of Agribank has also been attributed to the systematic looting of its resources by politicians who defaulted on their loan repayments. The politicians have been also blamed for meddling with its operations. (Mutumbara, 2016).

Insecurity of land tenure severely restricts the availability of bankable collateral by women, as fewer women than men own immovable property that can be used as collateral. There are no State-sponsored programs, and very few concrete policies, to help small-scale women farmers to access funding. One of the few existing initiatives is that the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe has now started requiring banks to establish women entrepreneur desks.

Contract farming

In recent times the government has been promoting contract farming as an alternative model to facilitate access to finance by the farmers. Contract farming arrangements are already widespread in the tobacco sector where over 80 % of the crop is under contract schemes (IRSP, 2016).

Though, these contract schemes are not always positive for the small-scale farmers. Most the farmers operating under the contract farming modality have not even signed contracts with the companies. Some of the contracting companies do not provide a holistic package of inputs, so the resulting yields are often sub-standard, so the farmers have to shoulder the burden of poor returns and poor loan repayments (SNV, 2012).

To face these issues, the 2016 IPRSP foresees that ‘promotion of contract farming activities
will be prioritized, and the focus should be instituting appropriate regulatory environment that protects farmers and the financier in a win-win situation’.

**Agriculture trade policies**

Export and import bans are a recurrent feature of Zimbabwe’s food trade policies. In 2016, to support the domestic industries, the Zimbabwean government placed an importation ban on a list of basic goods, including various foodstuffs (such as canned fruits and vegetables). The import embargo prompted episodes of civil unrest in the borders. Although probably positive for the local food industries, the embargo is reducing free competition and hence, augmenting consumer’s prices.

Also in 2016, Zambia issued a maize export ban except for maize intended for humanitarian assistance (through WFP), and Government to Government export, to limit the scarcity of maize caused by El Niño drought (FAWG, 2016).

**Food security support modalities in 2016**

Food security crisis response

Cash-based aid is rapidly increasing throughout Zimbabwe as tool to deal with the el Niño food security crisis. By the end of 2016, more than 50% of the food insecurity response funding to Zimbabwe was cash-based (Zimbabwe Food Security Cluster, 2016). The determination to provide cash rather than in-kind transfers is made on the basis of regularly updated district-level market and sectoral assessments looking at markets and traders’ capacity and ability to supply typical humanitarian commodities in a timely manner and in sufficient volumes to avoid stock outs and price surges.

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**Funded by the UK and the EU, CARE’s Emergency Cash First Response to Drought-affected communities in the Southern provinces of Zimbabwe**

**program (US$ 24 million) started in 2015 and will last until 2017. The program is addressing the immediate food needs of vulnerable population through the provision of mobile unconditional cash transfers that aim to cover 50% of the household food basket and nutritional needs of men, women, boys and girls.**

The cash transfers increased the proportion of beneficiaries reporting that women had control over household budgets by 11%, although the intervention did not affect women’s involvement in other household decisions. The programme also increased the proportion of women-dominated community networks by nearly 24%, and was associated with a decline in the incidence of domestic violence.

(CARE International in Zimbabwe, no date)

All the agencies implementing cash-based programs (including CARE Zimbabwe have harmonized the transfer value to US$ 7, based on the market assessments. Partners have been working to streamline the commodities and indicators measured in their market assessments. Measures are taken to ensure that the cash provided to beneficiaries is utilized for the purchase of the intended commodities. These include trainings to sensitize beneficiaries on the use and purpose of the cash transfers and post distribution monitoring to ensure the proper use of the transfers. Interviews of beneficiaries of cash distributions conducted by the end of 2016 show that almost all of the cash is spent on few essential food items, plus school fees and, to a minor degree, on various other livelihood items (WFP, 2016, 6).
Main conclusions

- Zimbabwe’s has a coherent agriculture and FS policy framework but is failing to deliver positive results for the small-scale farmers.

- The agricultural institutional setup is weak, and the budgetary allocations are below 10%.

- The policy foresees mechanisms for the participation of the civil society, but in practice only the farmers’ unions controlled by the elites have substantial influence.

- The 2000’s land reform may have had a positive impact in reducing hunger and improving access to land by small-scale farmers, but impacted negatively in terms of production and productivity. Ownership issues of the settled lands remains unresolved. A new wave of land acquisition by large investors is now taking place, undermining small-scale farmers’ rights.

- Most of the agriculture programs (mechanization; access to inputs; extension; access to finance), are not designed to improve the living conditions of the women and small-scale farmers.

- Zimbabwe’s response to the current food crisis caused by el Niño has been largely relying on cash transfers – rather than on in-kind food aid- and, overall, it has been implemented in a targeted and efficient manner.

### Agriculture/FNS policy implementation

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CARE’s SuPER approach to agriculture promotes (1) sustainable agricultural systems grounded in healthy ecosystems, stable, accountable and enduring institutions and sustainable financing; (2) productive, (including profitable, and nutrition-sensitive) intensification interventions that are ‘climate smart’ and increase returns on investment for farmers; (3) equitable outcomes in small-scale agriculture by enabling access to equal rights, opportunities, resources and rewards; taking into account the needs/constraints of women; and (4) supporting access to affordable nutritious food for all and help individuals, families, communities and systems to become resilient. The policies are assessed on the basis of formulation and the quality of their implementation— but not mainly on the basis of the allocation of resources to implement them.

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Green color in the table above means a positive assessment, while red means a negative assessment. The number of  ✔️ and ☒ qualify how positive or negative it is.
Access to land policies in Zimbabwe, and specifically the land reform, has not been sustainable from an institutional (poor land governance) and ecosystems (more deforestation) point of view. It did was not support or enable productive small-scale agriculture policy (production and productivity declined) but it was only partially inclusive: overall it improved the access to land by small-scale farmers, but women benefited less than men. It can be argued that the land beneficiaries have become more resilient and able to cope with shocks compared to when they were landless peasants.

The implementation of the access to inputs policies (i.e. the IPS program) is not grounded in ecosystems protection and the financing is not sustainable either; it has not significantly contributed to enhance yields (so it is not very productive); women are getting less support than men, and only one third of the small-scale farmers are covered (so it is not inclusive) and the access to inputs is not significantly supporting resilience of the small-scale producer.

The policy initiatives to improve access to agricultural equipment have been handled with lack of transparency, so they are not based on an accountable and enduring institutional framework (hence, not sustainable). These policies are not productive: Their impact in augmenting production is very questionable, and they are not climate smart. Mechanization programs mainly target larger farmers, and have a strong male-bias (so they are not inclusive) and they don’t contribute to make the farmers more resilient.

