Policy analysis

Food security, nutrition, climate change resilience, gender equality and the small-scale farmers

Zambia
Produced by Juan Echanove

Contributions by Tonja Rawe, Oliver Wakelin, Vitumbiko Chinoko, Marnie Davidson and Shaughn McArthurt

© CARE, March, 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABF</td>
<td>Agri-Business Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRP</td>
<td>Agriculture Climate Resilience Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Agriculture Development Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfDP</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AgSAG</td>
<td>Agriculture Sector Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAAPD</td>
<td>Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Climate change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCFU</td>
<td>Climate Change Facilitation Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRR</td>
<td>Climate change resilience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Climate smart agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMMYT</td>
<td>International Center for Wheat and Maize Improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOSUN</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization of SUN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EWS</td>
<td>Early warning system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFS</td>
<td>Farmers field school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFBS</td>
<td>Farmers field and business school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISP</td>
<td>Farmer Input Support Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCDP</td>
<td>Most Critical Days Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNS</td>
<td>Food and nutrition security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>Food Reserve Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS</td>
<td>Food security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCSA</td>
<td>Global Climate Smart Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Global Environmental Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNR</td>
<td>Global Nutrition Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNTs</td>
<td>Global Nutrition Targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRZ</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>International Fund for Agriculture Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Financial Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAPRI</td>
<td>Indaba Agriculture Policy Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCM</td>
<td>Integrated pest control management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISFM</td>
<td>Integrated soil fertility management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISLM</td>
<td>Improved Spoil and Land Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDCF</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSAl</td>
<td>Large scale agricultural investments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoA</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Index

## Introduction 9

## Executive summary 11

## Context and background 14

- Economic context 14
- Social context 14
- Political context 15
- Civil society 15
- Overall development policy 16
- External assistance 16
- Agriculture sector context 16
- The small-scale farmers 17
- Gender context 18
- Food security and nutrition context 19
- Climate change and other shocks 21

## Agriculture and food security policy framework 22

- International commitments 22
- Main policies 22
  - Agriculture 22
  - Livestock 23
  - Fisheries 24
  - Trade 24
- Institutional setup 25
- Budgetary commitments and expenditure 25
  - Budget commitments 25
  - Budget structure 26
  - Disbursement 27
- External assistance 27
- Policy monitoring and evaluation mechanisms 28
- Transparency and civil society participation in policy making 28
- Summary and conclusions 29
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and food security policy implementation</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to land</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to inputs</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension services</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize subsidies (Food Reserve Agency)</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to finance</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture/FNS policy implementation through the lens of the SuPER approach</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender policies and the women small-scale farmers</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International commitments</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main national policies</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional set-up</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender budgeting</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender-specific policies and women small-scale farmers</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to land</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to inputs</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension services</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to finance</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary and conclusions</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate change resilience policies and the small-scale farmers</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International commitments</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main national policies</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional setup</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budgetary commitments &amp; expenditure</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget commitments</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget allocations &amp; expenditure</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to climate funds</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of small-scale farmers in the policy framework</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of the policy implementation on the small-scale farmers</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability assessments</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weather forecast information</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of drought tolerant crops</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation agriculture</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved soil and land management</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agroforestry</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender mainstreaming</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary and conclusions</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nutrition Policies

International commitments

Main national policies

National Food and Nutrition Strategic Plan
First 1000 Most Critical Days Program

Institutional set-up

National Food and Nutrition Commission
Ministries and agencies
Multi-stakeholders’ platforms
Sub-national level

Budgetary commitments & expenditure

Transparency and participation in policy making

Policy monitoring and evaluation mechanisms

Food-related nutrition policies

Food-based nutrition education
Food diversification
Biofortification
Fortification

Health-related nutrition policies

Women in reproductive age
Pregnant and lactating women
Infant and children
Disease Prevention
Management of Acute Malnutrition

Water, sanitation and hygiene policies

Social protection nutrition policies and nutrition

Social Cash Transfer
School-based feeding
Food Security Pack

Summary and conclusions

NS-CCR global policy framework- Zambia’s performance and ownership

Conclusions

Recommendations: Possible themes for CARE advocacy

Bibliography consulted
Introduction

This Policy Analysis is part of series of country-specific studies on Food and Nutrition Security & Climate Change Resilience (FNS-CCR) policies in the Southern African region that CARE International is conducting. The Analysis seeks to contribute the implementation of the CARE Southern Africa Region Impact Growth Strategy (SAR IGS), which was adopted in 2016 with the aim at improving food and nutrition security (FNS) and climate resilience (CCR) for 10 million women and small scale farmers, entrepreneurs, workers, consumers and their families in the region. To achieve this, the FNS-CCR IGS focuses on three priorities areas: (1) Learning for influencing, generating evidence across the region; (2) mobilizing resources for new programs based on the SuPER\(^1\) principles and (3) advocating and influencing increased and more effective investment in gender transformative, climate resilient and nutrition smart agriculture.

CARE identifies advocacy as one of the priority approaches to influence broader change and scale up effective solutions. Multiplying the impact of innovative solutions that bring lasting changes, by documenting and replicating successful experiences, promoting pro-poor approaches and advocating and influencing policies are key aspects of CARE global 2020 Programme Strategy. CARE believes that advocacy need to build on evidence, and therefore, that there the is the need to conduct national policy analysis to inform critical areas for influence and advocacy in the FNS-CCR.

The focus of this Country Analysis is the implementation status of all FNS-CCR policies in Zambia, with a strong emphasis on how these policies impact small scale and women farmers. The analysis covers both national specific policies and those policies and commitments that the Government of Zambia (GRZ) has signed to as part of global collective efforts.

This Analysis, as all the other FNS-CCR country analysis that CARE is conducting in the SAR, deals meanly with agriculture and food security, CCR, gender and nutrition.

CARE International in Zambia has extensive experience in nutrition specific work which has focussed on lactating mothers and children. In this regard, the Analysis explores some of the policy gaps and implementation challenges of the existing nutrition specific and related policies in Zambia, including health, social protection, and WASH policies. The outcome of the policy analysis on nutrition will support CARE Zambia and partners in any national nutrition advocacy initiative.

---

\(^1\)CARE’s SuPER approach to agriculture promotes (1) sustainable agricultural systems (2) promote productive intensification interventions that are ‘climate smart’ and increase returns on investment for farmers; (3) promote equitable outcomes in smallholder agriculture and (4) supporting access to affordable nutritious food systems to become resilient
Executive summary

Context and background

Zambia political stability and recent years’ strong economic growth has not resulted in equitable social development. Progress in reducing rural poverty has been stagnated and the country remains one of the most unequal in the world.

Agriculture plays an important role in the economy. Maize is the top agricultural product in terms of land use, production volume, exports and consumption. There is a limited group of large-scale farms and an important segment of middle-size farmers, although low-productivity small-scale households constitute the vast majority of the rural population.

Agriculture plays an important role in the economy. Maize is the top agricultural product in terms of land use, production volume, exports and consumption. There is a limited group of large-scale farms and an important segment of middle-size farmers, although low-productivity small-scale households constitute the vast majority of the rural population.

Policies and interactions covered in the Analysis

In traditional Zambian culture, the man is considered the head of the household and women are often treated as subordinates. Male farmers have better access to land, credit, extension services, inputs and other agriculture assets than female farmers.

Between 1990 and 2015, the number of undernourished in Zambia augmented by 173%, the biggest increase worldwide. 40% of children below 5 years are stunted. Poor water and sanitation are also of particular concern.

Zambia rates high in the list of countries most vulnerable to climate change, which is already negatively affecting the agriculture sector.

Agriculture policies

Zambia has in place a consistent and well-articulated food security and agriculture policy framework. The main FNS policies are the National Agricultural Policy (NAP) 2004-2015 and the National Agriculture Investment Plan (NAIP) 2014-2018, both of which are, overall, well aligned with the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) and other international and regional commitments.

In various past years, and also in 2017, Zambia met the commitment set out in the African Union’s Maputo Declaration of allocating 10% of the budget to agriculture.

The clear majority of the budget is spent in maize input subsidies through the Farm Input Support Program (FISP) and in the procurement of maize through the Food Reserve Agency (FRA), while the rest of the sector policies (extension, research, irrigation, livestock etc.) remain severely underfunded. One quarter of the total funding to the sector comes from donors.

Zambia lacks a comprehensive agriculture and food security policy monitoring and evaluation system. The indicators included
in the policy documents are not regularly tracked.

Various agriculture multi-stakeholders’ platforms have been promoted by the civil society organizations to engage in the policy making processes, but their functioning is erratic.

In Zambia, the implementation of the agricultural policies has not substantially contributed to poverty reduction. Often their formulation is not evidence-based and the institutional coordination weak. Hence, many programs are ineffective and often costly, with little positive impact in empowering and improving the lives of the small-scale farmers:

- Large parcels of public land (farm blocks) have been awarded to large-scale agribusiness by the government and by tribal chiefs. These businesses are creating only limited job opportunities and have detrimental effects on the environment.