Due to the financial constraints, the extension and research systems in Zimbabwe have been shrinking so, although it promotes sustainable, productive and resilient practices, their impact is rather limited. Though in principle the system is inclusive towards small-scale farmers, the overall number of farmers accessing this service is also diminishing, and women have less access than men.

Community-based water management principles guide irrigation policies in Zimbabwe, so we can in principle talk about a sustainable, productive, inclusive and resilient model; but poor management and financial constrains limit the real impact of this policy.

The price subsidies policies in Zimbabwe are not financially or institutionally sustainable and have contributed to the fiscal burden; they were not productive either: the subsidies are expensive and ineffective in supporting small-scale farmers’ incomes. These subsidies have also failed to be inclusive, because of poor targeting and appropriation of the subsidies by corrupted elites. The model does not promote resilience, making farmers depending on delayed payments.

Zimbabwe is to a large extent neglecting livestock policies such as animal health or veterinary services promotion that could make the sector more sustainable, productive and resilient, and which could benefit the men and women small-scale livestock breeders (inclusive).

The access to agriculture finance model in Zimbabwe is not financially or institutionally sustainable: Elites are often blamed for meddling with the operations. The CAFP ruled that the government should prescribe a certain proportion of lending by commercial banks to the agricultural sector at concessional rates but this is not happening in practice. So the policy is not productive. No measures, are in place to help small-scale women farmers to access funding, so we cannot talk about inclusiveness. This lack of access to finance make the farmers less resilient to shocks.

The promotion in recent years in Zimbabwe of contract farming provides a way to enhance small-scale farmers’ financial sustainability and make them more productive and resilient to shocks. It is also, overall, and inclusive way to integrate the stallholders into the markets. Nevertheless,
there are failures in the implementation due to the poor contractual arrangements in place, a problem that the 2016 IPRSP wants to fix via a better regulatory environment.

The import embargo, which is part of the agriculture trade policy, is probably contributing to augment local production (so it may be productive) reducing free competition and hence, augmenting consumer’s prices, so it cannot be considered inclusive.

The Food security crisis response policy in Zimbabwe is now to provide cash transfers, a model which is more sustainable that in-kind transfers. This policy is also productive, because the cash provided to beneficiaries is utilized for the purchase of the intended commodities; it is inclusive because it is reaching the intended beneficiaries (households facing food insecurity, men and women alike) and resilient, because supports access to affordable nutritious food.
Climate change resilience policies and the small-scale farmers

International commitments

Zimbabwe was one of the first countries to sign and ratify the UNFCCC, doing so already in 1992. It acceded to the Kyoto Protocol in 2009, and in 2016 signed the Paris Agreement, but has not ratified it yet. Zimbabwe has also ratified the Convention on Biodiversity, the Convention to Combat Desertification and the Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forest, conventions that have synergies with efforts to address CC.

Main national policies

Zimbabwe submitted its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the UNFCCC in 2015. The document declares that the country seeks to build resilience to CC, whilst ensuring sustainable development. In the NDC Zimbabwe commits to promoting adapted crop and livestock development and CSA practices through strengthening capacities to generate new forms of empirical knowledge, technologies (including conservation agriculture) and agricultural support services that meet climate challenges; promoting the use of indigenous and scientific knowledge on drought tolerant crop types and varieties and developing frameworks for sustainable intensification and commercialization of agriculture.

The country’s Climate Change Response Strategy (CCRS), adopted in 2014, is built around six sub-sectors that cover water resources, agriculture, gender, youth and vulnerable groups, education and awareness, human settlement and governance. It mainstreams CC through a sectorial approach to ensure that each sector implements adaptation and mitigation actions. In the case of agriculture, the CCRS calls, amongst other priorities, for the development of frameworks for sustainable intensification, strengthen early warning systems on cropping season quality and strengthen the capacity of farmers, extension agencies, and private agro-service providers to take advantage of indigenous and scientific knowledge.

The CCRS includes a National Action Plan for adaptation and mitigation, analysis of strategy enablers (e.g. capacity building, climate change education, communication and awareness), CC governance and implementation framework.

Zimbabwe’ does not have a National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA).

Other sectoral Acts that contrain policies relevant to CC are the National Water Act (1998); the Meteorological Services Act (1990); and the Civil Protection Act (1989).

CC considerations have been incorporated also into some aspects of development and growth planning. The 2016 IPRSP has made CC mitigation and adaptation one of the seven pillars of the country’s socioeconomic development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main CCR activities foreseen in IPRSP</th>
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<tr>
<td>Development of efficient irrigation systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>Breeding of drought tolerant crop varieties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthening early warning systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>Integrate climate change in the planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop adaptation investment frameworks</td>
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However, Zimbabwe’s Comprehensive Agriculture Policy Framework is totally climate-change blind. There is not a single reference across the document to climate smart agriculture (CSA), CC adaptation or, in general, any aspect of the interfaces between CC and agriculture.

Institutional setup

Zimbabwe has in place a sophisticated institutional structure to deal with CC, but there are overlaps in functions and inter-institutional coordination is rather weak.

The Office of the President has the overall responsibility for decisions on CC policy. A
National Task Team on Climate Change has been established under the Directorate of the President’s Office. However, this Task Team does not have a legal mandate to address to coordinate other institutions, and is not embedded in the governance structures (such as the ministries) reaching the community level, so it is unable to implement field activities (Manzungu, 2014).

The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources Management (MENRM) advises the sectoral ministries on CC matters and chairs the National Climate Change Committee, which comprises representatives from line government ministries including environment, agriculture, etc.

The Ministry hosts the Climate Change Office; and is the Secretariat of the Clean Development Mechanism. The Climate Change Office coordinates CC activities across ministries and organisations, including the private sector; and represents the country on CC matters.

The MENRM demonstrated leadership in the formulation of CC policies and incorporated aspects of CSA including the promotion of soil and water management conservation. However, the Ministry of Agriculture lacks the drive to mainstream CSA in its policies. (Manzungu, 2014).

The Environmental Management Agency conducts much of the research and training on CC issues. The Disaster Risk Management Department and, the Department of Civil Protection have responsibilities in disasters’ prevention and response; and the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee conducts the annual Rural Livelihoods Assessments.

The Early Warning Unit of the Meteorological Department is more focus on weather prediction and not so much on risk prediction, and coordination with the Disaster Risk Management Department is not optimal. Its early warning system is outdated. (Manzungu, 2014)

Climate change knowledge platforms in Zimbabwe

In Zimbabwe, there are a few well-established research and knowledge sharing institutions working on CSA and CC.