- FISP has succeeded in augmenting the use of fertilizers and improved seeds. Thanks to FISP maize production has increased substantially. However, implementation has not been very efficient, with frequent delays in the supply. The impact on poverty reduction has been limited. Inputs are often diverted. FISP has also crowded out commercial investments and exacerbated deforestation rates. A new electronic voucher system is now gradually replacing the direct supply of physical inputs, allowing the farmers to choose the suppliers. This has led to better results in terms of timely delivering and less risk of deviations, although some farmers are still complaining of not receiving the supplies, as e-vouchers have not been activated.

- The maize subsidy via the FRA is perpetuating inefficient models of production and is a disincentive to diversification. Some poor farmers are net buyers of maize, so for them the program is a burden, not a help.

- The government’s frequent bans on maize exports are not reaching the intended result of reducing consumers’ prices.

- There are no incentives to improve access to finance by small-scale farmers.

A positive exception to this non-pro-small-scale farmers’ policy approach is the extension service, which reaches three out of every four farmers, one of the best rates in Africa.

**Climate change policies**

Zambia has produced the policy instruments required to fulfil the country’s international commitments on climate change, including the adaptation program (which was produced based on participatory community-based vulnerability assessments) and the intended nationally determined contributions, albeit these documents are not very detailed. A comprehensive climate change response strategy is also in place, but it lacks a detailed financing plan and a monitoring system. Although agriculture adaptation is addressed in these strategic documents, the specific needs of the small-scale farmers are not well covered. A specific policy framework for climate-smart agriculture is missing.

The institutional leadership on climate change has been problematic, with disagreements about which Ministry should spearhead this agenda. In fact, there is a general lack of institutional capacity to respond to climate change and, although there have been various donor-
funded efforts to improve the institutional capacities at national and local levels for a better multi-sectoral and multi-level responses, there are still considerable gaps and overlaps in the institutional architecture.

Zambia has been very successful tapping the global funding mechanisms for climate change. Officially, domestic public funding for climate change is also significant, although the criteria to determine if a budget heading can be considered adaptation is not yet well established. Anyhow, less than 10% of the climate change investments are oriented to agriculture adaptation.

The implementation of the climate smart policies leaves mix results. Draught tolerant maize varieties are now available, but poor farmers have limited access to them. The weather stations network has been expanded, but it is still inadequate. The Government has been proactively promoting conservation agriculture practices, during the last 20 years however, their real impact and the quality of the implementation are subject of debate. Important efforts have been conducted on agroforestry and improved soil and land management, still, the FISP has been steadily eroding the gains by trapping the farmers in input-dependent production systems.

Although gender is mainstreamed in the policy documents, the climate change adaptation activities that the GRZ promotes tend to give insufficient attention to the women needs.

**Gender policies**

Gender mainstreaming is an official policy in Zambia, reflected in the Constitution, in the national strategies and development plans, as well as in specific gender acts and policies. There is also a Ministry of Gender and gender focal points across the governmental institutions.

Despite this recognition, most of the State programs on agriculture fail to adequately address gender inequalities: Less than one third of the farmers targeted by FISP or by the extension services are women; the irrigation programs do not include gender indicators and do not address well the women needs. Until 2016, customary legislation (which was recognized by the Constitution as a constituent part of the legislative system) discriminated against women in the access to agriculture land. This has now changed in the 2016 Constitution reform, which does not recognize customary law if it counters the legislation.

**Nutrition policies**

Zambia has endorsed the relevant nutrition international commitments, including the Global Nutrition targets, the Nutrition for Growth initiative and the Scale Up Nutrition (SUN) movement. Joining SUN has been the main trigger of the country’s current high commitment towards promoting nutrition policies.

The country has a well-articulated policy framework, with time bound targets and multi-sectorial and multi-stakeholder policy coordination mechanisms.

The National Food and Nutrition Commission, placed under the Ministry of Health, is the main sectorial convening body. It enjoys good lines of communication with the key stakeholders, but its placement within a single line ministry limits its ability to coordinate across ministries.

The Zambian nutrition agenda remains largely driven and supported by the donors and NGOs active in the health sector.
Donors’ funding, although substantial (US$ 250 million as of 2017) is still limited. Donor funding has provided the basic package of cost-effective SUN interventions to 14 out of 103 districts. Significantly greater investments will be needed to increase coverage and scale up nutrition at the national level.

Zambia’s first strategic priority in nutrition is the prevention of stunting, and the flagship initiative is the SUN-funded “First 1,000 most critical days” program, which is focused on pregnant and lactating women and children below 3 years. The program is managed by CARE in collaboration with other partners and provides sub-grants to different kinds of nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive evidence-based activities, including iron supplementation, exclusive breastfeeding promotion, complementary feeding and nutrition sensitive messages. These actions are implemented in priority districts, where nutrition coordinating committees have been established.

The enforcement of salt fortification has drastically reduced iodine deficiency levels. On the contrary, the policies of promoting vitamin A fortified sugar and vitamin D fortified margarine are not evidence-based, because there is no deficiency of those vitamins in Zambia, so it can only be attributed to market protection (the former) and to the poor policy-making in the past (the later). Zambia has been also pioneering country in developing biofortified staple crops (potato, cassava, maize), but the market penetration is still limited.

Breastfeeding rates in Zambia are very high thanks to sound promotion policies.

Nutrition is not yet sufficiently integrated as a cross cutting issue in other relevant policies:

- Nutrition-sensitive agriculture has not been a priority in Zambia, where, as said, agricultural policies for many years kept a narrow focus on maize production. Diversification was neglected, even though promoting horticulture does not only enrich the diets, but is also more profitable for the small-scale farmers that growing only staple products. This is now changing for better. The agriculture inputs program voucher system is open to diversification and there are ongoing efforts to integrate nutrition in the agriculture extension system.

- Nutrition is not even mentioned in the National Water Policy. Public investments in the WASH sector are limited and often they are not sustainable because the users cannot afford payment for the services’ maintenance. New large-scale programs funded by donors are now about to start, but they are not explicitly aligned with nutrition targets.

- Zambia has a growing national social protection system whose cornerstone is a social cash transfer program targeting poor households. The program is not nutrition-sensitive: the support is not conditional to nutrition behavior or king to nutrition awareness activities.
**Five key messages:**

1. Despite substantial investments, agricultural policies in Zambia, with their narrow focus on maize and poor design and implementation, are not significantly contributing to poverty reduction.

2. Gender equality is enshrined in the Zambian constitution and in different pieces of legislation and policy documents, but is not well integrated in the agriculture programs.

3. Climate change policies in Zambia are often vague and not explicitly focusing on the needs of the small-scale farmers, and institutional challenges hinder their good implementation.

4. Nutrition-specific policies in Zambia are well articulated, evidence-based and drive by multi-stakeholder collaborative system, but funding is still limited, so services’ coverage is still patchy.

5. Nutrition is not yet well integrated as a cross cutting issue in other relevant policies, (agriculture, WASH, social protection).
Context and background

Economic context

Zambia is a Medium Human Development country, ranking 139 out of 188 in the Human Development Index (HDI). Zambia’s economy depends mainly on its copper industry, which accounts for 80% of the exports (ZDA, 2016).

Over the last ten years, Zambia’s economy has grown at an annual average of 7.5% (UNDP, 2016), making the country one of the best-performing economies in Africa. The Government’s fiscal discipline contributed to macroeconomic stability. Local business climate and the country attracted increasing volumes of foreign direct investment (WB, 2016). Copper output was also increasing steadily for many years, due to higher prices and the foreign investment.

The economic context started weakening in 2014, when global copper prices lowered, production decreased and Zambia was overtaken as Africa's largest copper producer by the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (UNDP, 2016). This was compound with surging inflation, which also affected reinvested earnings (Woodrow Wilson School, 2016), and poorly-timed rain, which reduced agricultural incomes and increased food prices in 2015.

The country started facing huge budget deficits. Political instability during the presidential campaign and the continuous inflation kept growth low during 2016.

The WB forecasts that growth will substantially improve in 2017 as the political stability improves alongside with better results from both the agriculture and mining sectors (WB, 2016).

Chinese investment

China is currently the top foreign direct investor in Zambia, with over US$ 3 billion investments from 500 companies, mainly in the mining (where they owned 11% of the sector companies), construction, and manufacturing sectors. Most of the Chinese firms operating in Zambia are state owned or are strongly supported by the Chinese state.

Social context

The country has a relatively young population, with 46% aged below 15 (ECA, 2015).

About 60% of Zambians reside in rural areas. These areas lack critical infrastructure for raising productivity and many people are not linked to domestic and foreign markets. In rural areas only 4.5% of the population is having access to electricity, compared to 53% in the urban areas. (6th SNDP, 2014).

HIV prevalence rate is 12.6% (ZDHS, 2014).
In Zambia 60% of the population live below the poverty line (AfDB, 2015). While urban poverty has reduced significantly, rural poverty remains high. Extreme poverty is four times higher in rural areas (57%) than in urban areas (13%) (WB, 2015).