The Institute of Environmental Studies at the University of Zimbabwe is a major center of CC research in Zimbabwe and had lead role in the development of a National Climate Change Response Policy and Strategy.

The Research Council of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Scientific, Industrial Research and Development Centre provide leadership on research matters in Zimbabwe, and are also engaged on CC research.

The Centre for Applied Social Sciences, which is affiliated to the Social Science and Humanities Faculty of the University of Zimbabwe, also undertakes some CC research.

Zimbabwe Environmental Regional Organization (ZERO) is a regional non-governmental organization based in Harare, funded in 1987. ZERO works on research and knowledge sharing on best practices of tackling CC at both the macro and micro levels. ZERO also works in advocacy, to ensure that poverty alleviation fed into the CC policy-making processes.

The Conservation Agriculture Task Force, brings together governmental institutions and NGOs and works on advocacy and capacity building.

Budgetary commitments & expenditure

Budget requirements

The total estimated cost to implement the Action Plans for Zimbabwe’s CCRS is almost US$ 10 billion. Agriculture, with a cost of US$ 2.3 billion is the sector with the second highest amount required (supersed only by water sector, which would require US$ 3.1 billion).
Budget commitments

Inadequate financial resources is perhaps the main challenge to implement some of the proven CC adaptation interventions. In the IPRSP the Government, committed itself to ensure increased budgetary allocation towards CC related programs but this has not happened yet, with the only exception of some modest resources for conservation agriculture allocated from 2010 to 2014.

Access to climate funds

Zimbabwe has not been able to take real advantage of climate funds: Only 0.7% of the multilateral and bilateral climate funds received by the SADC counties until 2016 went to Zimbabwe. The Government itself attributes this to the lack of capacity and lack of an accredited financial institution (RZ, 2014). The MENRM will need to be accredited to be able to access the Adaptation Fund.

In recent years, the country only got modest project funding, mainly from UN organizations. This includes the Coping with Drought and Climate Change project, funded by the GEF Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) and focused on adaptation mechanisms for small-scale farmers and pastoralists. Strengthening National Capacity for Climate Change is co-financed from UNDP and supports the MEWC to handle various CC related issues. The Scaling up Adaptation in Zimbabwe project focuses on improving rural livelihoods by strengthening integrated planning systems.

The EU and other donors have recently established the Zimbabwe Resilience Building Fund (ZRBF), which is managed by the UNDP. The objective of the ZRBF is to increase the adaptive capacities of households and communities in the face of climate related shocks and stresses. The fund supports multisector actions that can be implemented with the communities at risk. (EU, 2015).

There is not yet an official Zimbabwean institution accredited to access the GCF. UNEPs GCF Readiness Programme is assisting the Ministry of Environment to become accredited (GCF, 2016).

Transparency and participation in policy making

As it is also the case for other policies, local farmers’ groups have little representation in higher-level decision-making processes and planning procedures related to CC. The Second National Communication to the UNFCCC involved stakeholder consultation, and this was also the case for the development of the National Climate Change Response Strategy, but these were the exception, and consultations were confined to Harare.

Participation of the small-scale farmers at the local level policy process usually take place only when there are NGOs engaged in community-based projects (Kudijera, 2014).

REDD+

The NCCRS outlines the main strategies to implement legal frameworks and policies for REDD+ and carbon financing. Strategies include identification of lands subject for carbon management, developing government capacity to handle carbon financing mechanisms and measurement, reporting and verification of carbon stocks, promote livelihood enhancement activities to reduce rural population’s dependency on forests and forest products, and build capacity of local financial institutions to support carbon finance transactions.

The Kariba project, implemented by Carbon Green from 2011 to 2014 was the first of its kind in Zimbabwe (CODE REDD, 2012). The project reduced deforestation and forest degradation through locally-driven activities, including honey production, horticulture promotion and forest fire prevention, achieving Verified Carbon Standard validation and verification. The local communities were engaged in the planning of the project and the benefits where distributed amongst them (Nachmany, 2014).

CARE is a recipient of the first round of the ZRBF and leading a consortium implementing resilience activities in Mwenezi and Chiredzi.
Place of small-scale farmers in the policy framework

The agriculture sector in general, and the small-scale farmers in particular are a main focus of Zimbabwe’s CC resilience policy framework. Many of the CCRS goals and proposed activities (such as the promotion of drought tolerant crop varieties or the strengthening early warning systems) are aimed to augment the resilience of the Zimbabwean small-scale farmers. This strong focus in the rural milieu has prompted the observation that ‘Zimbabwe’s current CC policies ‘are heavily influenced by a strong rural bias’ and that ‘many policymakers and researchers ignore longstanding urbanization trends and continue to overstate the proportion of Zimbabwe’s population living in rural areas’ (IIED, 2013). However, the implementation of these pro-rural policy frameworks is a very different story, as we well see.

Impact of the policy implementation on the small-scale farmers

Due to the extremely limited resources, the lack of institutional capacities, the prevalence of corruption and the limited political commitment to change, the CSA agriculture initiatives contained in the policy frameworks are very seldom implemented. CC participatory vulnerability assessments, CC extension, promotion of drought tolerant crops or conservation agriculture practices are overall more the exception than the rule, and, when initiatives are conducted, usually they are not scaled up.

Participatory vulnerability assessments

Zimbabwe’s Vulnerability Assessment Committee regularly conducts socioeconomic food-security and livelihoods short to medium term vulnerability assessments, including surveys and market research. CC participatory long-term vulnerability assessments, on the contrary, have been only conducted by the Government on pilot basis, in the framework of specific externally-funded projects.

The Climate smart village project

This project, implemented by the MAMID, and funded by UNDP, was aimed to assess CC vulnerability and to develop priority adaptation strategies for smallholder farmers and pastoralists in Chiredzi District (IIED, 2013). Another similar example is the ICRISAT-funded project with the farmers in Nkayi, where the households identified future CC biophysical and socio-economic scenarios using the ‘climate smart village’ approach (ICRISAT, 2016).

Unfortunately, and mainly due to financial constraints, the Government has not been able to scale-up this models to other parts of the country.

Access to weather forecast information

A 2014 joint study by the Southern African Regional Universities Association concluded that in Zimbabwe, ‘there is an urgent need for making meteorological data more available’ (Lotz-Sisitka, 2014).

Extension and CC education

There is a lack of CC education and practical CC approaches among the current agriculture extension workers in Zimbabwe (Kudejira, 2014). To face this situation, the MAMID, with the support of the UNFCCC’s Climate Technology Centre and Network has recently produced a Climate-Smart Agriculture Manual (Green Impact, 2016) A Mainstreaming climate change adaptation in Zimbabwe’s extension system project is also underway, implemented by the MAMID and the University of Reading to train the agricultural extension staff so they can facilitate small-scale farmers to adapt to, and cope better with climate variability (SARUA, 2014).

Promotion of drought tolerant crops

One of the thematic issues incorporated in the Climate Change Response Strategy is to strengthen the capacity of farmers to take
advantage of knowledge on stress tolerant crop varieties. According to the strategy, ‘Zimbabwe will need to put in place frameworks for developing known stress tolerant and under-utilized crops’.

However, some of these varieties are available now in the country, most farmers are not taking advantage of them: The Drought Tolerant Maize for Africa Project, coordinated by CIMMYT released at least 3 open-pollinated varieties and 7 hybrid seeds in Zimbabwe in the last decade or so, but the country has not fully exploited these opportunities, owing to lack of complementary inputs (such as water and human capital) that are needed to realize the full benefits of improved varieties (USAID, 2016). Unfortunately, these varieties are not linked up with the input subsidy programs that the government implements.

A recent study in the Umguza District saw that 86% of the small-scale farmers are informed about drought-resistant crops, thanks to the abundant media material (radio, television, newspapers, pamphlets) targeting this subject. However, 72% of the farmers reject using the technique, mainly due to its labor-intensive nature as well as because of cultural perceptions (Mthokozisi, 2016).

Conservation agriculture

Since the 1980s, many CA techniques were actively promoted and assessed in Zimbabwe, including mulch ripping; clean ripping; no-till, etc. (ACB, 2016). In 2010, the Conservation Agriculture Task Force WUA 2015). developed the 2010–15 Conservation Agriculture Strategy. The Strategy set the target of at least 500,000 farmers practicing CA on at least 250,000 hectares by 2015, with the doubling of yield on CA fields in comparison to conventional fields. The ZAIP, for its side, targeted that by 2016 50% of agriculture land should be under sustainable land management.

The Zimbabwean government allocated funds for CA for the first time during the 2010/2011 agricultural season and these allocations have been confirmed for the subsequent years. The governments’ extension department set up CA demonstrations across the country and a CA module for colleges delivering the Diploma in Agriculture was launched in October 2010. By 2012 over 300,000 farmers were implementing some components of CA, over an area above 100,000 hectares (Marongwe, 2012) However, and despite this partial initial success, with the extension systems badly underfunded and reduced, and the sharp reduction for agriculture funds in the last years, these promising initial results have not been expanded much further.
Gender mainstreaming

The National Gender Policy contains a very concrete set of policy measures to mainstream gender into CC policies, including (1) to build the capacity of state and non-state development agencies in gender mainstreaming in CC; (2) support interventions aimed at increased participation of both females and males in the opportunities for carbon trading and (3) ensure national level strategies for climate induced disaster management and risk reduction and coping mechanisms are gender responsive. Despite these commitments, Zimbabwe has not yet developed a specific framework to comprehensively address gender inequalities in CC adaptation.

The regular vulnerability assessments conducted by the Vulnerability Assessment Committee disaggregate information by gender and, overall, integrate adequately gender considerations.

Interestingly, per a survey conducted in Juru area, 79% of small-scale farmers practicing organic agriculture are female (Svotwa, 2009). Although the study could not determine the reasons behind, it can be speculated that the lower income of women-headed households prevent women, more than men, to access artificial fertilizers and chemicals.

Policy monitoring and evaluation

The CCRS entrusts the Department of Climate Change Management of the Ministry of Environment to undertake regular monitoring reports, and calls for the establishment of a Technical Monitoring Committee to follow up the implementation of the Strategy. The CCRS also states that progress should be reviewed after every 5 years. The CCRS does not foresee any mechanisms for the small-scale farmers (nor any other stakeholders) to take active part in the monitoring and evaluation processes.

Main conclusions

- Zimbabwe has a comprehensive CC policy framework, with a strong focus on augmenting the resilience of the small-scale farmers. However, the institutional set up is weak and cannot efficiently support implementation. Furthermore, and while the CC policy might be focused on small scale food producers, the lack of attention to small scale farmers in the agriculture policies renders this less helpful than it otherwise could be.

- So far, Zimbabwe has had very limited access to global climate funds.

- The lack of financial resources constrains the implementation of the climate adaptation actions.

- There are some examples of participatory vulnerability assessments conducted locally, but they have not been scaled up.

- Many farmers are aware of drought tolerant seeds, but the majority are not using them due to labor constraints and cultural inappropriateness.

- Conservation agriculture practices were strongly promoted by the public extension system in the past but this process has slowed down due to the financial limitations.

- Zimbabwe has not adopted a specific framework to comprehensively address gender inequalities in CC.
Nutrition Policies

International commitments

Zimbabwe endorsed the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), committing to eliminate hunger and malnutrition by 2030. The country is party as well of the World Health Assembly (WHA) Global Nutrition Targets (GNTs), which are to be fulfilled by 2025, and has also signed the 1990 Innocenti Declaration, which set child survival targets related to breastfeeding.

In 2011, Zimbabwe joined the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN), a global movement that unites national leaders, civil society, bilateral and multilateral organizations, donors, businesses and researchers in a collective effort to improve nutrition and bring more coherence to the nutrition sector. Zimbabwe committed, perhaps not very realistically, to reduce stunting by 40% by 2025 at the Nutrition for Growth Event in London in June 2013.

In 2015 the country joined the Zero Hunger Challenge Strategy global initiative, which brings together different stakeholders at the country level to contribute to eliminate food nutrition insecurity. It is anchored on 5 pillars which are: Zero stunted children less than two years, 100% access to adequate food all year round, all food systems are sustainable, 100% increase in smallholder productivity and incomes and zero loss or waste of food. The country has also adopted the International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes, integrating it in the legislation.

Main national policies

Nutrition and food security have been adopted as a multi-sectoral development priority, and this commitment is beginning to achieve results after years of neglect. The political commitment to reduce chronic undernutrition is well articulated through the polices.

"Zimbabwe's food and nutrition situation is a national priority which requires coordinated and multi-sectoral interventions (...) The food and nutrition security structures we have put in place should therefore ensure that various stakeholders are held accountable for their role in achieving the desired outcomes.’