Zambia’s Gini coefficient is 0.65, making it one of the most unequal countries in the world (AfDB, 2014). In 2010, the bottom 50% of the population wealth accounted for 9.1% of the total income, while the top 10% accounted for 52.6% (CSO, 2012). The growing income inequality has exacerbated the differences in access to services such as education and health (ECA, 2015). These high levels of inequality kept rising when the economy was growing at high speed (UNDP, 2016).

**Political context**

Zambia, unlike most of its neighbors, has managed to avoid war and upheaval that has marked much of Africa’s post-colonial history, earning itself a reputation for political stability.

Zambia is a multi-party democracy and provides in a strife-free, multicultural society. However, the democratic institutions are still considered weak and the concentration of power in the president is high. Latest U.S. government Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Zambia observed serious human rights problems in several areas. (Government of the United States, 2016).

Although independent by law, in practice the legislative power in Zambia is often manipulated by the government, including cases of poaching opposition MPs. This creates disunity within the opposition, increases the government’s power and restricts the ability of the parliament to hold the government to account or to exercise a significant influence in the policy making.

The decentralization of the public sector has been implemented in certain sectors (such as health, where it was conducted already in 1992), but in others is pending. Progress in advancing the reforms that aim to increase efficiency of the public sector has been slow.

Zambia ranks 76 out of 168 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (TI, 2016). Although the Government’s commitment to good governance is clearly stated, corruption is widespread.

Edgar Lungu became the sixth president of Zambia in January 2015 after winning a narrow election victory to replace former leader Michael Sata, who died in office. He gained a new term in August 2016. Mr Lungu’s toughest challenge has been to turn around a slowing economy.

**Civil society and media**

Zambian civil society is relatively weak and largely based in Lusaka. The Catholic Church remains highly influential and is one of the few organizations to have a national reach. Civil society alliances have come together at key points to protect democracy, but, apart from that situations, there is a lack of concerted action (BTI, 2016).

The relations between the current government and civil society, especially on human rights and governance related issues, have deteriorated since 2016. However, there are numerous examples of positive collaboration between the civil society and the authorities in policy making, especially in subjects which are perceived more technical than political, as it is the case of the nutrition policies, where
the civil society is actively engage in the policy and implementation.

Radio is the main source of information in Zambia. There are more than 2.3 million internet users (BBC, 2016). Freedom House rates Zambia as "Not Free" in its 2016 Freedom of the Press survey. It cites the harassment of privately-owned news outlets and the blocking of critical websites.

**Overall development policy**

The Revised Sixth National Development Plan 2013-2016 (SNDP) is the main overall policy document, aimed at achieving the objectives set out in the Vision 2030 of Zambia becoming a “prosperous middle-income country by 2030”.

The 6th SNDP is primarily an investment plan which focuses on areas with a strong orientation towards rural development and job creation. While investing in human development, the Plan also aims to take care of macro-economic fundamentals. Agriculture, manufacturing, energy, construction, tourism and mining, are the growth sectors identified by the 6th SNDP.

The GRZ is in the process of finalizing the 7th NDP, which is expected to provide “practical implementation strategies” for the government’s goals to achieve economic transformation through an “integrated approach” that links key sectors (WB, 2016).

“The central pillar of the current development initiative is driven by the realization that while a robust private sector is important, a market force-led economy, as was previously propagated, is not efficient and sufficient to allocate resources in a manner that would have a positive impact on the livelihoods of the ordinary people, vis-a-vis poverty reduction.’

Government of Zambia 6th SNDP

**External assistance**

As some of the traditional cooperating partners are phasing out their support and several others are revising their country strategies, the working arrangements are changing in Zambia. Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) has decreased to less than 5% of the Government’s budget in 2016, compared to 21% in 2004. The largest amount of development financing to Zambia comes from the EU, US, the UK, Germany, the WB and the AfDB. Zambia has made progress in donor alignment and harmonization, but challenges remained in alignment of aid with the national priorities.

**Agriculture sector context**

Zambia has ample rainfall, but soil fertility is generally low (FAO, 2016). Less than 20% of Zambia’s arable land is currently utilized (USAID, 2016). Agriculture plays an important role in the Zambian economy; and accounts for at least 55.8% of the country’s labor force (CSO, 2012).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agriculture indicators</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contribution of agriculture to GDP</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>IAPRI</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution of agriculture to exports</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>WB</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution of agric. to employment</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average farm size (hectares)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>IAPRI</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture land under irrigation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers accessing improved seeds</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>IAPRI</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers using chemical fertilizers</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>IAPRI</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers accessing extension</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>IAPRI</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farms accessing financial services</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>RALS</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Agriculture makes up 8% of Zambia’s national GDP (IAPRI, 2016) Growth of the agriculture sector has been robust for several years — well above the 6% annual growth target foreseen in the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP). However, the increase in agriculture production has not been enough to meet the growing domestic and foreign demand of Zambian agricultural products. Despite significant investment, agricultural value added has been diminishing, from almost 20% in 2010 to 17% in 2015, mainly because of declining agricultural commodity prices and dwindling agricultural productivity, caused by low agricultural mechanization, poor access to markets, low access to finance and modern farm inputs, poor infrastructure in rural areas, as well as under-funded research services (6th SNDP, 2014).

Driven by the strong export market, maize represents Zambia’s the largest crop by cultivated area and production volume, followed by cassava, groundnut, cotton, soybean, and common bean. Zambia is the second-largest exporter of maize in Africa, behind South Africa. Maize accounts for almost 40% of the agriculture export volume and 25% of the agriculture export value. Sugar, cotton and tobacco are also important export goods. Palm oil is the top food import (22% of the import value) and groundnut (10%).

Prior to independence, agricultural land in Zambia was administered under two regimes: crown lands (freehold tenure reserved for European settlers) and ‘native reserves’ governed by traditional authorities. After 1964, these regimes were subsumed into the present-day tenure system that comprises state land and customary land. Most of the state land is leased to large scale commercial farmers (more than 20 hectares), a diverse group of some 2,500 actors ranging from institutional farmers and family farm owners to the recent wave of large agriculture investments (Sipangule et al, 2016) Many of these large farmers are market orientated and grow crops such as wheat, maize, sugarcane, cotton and soy beans.

A specific feature of the Zambian agriculture sector, compare to most other Sub-Saharan countries is the relatively high proportion of middle-size farmers (owning between 2 and 5 hectares). It is estimated that these farmers account for 20% of the total farming population (i.e. 200,000 households) and control 57% of the total farmland (Sitko, 2014).

The small-scale farmers

There are around 800,000 smallholder households in Zambia, comprising most of the rural population of the country. Almost 90% smallholders live on customary land without land titles (Sitko et al., 2014). The majority (72.4%) cultivate less than 2 hectares of land (Hichaambwa and Jayne, 2014).

Productivity of small scale farmers is very low, due to low adoption rates for appropriate agricultural technologies and poor farming practices. Thus, they rarely produce enough crop surplus to sell (USAID, 2016). In fact, the most salient
factor in food security in Zambia is probably the chronically low yields for smallholders. Only 13% of Zambian smallholder farmers had access to credit (Agricultural Livelihoods Survey, 2011).

Most of these smallholder farmers have not benefited from the recent economic growth, mainly due to dependency on rain-fed agriculture and limited levels of diversification. Roughly 60% of the small-scale farmers’ land is dedicated to maize production. Maize is also, together with cassava, the furthermost widely consumed crop by the smallholders, closely followed by roots and tuber. Nearly 30% of the smallholder farmers are net buyers of maize (IAPRI 2016). Only 300,000 small-scale farmers are also engaged in horticulture, while the fisheries sector provides income also to 300,000 households (Musamali, 2009).

**Gender context**

### Gender indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Indicators</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (100's US$)</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI values</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean years of schooling</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agriculture-related indicators</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landholding size (ha.)</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area cultivated (ha.)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to fertilizers</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to improved seeds</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to credit</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to extension</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: RALS (2015) and UNDP (2015)

UNDP’s Gender Equality Index puts Zambia at 135th among 187 countries. Men in Zambia earn, on average, 47% more income than women. Males attend school for about two years longer than females. The proportion of men in Zambia engaged in agriculture is at least 15% higher than the proportion of women (JICA, 2016).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input decision</th>
<th>Crop production</th>
<th>Processing</th>
<th>Marketing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>![Male]</td>
<td>![Male]</td>
<td>![Male]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>![Female]</td>
<td>![Female]</td>
<td>![Female]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On average male farmers in Zambia have more access to agricultural resources such as land, labor, credit and other productive assets compared to their female counterparts. 75% of the agriculture households in Zambia are headed by males (RALS, 2015), and, as we shall see later, women in Zambia have land rights which are more insecure and limited than those of men.

Average cultivated land by a woman farmer in Zambia is 2.9 hectares, compared to 4.4 in the case of a male farmer. The average value of the agricultural assets owned by male farmers’ doubles that of those owned by women. (Namonje-Kapembwa, 2016).

Only 14% of women farmers’ access credit, compare with 20% of men (RALS, 2015). Married women usually do not have property in their name, and as a result they often cannot provide the collateral required to access credit (USAID, 2011).