Robert Mugabe
President of Zimbabwe
Launching of the Nutrition Policy, 2013

The Constitution of Zimbabwe recognizes food and nutrition security as a human right.

The Food and Nutrition Security Policy (FNSP), which was launched in 2013, offers a framework for a cohesive multi-sectoral action program with a shared vision and strategy for improved food and nutrition security. Its policy goal is “to promote and ensure adequate food and nutrition security for all people at all times in Zimbabwe, particularly amongst the most vulnerable and in line with our cultural norms and values and the concept of rebuilding and maintaining family dignity”.

The FNSP 2013 is a very coherent and comprehensive document. It reaffirms the right to food and defines the roles and responsibilities of Government and NGOs and private

Conceptual Framework of the FNSP
sector partnerships, as well as communities, in ensuring FNS. It provides ‘a practical way forward towards fulfillment of various global, regional and national policy frameworks’ that Zimbabwe has committed to’, including the MDGs, the SDGs and the CAADP. The Policy envisions that food safety relief, recovery and development should occur simultaneously to mitigate shocks, in risk reduction particularly in the context of CC. The FNSP includes a detailed Policy Implementation Matrix, which was developed through wide consultation and translates the policy rhetoric into explicit strategic objectives, actions, outputs and outcomes.

### FNSP main commitments

- Ensuring nutrition security for all through the implementation of evidence-based interventions that are integrated within a broad public health framework including health services and WASH.
- Ensuring a national integrated FNS information system that provides timely, reliable information.
- Enhancing and strengthening national capacity in FNS primarily through supporting and reinforcing local community capacity and responsibility for food and nutrition security.

The **National Nutrition Strategy 2014–2018 (NNS)**, also launched in 2015, guides the implementation of nutrition policies. NNS priority in the short term is focused on addressing stunting during the first 1,000 days, together with a broader mandate to address malnutrition problems affecting the other age-groups.

The NSS targets are fully aligned with the World Health Assembly nutrition targets.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stunting under 5</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low birth weight</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasting under 5</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women anemia (15/49)</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nutrition sensitive policies, including integration of nutrition on education, social protection, WASH, agriculture and health are not covered in detail in the NSS, which see them as matters for a longer-term focus. The link between nutrition and agriculture policies is tenuous.

The **Maternal Protection Policy** provides 3 months of maternity leave post-partum and allows working mothers an hour off-work during the baby’s first six months to promote breastfeeding.

#### Health-related nutrition policies

Various donors’ funded initiatives are now focusing efforts on maternal and child nutrition to curb stunting, which, as said, is the top priority in the NNS:

Through village health workers, the **Ministry of Health and Child Care**, with UNICEF support, is implementing community infant and young child feeding interventions throughout the country. The aim is to empower mothers with children under the age of two with knowledge and skills that promote appropriate infant and young child feeding practices (SUN, 2016).

The Ministry is also working with WFP’s in the prevention of stunting program, providing nutritional support to infants below the age of...
two, who received fortified food on a monthly basis at health centers.

The **Enhancing Nutrition Stepping Up Resilience and Enterprise Food Security (ENSURE)** Program is a five-year joint CARE, World Vision (Consortium Lead), SAFIRE, ICRISAT and SNV intervention, funded by USAID (US$ 21.7 million), and designed to impact 215,000 vulnerable and food-insecure Zimbabweans in Manicaland and Masvingo Provinces. Improving maternal and child nutrition is one of the core priorities of the program.

Zimbabwe has also started implementing a multi-sectoral community based approach for food and nutrition in 4 pilot districts (Mwenezi, Chiredzi, Chipinge and Mutasa). The program is targeting 90,000 pregnant and lactating women and 160,000 children under two years old. The program also allows real time monitoring of specific food and nutrition security indicators that inform action at local level.

Due to the lack of consolidated monitoring mechanisms in place it is not possible to determine what is the overall coverage and impact of these interventions versus the NSS targets.

**Institutional set-up**

The **Ministry of Health and Child Care**, through the **National Nutrition Department**, is the institution mandated by the government to implement the NSS. Other key ministries with specific functions in the sector are the **MAMID** (responsible to implement the FNSP) and the **Ministry of Labor and Social Services** (social protection).

The **Food and Nutrition Council (FNC)** is chaired by the **Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC)** and is the main interinstitutional coordination body on nutrition (Mukodoka, 2013) and includes the MAMID and the Ministry of Health amongst its members. **Multi-stakeholder Food and Nutrition Security Committees** are also functioning at provincial, district and local levels. By the end of 2016, there were committees established in 8 out of 10 provinces, as well as in 33 out of 60 districts, and in 118 out of 1,200 wards (SUN, 2016), though these committees have varying levels of functionality (SUN 2016, 1). They are entitled to implement the FNS at the local; levels.

To mainstreaming nutrition through the sector, a “nutrition hub” within the **MAMID** was established in 2015, with the financial support of the EU. This hub should contribute to raising awareness across the different agricultural departments about how their services can contribute to better nutrition outcomes; as well as to better integrate nutrition into the agriculture research agenda and extension services (EU, 2015).

**Zimbabwe SUN priorities for 2017**

- **High-level engagement, including nutrition champions and parliamentarians, for legislative advocacy, budget allocation for nutrition and public outreach**
- **Building national investment cases, supported by data and evidence, to drive nutrition advocacy**
- **Strengthening of skills of multi-stakeholder platform members including Food and Nutrition Security Committees and SUN Networks**
- **Support with strengthening capacity of individual networks including the Donor, CSA, Business and UN Networks.**

The Government has demonstrated its commitment to prioritize nutrition in the political agenda by joining the **Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN)**. The EU is responsible for the SUN Donor Convener role including support and mobilizing resources. There is still the need to engage further the academic and research community and to formalize a business network for a proper SUN functioning (SUN, 2016).
Nutrition knowledge platforms in Zimbabwe

Besides ZimVAC (which also undertakes regular food security and nutrition assessments) the FNC is the main Zimbabwean knowledge platform on nutrition. FNC coordinates the review of relevant policies, and also engages academic institutions to conduct research on emerging food and nutrition issues.

The **Department of Food, Nutrition and Family Science of the University of Zimbabwe**, in Harare, undertakes some nutrition-related research.

**Budgetary commitments and expenditure**

The National Nutrition Strategy is costed and estimates the financial resources needed to address the priorities during the period 2014-2018. The total budget for that period is estimated at US$ 600 million, which are planned to be allocated to direct health and nutrition interventions to reduce stunting in under-fives; nutrition information systems, and strengthening multi-sectoral interventions. In the NSS, the Government also makes the commitment to allocate funds equivalent to 1% of the GDP to nutrition-related activities.