Gender division of labor in Zambian agriculture tends to be by task and by crop, although this varies by household. As shown in the table above, women are on average more active in the production of food security crops.
There are four times as many women between 15 and 49 years old infected by HIV than males. This higher infection rate in females, the primary caregivers, adversely affects food security and income streams (WFP, 2006).

**Food security and nutrition context**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nutrition indicators</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of people undernourished</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stunting, children under 5 yrs.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>ZDHS</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasting, children under 5 yrs.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>ZDHS</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underweight children under 5 yrs.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>ZDHS</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overweight, children under 5 yrs.</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>ZHDS</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaemia women of reproductive age</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>GNR</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low birth weight</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>ZHDS</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclus. breastfeeding under 6 months</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>ZHDS</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Zambia ranks 30th (out of 45 countries) on the Hunger and Nutrition Commitment Index (HANCI). Despite the economic growth, in the last 25 years, nutrition indicators in Zambia have worsened: In 1990, 33.8% of Zambians were undernourished. In 2015 the proportion was 47.8%. While globally number of undernourished declined, in Zambia it augmented by 173% (the biggest increase worldwide): From 2.7 million in 1990 to 7.4 in 2015 (FAO, 2015).

On average, Zambians spend around 50% of their total household budget on food. 53% of households cannot afford three meals a day (CSO, 2012). Many more households likely lack access to diverse diets year-round. Maize, other cereals and starchy roots account for 80% of the total energy intake (Save the Children, 2016).

Diets in Zambia are monotonous and traditionally based on *nshima*, a thick starchy porridge made from maize or other staple crops, eaten with a small amount of ‘relish’ of a few basic vegetables sometimes supplemented with a little meat, beans or fish; intake of nutrient-rich foods is seasonal and amounts of these foods often minimal (Harris, 2014).

Besides lack of access to food, myths traditions and poor dietary practices also contributes to malnutrition. This may explain, for instance, why the Eastern Province, with high agriculture production, has high levels of malnutrition.

Zambia has one of the highest rates of child malnutrition in the world (Kuhlgatz, 2015). Stunting levels in children under five years of age are alarmingly high (40%) and well above other African nations with similar or lower per capita income. These high levels have remained virtually unchanged from the early 1990s until mid-2000s, when it started to slightly decline, probably due to better overall economic performance of the country and more coherent children nutrition policies in place.

The absolute number of children under five who are stunted has increased, from 685,000 in 1992 to 1.14 million in 2013 (Save the Children, 2016). 15% of children under five are underweight (ZHDS, 2014).
More than 94% of babies in Zambia are breastfed within one day of birth. However, progress is still required in relation to exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months. 73% of babies less than six months were exclusively breastfed, with levels falling to 45% at age 4–5 months (Save the Children, 2016).

As mentioned above, the average household diet is over-reliant on maize, the principal staple. Micronutrient deficiencies especially in vitamin A and iron remain very high amongst women and young children.

Zambia has one of the highest HIV prevalence in the world, and nutrition remains a key component in managing this condition (EU, 2016).

**Prevalence of stunting (children under 5)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Boys</th>
<th>Girls</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lack of access to clean water is another key factor in the persistence of chronic malnutrition. In rural areas, 19% of the population uses surface water for drinking, and 22% of the rural population practices open defecation (JMP, 2015).

**Geographical distribution of stunting (under 5 yrs.)**

- National: 40.31%
- Western: 36.2%
- Southern: 37.2%
- North Western: 36.9%
- Northern: 48.5%
- Muchinga: 43.6%
- Luuka: 35.7%
- Lusaka: 43%
- Luapula: 43%
- Eastern: 36.2%
- Copperbelt: 42.5%
- Central: 42.5%

ZHDS, 2014
**Climate change and other shocks**

Zambia ranks 15th in the list of countries that are most vulnerable to climate change (Wheeler, 2011). Average annual temperature has increased by 1.3° C from 1960 to 2006. (Zambia Meteorology Department, 2013).

Climate change is already affecting negatively the performance of the agriculture sector in the country, due to adverse weather outcomes including droughts, seasonal floods, extreme temperatures, shortening of the rain season (crop growing period) and long dry spells coupled with poor rainfall distribution (NAPA 2007; Neubert, 2011). The average annual temperature is projected to increase by 1.2° /3.4°C by the 2060s with more rapid warming in the southern and western regions. The proportion of rainfall that falls in heavy events is projected to increase (Irish Aid, 2015).

Agriculture output is projected to decline by 30% by 2080 under the current CC scenario unless adaptation measures are applied (ZaAS, 2013), although it will have different effects in different agro-regions. Farmers in the east and south of Zambia have already noticed a generally shortened growing season (MTENR, 2007)

Zambian rural households are very vulnerable also to various other shocks which affect their supply of food, such as change in food prices, illness, flood, changes in input prices, and drought etc. According to a national survey conducted in 2012, 62% of rural households experienced at least one of these incidents in the last 12 months.

---

**2015/16 El Niño**

In 2015/16 a strong El Niño led to prolonged dry spells in the southern half of the Country. About 50 districts were adversely affected. The number of food insecure households doubled to 266,000 households.
Agriculture and food security overall policy framework

International commitments

Zambia has adopted the UN 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), committing to eradicate hunger by 2030.

The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) was initiated in 2003 in Maputo, as a continent-wide African Union initiative. Zambia, as well as the other countries signing the CAADP compact adopted the core principles of pursuing an average of 6% annual agricultural sector growth at country level and allocating 10% of the national budget to agricultural development. Zambia signed its current Compact in 2011. These commitments were reinvigorated in 2014 in the Malabo Declaration, that introduced a further set of targets for the African Agriculture for 2025 and which Zambia has also signed.

As member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Zambia is also signatory of the Regional Agricultural Policy (RAP), aimed at harmonizing the growth and development of agriculture and promotion marketing and trade among SADC member States.

Zambia has not explicitly yet indicated if it will subscribe the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Land Tenure, which were endorsed by the Committee on World Food Security in 2012. The guidelines define several principles including the need to ensure that investments in agriculture lands are responsible.

Main national policies

‘Agriculture development is critical for achieving inclusive growth and poverty reduction’.

In Vision 2030, which was elaborated in 2006, the Government of the republic Zambia (GRZ) identified agriculture as a key driver of the economy. According to this view, agriculture should become a sound economic alternative to the mining sector, which has been the largest contributor of foreign exchange earnings and national revenue to date.

The 6th SNPD (2011 to 2015) recognized that achieving rapid poverty reduction, national food security and broad-based income growth requires major productivity improvements and diversification in the agriculture sector. The 6th SNPD agriculture development goal is ‘to facilitate and support the development of a sustainable, diversified and a competitive agriculture sector that assures food security at national and household levels and maximizes profits and the Sector’s contribution to GDP’.

The National Agricultural Policy (NAP) 2004-2015, which is still to be updated, is built on six guiding principles: The right to adequate and nutritious food; equitable, inclusive and sustainable agriculture development; profitability and competitiveness; recognition of current traditional and state land tenure systems; stakeholders’ involvement; and pursuing of international commitments.

The National Agriculture Investment Plan (NAIP) 2014-2018 is Zambia’s guiding policy framework for agriculture and food security. It is widely viewed as a
very well developed policy and investment framework (USAID, 2014) and it adequately reflects the priorities defined in the FISP and FRA.

The NAIP was formulated based on the CAADP compact, and it outlines the key areas of support for investment. The overall objective of NAIP is ‘to facilitate and support the development of a sustainable, dynamic, diversified and a competitive agricultural sector that assures food security at household and national levels’. The preparation of the NAIP was undertaken with a wide stakeholder consultation process at national level, as well as in various communities across 6 different provinces. Engaging government officials; farmers’ representatives, NGOs, traditional leaders, farmer groups, cooperatives, and project representatives.

### NAIP indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAIP indicators</th>
<th>Baseline 2011</th>
<th>Target 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural poverty</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural exports</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of non-traditional exports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronic malnutrition children &lt; 5 years</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soil erosion rate (ton/ha/year)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereals production (million tons)</td>
<td>3,26</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NAIP programs

- Sust. Natural Resources Management
- Production and Productivity Improvement
- Market Access and Services Development
- Food and Nutrition Security
- Knowledge Support Systems
- Institutional Strengthening

Other important sub-sectorial policies and strategies in agriculture are the **National Aquaculture Strategy**, the **National Rice Development Strategy**, and the **National Irrigation Policy**.

The **Land Act** (1995) has been critical in shaping the existing agricultural sector in Zambia, by allowing national and foreign investors to acquire customary land and convert it to state land that can be used for commercial purposes. Since enactment of the Land Act, at least 10% of land held under customary tenure has been privatized through conversion to leaseholds (Nyondo, 2009). This has given way to the rise in the number of medium scale farmers (Sipangule et al, 2016). Another important consequence of the Lands Act has been the rapid growth of foreign large scale agricultural investments in the country (Nolte, 2014), which has sometimes negatively affected local communities, as we will see later.

### Livestock policies

UNDP reports that ‘planning in the livestock sector is still a top-down approach as the central government retains control of policy and planning options for the sector’ (UNDP, 2016).

Most of the livestock policies in recent years have been focused on animal disease control (via veterinary extension, vaccinations, and slaughterhouses control) with the aim of establishing of disease free zones in regions of export-potential. These programs paid-back well: Zambia has witnessed very significant reductions in various animal diseases.

However, the impact of the livestock policies in the small-scale farmers has been limited, given their strong focus the export-oriented producers. The small-scale livestock farmers still faces several challenges including the high cost of and limited access to the veterinary services.
The Government is now expanding the access to artificial insemination and has also established milk collection centers, but, again, these investments tend to benefit more the large and middle size farmers rather than the small ones.

Despite the increased overall budget allocation to the agricultural sector in 2017, the allocation to the livestock subsector has been reduced from 22.9% in 2016 to 10.6% (IAPRI, 2017).

There are plans to undertake a livestock census in 2017.

Fisheries policies

Although the official agriculture policies in Zambia often refer to fish farming as an activity with high potential for smallholders’ livelihoods diversification, the truth is that the sector remains stagnant, and largely, according to UNDP, because of the lack of incentives and other forms of support by the government. Many fish growing stations have been abandoned in recent years, dropping national production, and resulting on the current situation where most of the fish consumed in the country is imported -and expensive (UNDP, 2014).

In recent times the GRZ has been promoting new initiatives to try to revitalize the sector. In 2016 fish feed become VAT exempted and customs duties on aquaculture implements were suspended for 3 years. A new Aquiculture Entrepreneurship Fund will be launched by the GRZ in 2017 (IAPRI, 2017). This can be considered positive steps in order to augment fisheries production and diversify the diet and improve nutrition of the Zambians, although it is far too early assessing their impact.

Agriculture trade policies

The most salient feature of Zambia's agriculture trade polices is the recurrent impositions by the GRZ of bans on maize exports to neighborhood countries, allegedly to curb local shortages and to keep maize prices low. The latest incarnation of the maize bans was the one imposed in 2016.

Besides the formal explicitly maize exports bans, Zambia also applies de facto maize export constrains, such as delays in the issuance of export permit and restrictions on imports from certain countries. The FRA maize procurement, which severely limit the amounts of grain for the private sector to buy, is another limiting factor for the traders to export.

A 2014 analysis of the effects of maize trade restrictions demonstrated that formal export bans and the informal limitations on trade in Zambia did not seem to have a measurable effect on reducing consumer maize meal prices (Sikto et al, 2014).

From 2017, the government plans to put to and end the ban and keep borders open to free maize trade. Maize export will be subject of a 10% export tax, aiming to encourage local value addition and to augment State’s revenue. It remains to be seen if Zambian maize will continue to be competitive and to which extend this new

Zambia has an opportunity to export maize to the deficit countries and earn much needed foreign currency but this is not possible if the borders remain closed. Unfortunately, in 2016 the country wasted the opportunity of earning the much-needed foreign currency due to politically triggered export restrictions'.

Advisory Note prepared by IAPRI October, 2016
tax will really promote maize trade in the long run (IAPRI, 2017).

Another agriculture commodity where trade restrictions are imposed is soya, whose production has been boosting in recent years.

This situation, as IAPRI puts, it, ‘needs to be closely monitored in order not to promote inefficient producers or foster the development of an uncompetitive market for soya beans and its products.’ (IAPRI, 2016 2)

**Institutional setup**

Agriculture and food security have very strong political attention and commitment in Zambia, as evidenced by the participation of high-level decision-makers in the policy making processes.

The **Ministry of Agriculture (MoA)** mission is ‘to facilitate and support the development of a sustainable, diversified, and competitive agricultural sector that assures food and nutrition security, contributes to job creation, and maximizes the sector’s contribution to GDP’. MoA has three major departments – Agriculture (crops), Livestock and Administration – with each one headed by a Deputy Minister. There are 10 Directorates, and one of these, Policy and Planning, plays a key role in policy development and coordination. The MoA holds a network of **Provincial Agriculture Coordination Offices**.

The **Food Reserve Agency** (FRA), which operates under the MAL, has the mandate to maintain the national strategic food reserves. According to a 2014 assessment by USAID Feed the Future Program, ‘the effectiveness of the administrative support functions within the MAL remains constrained by limited funding for equipment, training and communications’ (USAID, 2014).

Agricultural research in Zambia is largely undertaken by the **Zambia Agriculture Research Institute (ZARI)**, which also belongs to MoA. ZARI, which coordinates various research stations, is still contending with the effects of long-term underinvestment and continue to struggle with funding issues that hinder their ability to contribute more effectively to the country’s agricultural and economic development and to the needs of the small-scale farmers (IFPRI, 2015)

The **Ministry of Livestock** has recently been separated from the MoA.

The **Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture** covers legislative issues on the sector. However, the Committee lacks capacities for independent analysis and to ensure the government’s accountability (USAID, 2014).

**Budgetary commitments and expenditure**

**Budget commitments**

The total budget for NAIP over the 5-year implementation period (2014 to 2018) is US$ 2,730 million, out of which US$ 2,141 million (78.4% of the total) is to be funded by the GRZ and donors; while the rest is expected to be contributed by farmers (14.4%) and the corporate private sector (7.2%).

| NAIP planned funding (US$ million) |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 2014     | 2015     | 2016     | 2017     | 2018     |
| 488      | 596      | 630      | 502      | 513      |

In 2013 UNDP estimated that the financing gap between the budget of the interventions already planned by that time and the overall NAIP requirements was
US$ 605 million equivalent to 22% (UNDP/CAADP, 2013). No updated date is currently available.

Budget allocation for agriculture

In Zambia, annual budgetary allocations for agriculture have grown over time during the last 15 years. By 2015, for instance, the budget had more than doubled that of 2013. However, the agriculture budget has not always kept pace with the growth of the national budget.

From 2006 to 2011 Zambia was allocating at least 10% of the State budget to agriculture in 2006, and therefore, fulfilling the CAADP commitment. 2010 and 2011 were record years, with agriculture budget allocations close to 14% of the total budget. In the following years, the proportion declined, to rise again in 2015. In 2017 the budget, augmented substantially, became very close to the 10% (9.4%, compare to 6.5% in 2016), and bringing some renewed optimism on the level of political attention to the sector by the government.

Budget structure

While agricultural sector budget has grown considerably since 2002, this growth exclusively benefits two programs: The Food Reserve Agency (FRA) –which provides subsidies to maize-, and the Farmer Input Support Program (FISP) –whose focus is also mainly in maize (UNDP, 2016).

On average, since 2009, about 50%, of the budget allocations for agriculture have been assigned to these two maize support programs (20% to 30% for the FISP and 15% to 25% for the FRA; the percentages vary from one year to another); while usually no more than 20% goes for all the other agricultural development programs (ADPs). The remaining 30% to salaries and administrative costs (PARI, 2015).

As the agriculture think tank IAPRI puts it, ‘this way of spending distorts the market and this leads to crowding out private sector investments both in the input and output markets. Given limited funding, subsidy programs do not only drain the national treasury, but are also financially unsustainable in the long run’ (IAPRI, 2016).

Because of the limited financial support beyond these two programs, most of the other State-lead agriculture activities are underperforming.

In fact, the high spending on FISP and FRA is done at the expense of investments in ADPs –i.e. all the other core productive areas such as research, extension services, irrigation, livestock development, rural infrastructures, etc. For instance, in 2010 livestock disease control, plus research and irrigation programs got, all-together, only 1% of the agricultural budget. Similarly, funding to the Provincial Agricultural Coordination Offices has been erratic (UNDP, 2016).

2017 budget is even more strongly oriented towards maize subsidies with FISP and FRA accounting for 70% of the agriculture budget -52.7% FISP and 17.3% FRA- (IAPRI, 2017). This leaves a mere 30% for ADPs plus staff and administrative costs.
Disbursement

In Zambia, there is a certain amount of vagueness as to how the agricultural budgets are executed and the disparities between approved estimates and actual releases suggest the agricultural budget only offers a rough guide of spending priorities (Govereh et al. 2006). While there are often overspendings in (the already massive) FISP and FRA, the percentages spent for (other) agricultural development programs are almost always well below what it was initially budgeted. In 2015, for instance, only 21% of the budget for the ADPs i.e. non-FISP and FRA programs, such as irrigation, extension, etc.- was spent, largely because the FISP and FRA disbursements exceed their initial allocations.

External assistance

Donor support to the agriculture and food security sector in Zambia is, overall, well-articulated and aligned with the country priorities. The CAADP agenda and the Vision 2030 program provide the structure for mobilizing he donors’ support.

Donors account for 25% of the Zambian agriculture public investments (WB, 2014). The WB is the first donor in the agriculture sector (34% of the agriculture ODA), followed by AfDB (23%), IFAD (17%), USAID (8%) and EU (5%).