Despite these commitments, the actual resources allocated to nutrition in Zimbabwe represent less than 1% of the total national budget (WFP, 2015) and less than 0.3% of the GDP. Most of these budget funds are actually allocated towards salaries at the National Nutrition Department, so very little resources are available for implementing the activities at field level (Kembo, 2016).

No tracking of funds for nutrition-sensitive interventions in other sectors is currently taking place. In fact, mapping on current spending still requires substantial analysis to identify both nutrition-specific and sensitive interventions which contribute to specific key result areas and national nutrition commitments.

The main donors in the nutrition-specific sector in Zimbabwe are the EU, Japan, USAID, DFID and the UN organizations. Donor coordination in the sector is working well, with donors pooling resources to activities which are aligned with the country priorities.

*In Zimbabwe, there is need to strengthen resource mobilization for the Government and development partners, to address financial shortfalls in the nutrition sector*.  

Zimbabwe SUN Movement
Annual Progress Report, 2015

**Transparency and participation in policy making**

Civil society organizations, including small-scale farmers’ organizations, have various entry points right now in Zimbabwe to influence the policy making, implementation and monitoring, already in the framework of the SUN institutional architecture, which is highly inclusive.

As already mentioned, ‘supporting and reinforcing local community capacity and responsibility for food and nutrition security’ is one of the key policy commitments of the FNSP. The Strategy has been widely disseminated at provincial and district levels, including amongst rural communities and farmers.

The NNS was also developed following a wide consultative process which included community-based organizations and local communities at large (GoZ, 2015, 6).

The **Zimbabwe Civil Society Alliance (ZCSOSUNA)** is a national umbrella of NGOs in different sectors, which is helping to ensure that the voices of local communities are taken into account in the processes to scale up nutrition. Besides its activities advocating towards the government for the implementation of the nutrition policies, ZCSOSUNA conducts various activities to engage the **Parliament** members in nutrition-related actions.
The Food and Nutrition Security Advisory Group is composed of government, NGOs and donors. The Advisory Group leadership is critical in making progress in scaling up nutrition. The Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC) also integrates representatives from the NGOs, and conducts regular food security surveys.

The Zimbabwe Civil Society Alliance (ZCSOSUNA) is a national umbrella of NGOs in different sectors, which is helping to ensure that the voices of local communities are taken into account in the processes to scale up nutrition.

As said, FNS Committees are not operating in most provinces, as well as in many districts and wards, where the local small farmers' groups and other community stakeholders are represented.

Policy monitoring and evaluation mechanisms

The NSS includes a detail set of SMART indicators to assess knowledge, behavior change, nutrition practices, outcomes and impacts of the nutrition specific policies. The foreseen verification sources include regular surveys, national micronutrient surveys, and national nutrition surveys, plus routine administrative data collection systems on reach and coverage of nutrition services. Zimbabwe also conducts annual livelihoods assessments.

The tracking of the implementation of the strategy indicators is ongoing through the national, provincial and district-level Committees.

A comprehensive food and nutrition security information system is being developed to track progress and the SUN CSO intends to conduct a joint mapping exercise and develop a database of who is doing what and where.

Food-related nutrition policies

As we saw, nutrition-sensitive activities in the agriculture sector are not considered a current priority in the NSS, whose short-term focus is on nutrition-specific activities.

Food-based nutrition education and communication

As already mentioned, the lack of awareness on nutritional matters along with prevalent cultural traditions (i.e. diet of mainly maize as key staple food) are estimated among the causes of inadequate nutritional practices and poor nutrition intake (EU, 2015).

Several international NGOs in Zimbabwe are integrating social and behavioral change communication activities across their programs to promote positive nutrition outcomes, in the context both of nutrition specific interventions (such as exclusive breastfeeding) and also in terms of food-based education programs. This is the case, for instance, of the community forums initiative of the Peace Building and Capacity Development Foundation, where women meet to gain knowledge on the composition of a healthy diet (SUN, 2016). Community sensitization through the media is also ongoing with the media reporting on key food and nutrition security issues. USAID has been also funding various NGOs working on nutrition behavior change models (SUN, 2016, 1).

The Ministry of Health and Child Care. TA has produced Nutrition Communication for Development Strategy, developed through a highly multi-stakeholder consultative process. The goal of the Strategy is ‘facilitating

Community based Nutrition Monitoring in Zimbabwe

Through the Community Based Management Near Real Time Data Monitoring model, data is collected at household level and is captured into a system that produces dashboards and allows for the tracking of key food and nutrition security indicators in near real time. The system has a feedback mechanism where the community receives alerts about key FNS issues that need to be addressed (SUN, 2016, 1)
behavior changes that promote better nutrition practices among communities'.

**Food diversification**

One of the policy objectives of Zimbabwe’s Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Framework is to diversify cropping patterns, as a risk coping strategy and also to improve nutrition, via promoting crop rotations to include nitrogen fixing crops; research and adoption of high value crops such as horticulture and green legumes, and promoting post-harvest handling facilities for horticulture through investment in cold chain systems. These good intentions have limited reflection in reality, due to the limited capacities of the extension system to reach out the farmers, and the funding constrains for the government to invest in postharvest infrastructures.

Although the extension programs in Zimbabwe have in theory promoted crop diversification for years, its impact in small scale farmers’ behavior has been rather limited. A 2016 survey conducted in Manicaland and Masvingo provinces analyzing the adoption of diversified cropping patterns demonstrated that small scale farmers who received routine extension services are only 5.7% more likely to adopt crop diversification when compared to farmers who do not receive routine extension service (Dube, 2016).

**Impact of diversification on nutrition**

Using data from over 500 smallholder farmers, a study conducted in Zimbabwe in 2016 confirmed that crop diversification besides, improving productivity, increasing production and income stability, and enhancing resilience in rural smallholder farming systems, it also has a direct effect on food availability and nutrition, measured in terms of food consumption score and household dietary diversity (Makate, 2016).

**Biofortification**

A wide range of institutions including government research centers, have already initiated efforts to expand production of bio-fortified crops in Zimbabwe. Vitamin A-enriched sweet potatoes varieties have been introduced in the last 15 years promoted by the Horticultural Research Centre in Marondera. CIMMYT Zimbabwe has been also working on developing quality protein maize and bio-fortified beans have also been developed (LFSP, 2014).