The Agriculture Cooperating Partners Group is a government-donor coordination group focused on agriculture, food security and natural resources management, and was established to promote mutual accountability. The Cooperating Partners Group is currently chaired by the European Union with FAO and Finland sharing chair responsibilities on a rotating basis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main recent ODA agriculture projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Productivity Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation Development Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot Project on Climate Resilience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced Smallholder Livestock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallholder Agribusiness Promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Productivity &amp; Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock Infrastructure Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Productivity and Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Sector Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening Rice Seed Production</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Policy monitoring and evaluation mechanisms

Zambia lacks a comprehensive agriculture and food security policy monitoring and evaluation system (USAID, 2014). The NAIP includes consistent performance indicators and monitoring measures that provide a solid basis for monitoring and evaluation. However, a data collection system tied to these indicators and able to track the annual budget accordingly, is still missing.

The MoA sometimes conduct surveys and assessment of some of its programs, but they do address the issue of their contribution to the overall food security of the country. The Parliament does not have an independent process to carry out monitoring and evaluations.

Although it is planned that the NAIP implementation would be subjected to annual performance reviews, these reviews have not been regularly performed.
Main CSOs networks and alliances in the FNS sector

The Zambia National Farmers’ Union (ZNFU) was funded in the 1990 as an alliance of large-scale producers. In the 1990s, in the wave of Zambian democratic transition, ZNFU expanded to integrate small-scale farmers. However, the role of the smallholders remains limited. ZNU is the most influential organization in the sector, thanks to its media network and the economic muscle of its members. In 2016 the ZNFU was involved in a massive corruption scandal, when the Executive Director and other where incriminated of embezzlement of large sums in donor funds meant to help small scale farmers.

The Women Farmers Forum is a platform within ZNFU to enhance gender mainstreaming in agriculture.

The Agri-Business Forum (ABF) is a private sector initiative that seeks to develop and maintain ongoing engagement with government.

National Union of Small Scale Farmers of Zambia (NUSSFZ) was created in 2000 and is strictly focused in the needs and demands of the small-scale farmers. It has 56,000 members and is present in almost all the districts.

The Zambia Alliance for Agroecology and Biodiversity Conservation (ZAABC), pools 20 organizations and promotes small-scale farmer driven agro-ecological farming systems and pro-poor sustainable development, supporting smallholder seed saving traditions.

In Zambia there are some academic institutions and think-tanks engaged agriculture policy research and analysis, including the Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute (IAPRI), the Conservation Farming Unit (CFU) or the University of Zambia.

Transparency and civil society participation in policy making

Various agriculture multi-stakeholders’ platforms have been promoted by the GoZ in recent years to facilitate civil society participation in the policy making processes, but in practice their functioning is erratic and their direct involvement in policy formulation very limited (USAID, 2014).

There is, for instance, an Agriculture Sector Advisory Group (AgSAG) which bring together the MoA, key donors and some civil society organizations, and that should meet with government to provide input to policy development and implementation. The MoA chairs the AgSAG and operates the secretariat; in practice, AgSAG convenes infrequently and is not been a regular part of policy discussion, development and coordination.

Farmers cooperatives

According to some estimations, 52% of Zambian farmers are members of cooperatives (RALS, 2015), grouped in more than 20,000 primary coops (Lolojih, 2012).

Till the 80s, cooperatives in Zambia were operating as quasi subsidiaries of the State for the distribution and implementation of various public-funded projects, but since the full liberalization of the coops sector in the 90s, they lost this top-down and monopolistic nature.

The majority of the cooperatives now are financially very weak and many are actually de facto defunct, even if they are still legally registered. Still a certain number of new cooperatives, community-driven and with a clear business orientation, have started to emerged in recent years, including many all-women coops.
Another multi-stakeholder platform for consultation and dialogue around agriculture policy development is the Agriculture Consultative Forum (ACF). The board is elected by the members and it has a full-time secretariat that is independent of government. In practice, ACF meets infrequently and is not very effective.

Summary and conclusions

Zambia has produced a consistent and well-articulated food security and agriculture policy framework (NAP, NAIP), which is well aligned with the international and regional commitments and where the needs of the small-scale farmers are well reflected.

Financial investments for agriculture are substantial, often above the 10% Maputo commitment. Though, the indicators included in the policy documents are not regularly tracked and civil society participation in the policy making process is erratic.

Despite these substantial investments, the agricultural policies have not significantly contributed to hunger reduction. This is mainly because most of the policy and budgetary efforts have been focused on poorly designed programs with a narrow focus on maize production, such as the FISP and in the State procurement of maize, with little impact in improving the food security of the smallholders, while other key such as extension or irrigation, remained severely underfunded.

In the following chapter, we will analyse in greater detail how the implementation of the various subcomponents of the agriculture and food security policy (access to land, inputs, extension, irrigation, etc.) are impacting in the small-scale farmers.
Agriculture and food security policy implementation

Overall, Zambian agricultural policies have only marginally led to an increase in rural incomes and contributed marginally to poverty reduction and to increased food and nutrition security (Mason et al., 2013). This is mainly because agricultural policymaking has not been evidence-based, due to a lack of available and accessible information, little transparency in the decision processes, limited institutional coordination, prevalence of political and partisan interests and a rent-seeking behavior by some decision makers. This has frequently led to ineffective and often costly programs with little positive impact in empowering and improving the lives of the small-scale farmers. In this chapter, we will look into each of these main programs or subcomponents of the overall agriculture and food security policy.

Access to land and the large-scale agricultural investments

In Zambia, the policies and procedures for awarding land titles tend to favor non-local investors, such as formal wage earners and individuals with connections to the state, over local farmers (Sitko et al, 2014). Since the mid-2000s the GoZ have embarked on the development and commercialization of ‘Farm Blocks’, by availing land for large scale agribusiness investment to the private sector. Normally, each Farm Block has no less than 100,000 ha. was targeted for development in each province of the country.

The official goals of the Farm Block policy is to enhance food security, open underdeveloped rural areas, reduce poverty, minimize rural to urban migration and add value to agricultural products by processing them into products ready for the market. The government develops backbone infrastructure in the designated blocks (roads, electrification, bulk water supply to small scale farmers, etc.) and leases the land to the investors for 99 years’ renewable. The core venture investor shall provide a market and processing facilities to small and medium scale farmers, which are to be organized in out-grower arrangement.

Land grabbing

The Land Matrix Global Observatory reports that currently 18 foreign large scale agricultural investments (LSAIs) are operational in Zambia and hold 165,837 hectares of public land under contract. Many of these lands were already cultivated by small-scale farmers. It is estimated that 12% of land in Zambia has been acquired by LSAIs that are larger than 2,000 hectares (Schoneveld, 2014), often for developing mining.

84% of the large commercial farm owners in Zambia are Zambians; 4,5% are from Zimbabwe, 3% from South Africa and another 3% of the UK. Less than 0,5% are from USA. (Sipangule, K. Et al, 2016)

Some studies have analyzed various aspects of the impact on the small-scale farmers of the LSAIs promoted by the ‘farms block policy’ in Zambia. Based on focus group discussion conducted near the Mkushi farm block in Zambia, Nolte (2014) reports that smallholders criticize foreign LSAIs for having flooded local markets and driving down the prices of agricultural produce. Another field study on the impact of two investments points out that the potential of commercial farms to employ people from the local population is quite limited, because ‘high
mechanization and demand for qualified labor leads to limited job opportunities for local communities’ (Nolte and Susibanka, 2016).

Fertilizer use rate
Crop Forecast Survey (2003 – 2016)

Zambian ‘farm blocks’ policy has been also criticized for their detrimental effects on the environment. A case study (Mujenja and Wonani, 2012) showed that LSAIs are responsible for the contamination of ground water through seepage caused by the excessive use of chemical fertilizers and aerial pesticide sprays. Another research (German et al., 2013) show that LSAIs are responsible for large tracts of deforestation in the Miombo woodlands in the north of Zambia.

Access to inputs

Input subsidies have been part of Zambia’s landscape since independence. However, in the 1990s, during the structural adjustment, these programs were curbed for some time and one of the results was a decline in maize production. In the early 2000s the Government decided to reinstate subsidies for fertilizer and hybrid maize seed (ACB, 2015). In 2009 the program was updated and became the Farmer Input Support Program (FISP) and, since them, as we already saw, it has become an enormous burden to the Government’s budget. As a recent study by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), highlighted, FISP is mainly ‘a politically motivated program because it resonated with so many rural voters’ (Resnick, 2016).

Under FISP, fertilizers and improved seeds are distributed to farmers that cultivate a minimum of 0.5 hectares (Mason and Tembo, 2015). Initially focused on maize, the number of products covered by the program has been also expanded, to cover also cotton, rice, groundnuts and sorghum seeds (Burke, 2012).

FISP has been successful in reaching its immediate goal of augmenting the use rate of agrochemical fertilizers (although levels are still below the World average application rate and within sustainable ranges) by the farmers (see chart). Largely due to FISP, the adoption rates in Zambia for improved maize seed are amongst the highest in Africa: Up to 90% of maize seed is hybrid. But most seed and seed types apart from maize are still being produced year after year by farmers themselves.

‘A large body of evidence has repeatedly pointed to concerns over the FISP, including its inability to achieve its stated objectives, the crowding out of other important agricultural investments, few opportunities for strengthening the private sector, a lack of transparency in the tendering process, and repeated late delivery of inputs’.

IFPRI, 2016

The program seems also successful in augmenting maize production: There was a sharp increase in average annual maize production following the launch of FISP, from an average of 1.2 million tons in the 2000s, to 2.9 million tons from 2010–2014. The good performance in sorghum
and groundnuts crops can be credited to the FISP too.

However, FISP has been subject of severe criticism: While an increase in production may be welcome, there are costs to this exclusive focus on a single crop. It directs farming households towards maize production even in marginal conditions, thus reducing ecological sustainability and ultimately production diversity (African Center for Biodiversity, 2015).

Besides, the program is not really poverty-oriented. Better-off households that have more land, livestock and farm equipment have been benefiting more from FISP than poor smallholders (Chapoto et al, 2015). This is because the program tends to favor medium-scale farmers due to the intentional targeting of “viable” farmers, that excludes many smallholders (Burke, 2012). According to an independent survey, only about only 25% of the poorest households received FISP fertilizer compared to 45% among the better off farmers (IAPRI, 2016).

FISP has also been critically assessed because it crowds out commercial input investments by the private sector (Xu et al. 2009). The program tends to source from a limited number of fertilizer suppliers, creating an uneven playing field for private sector.

*‘Government expenditure on FISP is benefiting mostly the larger and relatively already well off households, with very little impact on yields and poverty reduction’.*

Antony Chapoto, PhD
Zambian agriculture policy expert

In addition, the design of FISP does not take the spatial variability of soil fertility and geographical differences of the country into consideration, producing very distorting effects (Sipangule, K., 216). It has also been argued that the expansion of maize cultivation onto virgin lands supported by subsidized inputs has exacerbated deforestation rates (ISSD Africa, 2012).

Furthermore, FISP has been often implemented in an inefficient manner, due huge delays in the delivery of the fertilizers. A study found that this late delivery negatively affects Zambian farmers’ technical efficiency, causing losses in maize production above 20% of the total cost of the program. (Namonje-Kapembwa, et al. 2015).

Efforts to reform the FISP have been met with a lot of resistance due to the political nature of maize cultivation, but finally, after years of lobbying by various stakeholders to reform the FISP the Ministry of Agriculture finally launched an e-voucher version program as a pilot in 13 selected districts during the 2015/2016 agricultural season. In this modality, the farmers get electronic vouchers that they can use to acquire the inputs from the providers suppliers of their choice, instead of receiving the physical inputs. The e-vouchers has been expanded to 39 districts during the 2016/17 farming season. The idea is that by using the e-vouchers modality there will be more crowd-in of private sector in agro-input distribution, reducing public expenditure; the model also ensures timely delivery, allows farmers to choose inputs by themselves and reduce the leakages and deviations and promote diversification.

Despite some notable delays in e-cards activation and various logistical complications, most farmers reported having access to inputs of their choice on time in nearby agro-dealer shops.

In the 2017 Budget Speech, Zambia’s president announced that FISP will fully
migrate to the e-voucher modality during the 2017/18 agricultural season.

‘FISP and FRA, are not achieving the policy objectives of reducing rural poverty and building small scale agriculture. However, any reduction in these programs is politically risky because it appears as an abandonment of small farmers’. USAID Zambia Food Security Assessment, 2014

Extension services

Most sources agree that, overall, Zambian extension system is quite effective and properly reaches out to poor farmers. The Government encourages varied agricultural research and extension modalities and local farmer organizations are involved in setting the extension policy priorities (HANCI, 2014).

In fact, 73.7% of Zambian small-scale farmers have regular access to extension services (IAPRI, 2016), which is one of the best percentages in the whole of Africa. Currently there are nine Farm Training Institutes and 43 Farmers’ Training Centers, covering various districts. The current ratio of frontline extension officers is 1 per every 1,700 farmers.

At least part this of this success is attributable to CARE, which for many years was working in expanding the extension network and promoting farmers’ field schools.

Still, and despite this large penetration, the extension system cannot yet cover all the demand. IPAPRI has demanded that ‘the government should, channel more resources towards extension services for the staff to be able to go into the field and interact with farmers (…) as well as engage more officers to cope with the rising demand for extension services among smallholder farmers’. (Namonje-Kapembwa T., 2016).

The Patriotic Front Manifesto has set the goal to expand the network of training centers in order to cover all the districts of the country and to increase the extensions’ ratio to 1 per 400 farmers.

Since 2015, the CSO platform Zambia Forum for Agriculture Extension and Advisory Services (ZAFAS), plays a role in coordinating agriculture extension, through inclusive sharing of information and increase professional interaction (Feed the Future, 2015). ZAFAS is committed to gender-responsive and nutrition-sensitive approaches.

Irrigation

Irrigation has not been sufficiently promoted in Zambia. Zambian potential of irrigable land is over 423,000 ha, of which about only 100,000 ha is currently irrigated, mainly among the large-scale farmers (PARI, 2015).

Zambia’s National Irrigation Plan (2001) aims to make Zambia’s agriculture less dependent on rain. The approach is to promote commercial irrigation enterprises by establishing an enabling environment and introducing alternatives to formal irrigation schemes.

The major ongoing investment in irrigation in Zambia is World Bank’s Irrigation and Development Support Project (2011-2018; US$ 115 million loan), implemented by the MoA. The project objective is to increase yields and volume of products marketed by smallholders by constructing large-scale irrigation schemes. This approach contradicts the results of a national consultation process conducted in 2009, where the majority of the small-scale
farmers indicated that their preferred agricultural water management solutions are farm-level low-cost technologies, instead of large-scale irrigation schemes (AGWATER, 2009).

2017 agriculture budget foresees a massive 656% increase in the allocations for irrigation (IAPRI 2 2017), aiming to set up 20 large irrigation schemes under private-public partnerships, particularly in farm blocks, and therefore, not really adapted to the needs of the smalls-scale farmers.

Maize subsidies
(Food Reserve Agency)

‘Maize centric policies that have characterized Zambian agriculture have adversely affected the other sub-sectors such as smallholder horticulture (...) Smallholder horticulture is much more profitable compared to maize’

Munguzwe Hichaambwa,
Is Smallholder Horticulture the Unfunded Rural Poverty Reduction Option in Zambia?
IAPRI, 2015

During the last 20 years or so, the GoZ has been (and still is) subsidizing maize, via the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) which purchases maize above market prices.

Like the FISP, this massive program has been subject of serious criticism. According to various sources, the FRA has perpetuated the inefficient modes of production faced by these smallholders. The subsidy distorts the market and prevents the small-scale farmers from moving into more profitable crop varieties. Returns to maize production per unit of land are low compared to horticultural and other high value crops which are not supported by the Government (Hichaambwa, et al, 2015). ‘Maize production is unlikely to provide a means out of poverty for these land constrained farmers’ (IAPRI, 2016). Even the GoZ has recognized that the unbalance agriculture policies that favor maize production have been creating a disadvantage conditions to produce other crops (6th SNDP, 2014).

FRA has also impacted negatively on the private sector participation in maize marketing, by reducing competition in the wholesaling sector and concentrating the maize supply chain around the government-led marketing system (Kuteya and Sitko, 2015).

Overall, FRA benefits more those farmers that are relatively better-off rather than the small-scale farmers. Furthermore, and because as many as one third of the poor famers in Zambia are net buyers of food, they would benefit more from lower average food prices that result from functional food markets rather than higher producer prices caused by the subsidies.

In 2016 the GRZ launched the Cashew Infrastructure Development Project cofounded by the AfDB (US$ 45 million loan) and budgetary resources (US$ 18.45). The CIDP is meant to benefit 70,000 smallholders’ farmers out of which 35,000 are women. This seems to be a serious attempt to promote diversification (i.e. a sizable program with a focus other than maize) although via the promotion for a cash crop, rather than through nutrients’ rich crops such as fruits or vegetables.

Access to finance

The CAADP established a number of specific targets in order to increase access to rural finance including training of financial services providers, training 250,000 small-scale farmers (of which at least 30% women) in rural finance but no evidence.
However, these good intentions did not translate into reality, and Zambia does not have in place such set of actions to facilitate access to credit by the smallholders.

In 2017, the Government has started running the new **Emergent Farmer Support Program** (US$40 million) which includes a fund to support 1,000 emergent farmers in mechanization of crop production, so the vast majority of the small-scale-farmers are, in fact, out the scope of the program.

---

**Summary and conclusions**

The implementation of the agriculture and food security policies in Zambia is having little positive impact in empowering and improving the lives of the small-scale farmers:

- The so-called farm blocks have been awarded to large scale agribusiness, and the small-scale farmers cannot compete with the low-cost production from these large agribusinesses.

- Thanks to FISP maize production has increased substantially, but the program does not focus on the very small-scale farmers.

- The maize subsidy via is perpetuating inefficient models of production and is a disincentive to diversification.

- There are no incentives to improve access to finance by small scale farmers.

- The government favours large scale irrigation investments, instead of community-based water management solutions.