However, progress in the promotion of these varieties has been slow. A major bottleneck is the inadequate capacity of public institutions to produce enough breeder seed, which must be produced through a rigorous and carefully monitored process. The promotion of the consumption of the bio-fortified crops has also lagged. In fact, no clearly structured or coordinated implementation strategy for bio-fortified food promotion as a nutrition intervention exists right now in in Zimbabwe.

**Food fortification**

The National Food Fortification Strategy provides guidance for industrial food fortification of wheat flour, maize meal, cooking oil and sugar, with selected micronutrients. Legislation is now being developed to ensure that these mandatory fortification measures begin to be implemented.

A handicap for the implementation of food fortification in Zimbabwe is the negative perceptions by the consumers. According to surveys, majority Zimbabwean consumers are suspicious of food that contains ‘unnatural’ additives such as fortified maize meal (LFSP, 2014).

**Water, Sanitation & Hygiene**

A 2014 study by UNICEF has demonstrated that in Zimbabwe, as elsewhere, better access to improved water and sanitation has a huge positive impact on nutritional status of children, especially those in the most vulnerable age group 18-23 months (UNICEF, 2016, 1). This is reflected by the much lower stunting rates among children in Zimbabwean households with access to improved water and sanitation compared to those without (practicing open defecation). In the same...
study, UNIFEC called for strengthen integration of nutrition and WASH, and to promote hygiene practices to avert diarrheal conditions.

Aid activities in the WASH sector are coordinated by the **WASH Sector Coordination and Information Forum**. At the sub-national level, interventions are coordinated through the **Provincial and District Water Supply and Sanitation Committees**.

Budgetary support for water and sanitation infrastructure in Zimbabwe is rather small, and has been declining in recent years, from US$16 million in 2013 to a mere US$3 million in 2015 (IPRSP, 2016). The main action funded by the government is the **Integrated Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Program**.

**Social protection policies and nutrition**

Zimbabwe keeps various social protection programs, which remain fragmented and limited, both in scope and coverage (FAO, 2016). They have been negatively affected by the country’s economic instability and reduced fiscal revenue. A **Social Protection Policy Framework** was produced in 2015 to strengthen the existing social protection system, increase harmonization across programs, and ensure overall policy coherence.

The NNS states that 'the government of Zimbabwe is committed to ensuring that where social protection including social assistance programs are implemented, these must contribute and enhance food and nutrition security of the most vulnerable in the short and medium term'. However, this is not happening in practice.

Introduced in 2011 with financial and technical support from UNICEF, the **Social Cash Transfer Program** is the largest social protection program in Zimbabwe. It targets poor households who are labor-constrained and food-poor. The Program currently covers only 55,000 households (a very limited portion of the country’s poor households) but the aim is to expand to 200,000 households by 2018, with support from development partners. Eligible households do not receive nutrition services as part of the program, which also lacks nutrition behavior change communication activities.

The **Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education** is implementing a longer-term **National School Feeding Program** that provides at least one nutritious hot meal per learner per day. However due to resource constraints, this program is not covering all the schools (UN, 2016a).

**Conclusions**

- Zimbabwe recognizes the right for food, and has endorsed all the main international commitments on nutrition.

- Nutrition has been adopted as a development priority. The policy framework is comprehensive and sets clear targets. Reducing infant stunting is the top nutrition priority in Zimbabwe.

- The nutrition policy framework provides space for the participation of the civil society.

- Budgetary funds for nutrition are very limited, so there are critical financial shortfalls in the implementation of the nutrition programs.

- Various donors’ funded initiatives are implemented to address nutrition during the crucial first 1,000 days, and behavioral change communication activities are also in place.

- Efforts on Nutrition-sensitive interventions are, on the contrary, still insufficient: Adoption of diversification by the farmers remains extremely limited; as well as progress in promoting biofortification and food fortification; public funding for WASH has sharply declined and the social cash transfer program has a limited coverage and is nutrition-blind.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Global and regional FNS policies</strong></th>
<th><strong>Performance (source, year)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Adoption/ownership</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main commitments</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Past commitments</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG#1 (1990) By 2015...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Halve proportion of people with hunger</td>
<td>25% reduction (FAO, 2015)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>World Food Summit (1996) By 2015...</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halve number of people with hunger</td>
<td>10% increase (FAO 2015)</td>
<td>Adopted, but inefficient implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maputo Declaration/NEPAP/CAADP (2003)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPACT signed /NAIP produced</td>
<td>Yes – ZAIP (NEPAP, 2013)</td>
<td>Adequate ownership by Gov. Limited follow-up/engagement by CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAIP technical review conducted</td>
<td>Not yet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 % annual agriculture GDP growth</td>
<td>Negative growth (IAPRI, 2016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10% budget for agriculture</td>
<td>3.8% to 5.3 %</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan. By 2015...</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase cereal yield to 2 Tons/hectare</td>
<td>50% decrease (USAID, 2016)</td>
<td>Little ownership by Gov and CSOs, and no consistent follow-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily per capita dietary 2,700 kcal</td>
<td>? (no data)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halve proportion of people with hunger</td>
<td>25% reduction (FAO, 2015)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>On-going commitments</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG #2 (2015) By 2030...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End hunger and malnutrition</td>
<td>Too early to assess</td>
<td>Little adoption/ownership by Gov. Limited follow-up/engagement by CSOs. Not consistent follow-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double productivity small-scale farmers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Double income small-scale farmers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure sustainable production systems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain genetic diversity of seeds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>World Health Assembly Global Nutrition Targets (2012). By 2025...</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40% reduction stunted children</td>
<td>Off course (GNR, 2014)</td>
<td>Both Government and CSO owned the targets, mainly thanks to the SUN Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% reduction anemia women</td>
<td>Off course (GNR, 2014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% increase breastfeeding rate</td>
<td>On course (GNR, 2014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5% reduction childhood wasting</td>
<td>On course (GNR, 2014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scaling Up Nutrition -SUN. By 2020...</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bringing people together</td>
<td>70% (SUN, 2016)</td>
<td>High Gov ownership on policy coherence and CSO participation, but not towards funds allocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coherent policy and legal framework</td>
<td>79% (SUN, 2016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Results Framework</td>
<td>65% (SUN, 2016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial tracking / mobilization</td>
<td>45% (SUN, 2016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Committing to Child Survival By 2035...</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce under 5 mortality to 20/1,000</td>
<td>88.5/1000 (WHO, 2013)</td>
<td>More commitment needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nutrition for Growth (N4G) London Summit. By 2023...</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40% reduction stunted children</td>
<td>Off course (GNR, 2014)</td>
<td>No ownership by Gov on fund allocations. Very limited advocacy by CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30/child nutrition budget increase</td>
<td>Off course</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20% annual increase nutrition budget</td>
<td>Off course</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Malabo Declaration (2014). By 2025...</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100% agriculture productivity increase</td>
<td>Off course (decreasing)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% post-harvest loses decrease</td>
<td>Not tracked</td>
<td>Not all indicators reflected in NAIP and some are not tracked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10% reduction stunted children</td>
<td>Off course (GMR, 2014)</td>
<td>Only the nutrition targets are owned by the government. Limited ownership by CSOs on the agriculture-related targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5% underweight reduction</td>
<td>On course (GMR, 2014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% contrib. of agr. to poverty reduction</td>
<td>Not tracked</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6% Annual agricultural GDP growth</td>
<td>Off course (FAO, 2015)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 PPP agriculture VCs established</td>
<td>Not tracked</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30% households resilient to shocks</td>
<td>Not tracked</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nairobi COP 11 Decision (2005)**
- Produce NAPA: Not produced

**Cancun Adaptation Framework (2010)**
- Adaptation to be addressed as priority National Adaptation Plan: Not on track Limited CSO participation,= and funding

**Paris Agreement (2016)**
- Promote greater resilience: Not on track Limited CSO participation,= and funding
### Main conclusions

1. Poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition are serious challenges in Zimbabwe, particularly in rural areas, and will continue to be challenging because of climate change.

2. Zimbabwe’s has a comprehensive agriculture policy framework, whose overall objective is to increase production and productivity, with the main emphasis on commodities that have the biggest potential for growth and impact’, while food security is only a secondary goal.

3. Yet, the policy implementation is very weak: institutional arrangements are inefficient, budgetary allocations too limited and main programs such as mechanization or access to finance are not substantially contributing to improve the lives of the small-scale farmers. Elite capture and corruption are widely spread.

4. The radical land reform conducted 20 years ago, gave access to land to hundreds of thousands of small scale farmers, many of which improved their food security, but the reform resulted in the overall reduction of agricultural productivity and production.

5. Zimbabwe’s is responding to the current food crisis caused by el Niño in a targeted and efficient manner, combining in-kind food aid with cash transfers.

6. Zimbabwe CC policy is very consistent, and has a strong focus on enhancing the small-scale farmers’ resilience. However, these policies were designed without engaging the stallholders, and lack of financial resources constrains the implementation of the climate adaptation actions.

7. Zimbabwe recognizes the right for food, and nutrition is a development priority. The policy framework is comprehensive, sets clear targets, and provides space for the participation of the civil society.

8. However, funds for nutrition-specific programs are very limited

9. Nutrition priorities are not well integrated into other development sectors such as agriculture, WASH or social protection.
Recommendations: Possible themes for CARE advocacy

This set of recommendations is not intended to be implemented in full; it aims to provide a range of options from where priorities can be picked up, based on technical and financial resources’ availability, alignment with ongoing programing processes, and after consultation with key stakeholders and partners.

It is recommended not to expand too much the scope of the advocacy efforts, to ensure effectiveness and impact.

**Sustainable, climate-resilient agriculture approaches**

1. To advocate for the reform of the Plant Breeders Rights Act and the Seed Act, to remove the existing restrictions for small-scale farmers to sell and exchange their own seeds.

2. To advocate with the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Finance and Agribank for the fulfillment of the CAFP commitment that the government should prescribe a certain proportion of lending by commercial banks to the agricultural sector at concessional rates, and to ensure that that lending mechanism will prioritize the funding of sustainable, climate-resilient agriculture approaches and support small scale producers.

3. To advocate for the enactment of a regulatory environment for contract farming, that protects small-scale farmers and the financier in a win-win situation (as foreseen in the 2016 IPRSP) and promotes sustainable, climate-resilient agriculture approaches. To this aim, to offer technical assistance and legal expertise, if needed, to the Government.

4. To advocate for reinvestment in extension services that meet the needs of smallholders and would support scale up of climate-resilient and sustainable approaches.

5. To follow up, in dialogue the government, the EU, the UNDP, and other key parties, that the initiatives to be funded by the Zimbabwe Resilience Building Fund, fulfill the objective of increasing the adaptive capacities of households and communities and that they are designed and implemented in a participatory manner.

6. To work with the Vulnerability Assessment Committee for scaling-up climate change participatory vulnerability assessments.

**Gender integration**

7. To regularly (i.e. annually) track the budget allocations for gender equality and how women benefit from government expenditures in FNS and disseminate the findings.

8. To advocate for gender integration within the Land Policy currently under preparation, including resolving outstanding land issues affecting women farmers increasing security of tenure by women.

9. To provide technical assistance and capacity building to the Government for the design of a State-sponsored program to help small-scale women farmers to access funding.
11. To assist the Government of Zimbabwe to develop a specific framework to comprehensively address gender inequalities in climate change adaptation.

12. Improved nutrition

12. To track the funds for nutrition sensitive and nutrition-sensible interventions within the State budget (i.e. in a similar way as CARE in Zambia is currently doing).

13. To advocate with the government of Zimbabwe and the main donors for the fulfillment of the National Nutrition Strategy commitment that nutrition funds should be equivalent to 1% of the GDP

14. To help the Government of Zimbabwe to redesign the Social Cash Transfer Program in order to integrate nutrition (e.g. integrating nutrition behavior change communication activities in the program)

High-level leadership and improved governance

15. To promote the establishment of a multi-stakeholders’ advocacy FNS platform to bring about changes to reduce poverty, gender inequality and hunger modeled on the SUN platform.

16. To provide capacity building and technical assistance to enhance the advocacy capacities of the farmers’ organizations genuinely representing the interest of small-scale farmers and peasants, such as the Zimbabwe Small Organic Farmers Forum and the General Agricultural Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe

17. To follow up cases of displacements of small-scale settlers caused by land grabbing processes and advocate for their fair resolution.

18. To assist the Agricultural Sector Steering Committee to undertake progress reports on the ZAIP implementation and to provide input to guide the inter-ministerial committee.

19. To assist the Zimbabwe to take advantage of the global climate funds, providing technical assistance to the Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate for its accreditation, to be able to access the Global Adaptation Fund.

20. To provide technical support for the establishment of the Technical Monitoring Committee foreseen in the Climate Change Resilience Strategy, ensuring that the small-scale farmers organizations are integrated in the Committee, and to assist the Committee to conduct its monitoring tasks.
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