- Zambian extension policy on the contrary, can be praised for its large coverage and remarkable quality, although women farmers (as we will see in the next chapter, when analyzing the gender implications of the agriculture and food security policies) still have less access to it than men.
**Agriculture/FNS policy implementation through the lens of the SuPER approach**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy area</th>
<th>Sustainable</th>
<th>Productive</th>
<th>Inclusive</th>
<th>Resilient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to land</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inputs</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension services</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>✔️</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>✔️</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize subsidies</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>❌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to finance</td>
<td>To early to asses</td>
<td>To early to asses</td>
<td>❌</td>
<td>To early to asses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CARE’s SuPER approach to agriculture promotes (1) sustainable agricultural systems grounded in healthy ecosystems, stable, accountable and enduring institutions and sustainable financing; (2) productive, (including profitable, and nutrition-sensitive) intensification interventions that are ‘climate smart’ and increase returns on investment for farmers; (3) equitable outcomes in smallholder agriculture by enabling access to equal rights, opportunities, resources and rewards; taking into account the needs/constraints of women; and (4) supporting access to affordable nutritious food for all and help individuals, families, communities and systems to become resilient.

**Access to land**: The farm block model, sponsored by the government of Zambia, promotes resource-intensive agricultural systems whose environmental and economic sustainability is questionable. Although economically productive, the model is neither inclusive towards small scale farmers nor designed to enhance resilience. Women farmers face restriction in accessing land due to traditional law.

**Inputs**: FISP is not grounded at all on an ecosystems sustainability models and there are issues on the accountability of the program and the institutions involved in managing it. The program is augmenting maize productivity but not hand to hand with nutrition-sensitive and climate smart models. The focus of the program is the viable farmers and not to the poorest farmers, and women farmers are neglected by the program, so we cannot talk about inclusiveness. Finally, resilience is not really incorporated to the program.

**Extension services**: Zambian extension on system promotes conservation agriculture and other sustainable models. It helps farmers to augment production, including via climate smart approached (hence, it is productive). The system reaches majority of the farmers, although women farmers are less targeted by the extension services than men, so inclusiveness remains an issue. Diversification is increasingly part of the extension content (making the model more resilient).

The irrigation models that Zambia promotes are based in intensive use of the resource, and the maintenance of the irrigation schemes is not properly kept, so both environmental and financial sustainability remain an issue. Production augments thanks to irrigation, including the options to diversify. The model is not inclusive: Community-based irrigation models are neglected compare to large infrastructures, and women are not adequately targeted. Resilience is not promoted.

The maize subsidies in Zambia are financially and environmentally non-sustainable. They may have contributed in augmenting production, but only of this crop, disactivating diversification. The subsidies are not inclusive: They benefit more the larger farmers compare to the smalls scale farmers, impacting also negatively in consumers in general. The subsidies do not promote access to nutritious and diversify food, so does not support resilience.
Gender policies and the women small-scale farmers

International commitments

Zambia has signed the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, upholding its commitment to the rights of people, including women, to access to the courts, equal protection and peace. Zambia has also agreed with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women and Peace which requests member countries of the UN to promote women’s equal involvement in peace and security, to protect women in conflicts and to prevent sexual violence as well as gender based violence, but the country does not have its own national action plan to implement this resolution.

In Zambia there exists a deep-rooted concept of an unequal gender relationship in which men are considered to be superior to women. This biased view regarding gender equality originates from not only traditional cultural and social norms but also from the dual structure of statutory law and customary law’.

Zambia- Country Gender Profile
JICA, 2016

Main national policies

The National Gender Policy was formulated in 2014 and advocates for a 50% representation of women in all national programs. This policy lists the strategy and actions to be implemented by government ministries and agencies in 15 different fields to achieve gender equality, although there are no formal commitments in terms of indicators and annual budgets. (Sitko, 2014 2).

In 2015 the Parliament of Zambia enacted the Gender Equity and Equality Act, which rules that ‘all public bodies and private bodies shall, within their ambit of responsibility, promote gender equity and equality in all spheres of life by (…) mainstreaming gender in all strategies, policies, programs and budgets to empower and benefit both sexes [and] ensuring accommodation of the needs and interests of both sexes’.

In 2005, the Penal Code was revised, making the punishments for sexual violence against women and children stricter. The Anti-Gender Based Violence Act was enacted in 2011. However, the actual enforcement of these laws has been slow and acceleration of their enforcement is sought (CARE, 2014).

In Zambia, 43 % of women aged 15-49 years have experienced intimate partner physical and/or sexual violence in the last 12 months (UNW, 2016).

Institutional set-up

The main State body responsible for gender issues in Zambia is the Ministry of Gender, which was established in 2012). The Ministry has focal persons in all the provinces.

Most ministries and agencies have appointed also their own gender focal points but in general they lack decision-making power and/or knowledge of gender. The 2014 Gender Policy explicitly recognizes as one of the main challenges in gender mainstreaming in the country is the limited co-ordination between and within ministries and other government agencies.

The Gender Equity and Equality Rights Act has established a Gender Equity and
Equality Commission to supervise the implementation of gender equality.

The Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs, Governance, Human Rights and Gender Matters is supposed to provide oversight on gender mainstreaming in the administration, but it is not very effective due to insufficient capability to conduct gender analyses and lack of precise information and data (JICA, 2016).

There is a skewed distribution of males and females in key leadership positions in the agriculture and natural resources sector. This is depicted by the higher proportion of males than females in senior positions in government (Dlamini, 2016).

In Zambia there are no robust monitoring and evaluation frameworks for the gender equality policies or gender assessments of legislation.

**Women organizations and the Constitutional Reform**

Various civil society organizations in Zambia are actively involved in advocacy with the Government on women’s rights issues, such as the NGO Coordinating Council (NGOCC) and the Zambia National Women’s Lobby (ZNWL).

**Gender-specific policies and women small-scale farmers**

The National Gender Policy Implementation Plan 2014 – 2016 included a number of provisions aiming to reduce the gender gap in the agriculture sector, including awareness raising on the issue of land ownership rights of women, integrating gender in the agricultural training programs and training sessions, capacity building to facilitate women’s participation in production cooperatives, and identification of potential market linkages as part of the women’s economic empowerment program.

The National Agriculture Policy includes a whole section on promotion of gender equity in resources’ allocation and access to agriculture services. The NAIP 2014 – 2018 contains also various gender equality measures, including the promotion of gender sensitive agriculture research or the requirement for all the sector data to be des-aggregated by gender.

However, as we shall see, these good intentions often do not translate into real gender mainstreaming in the implementation of the agriculture specific policies, and there appears to be a lack of
women participation in agriculture, natural resources and environment programs and projects (AfDB, 2006; Banda, 2015).

**Access to land**

The Zambian Constitution, which was reformed in 2016, states that the land policy of Zambia should ensure equitable access to and ownership of land by women. However, the customary law (94% of the land is owned under customary law) severely limit women access to land. Married women in Zambian patrilineal communities’ access land through their husbands; while in matrilineal societies, women access land through their natal families, and men receive land through their wives (USAID, 2011). In both systems, the male head of household usually exercises primary control over the land (Unruh, 2005). The 2016 Constitution has established its prevalence over customary law, and hence, prohibiting any gender discrimination, even if legitimated by the customary law.

The National Gender Policy provides that 30% of all land available for distribution by the state should be given to women. The policy has not been implemented.

**Access to inputs**

FISP has largely fail to target women farmers. A study by the Ministry of Gender conducted in 2012 saw that during tis 5 first years of implementation, only one third of the farmers benefited from the FISP program were women farmers (MoG, 2012).

**Extension services**

The agricultural extension services in Zambia lean towards to focus on male farmers only. The male family members accessing the service usually do not to share their newly acquired knowledge and skills with the female members (SIDA, 2008).

The NAIP foresees a 30% quota for female participants in training in rural areas, which is not very ambitious given that the percentage of women in agriculture activities is much higher. Although the MoA has adopted a target figure of also 30% for women extension workers, as of Nov 2015 the proportion was around 25%.

There is also a small number of women enrolling in agricultural schools and the concentration of female extension workers in areas near the cities as they are reluctant to work in rural areas due to family circumstances.

**Access to finance**

In Zambia, as in many other countries, village-level savings schemes, which are predominantly for women and, overall, rural women can increase household livelihood assets better than their male (Dlamini, 2016).

Zambian women face severe difficulty accessing bank loans. Most women are unable to provide the required guarantees.

---

**Women participation in community projects on agriculture**

A recent survey on 14 community-level agricultural projects implemented in the Northern and Sothern provinces (Dlamini, 2016) found that the level of participation of women in the projects is high, although important differences exist between both provinces (42% in Southern province and 53% in Northern province).
and, although the practice is illegal, banks often demand that women provide proof of their husbands’ consent when applying for loans. Without access to bank loans, many women are forced to take short-term loans from private lenders, who charge extremely high interest rates.

The now finalized Government’s Child Grant Program (CGP) was an unconditional cash transfer targeted to women in households with young children. A 2016 independent study found that the CGP enabled poor women to save more cash and that the impact of the program is larger for women who had lower decision-making power at baseline. The program increased diversification into non-farm enterprises that are traditionally operated by women, driven in part by the increased savings generated by the cash transfer (UNICEF, 2016).

Access to irrigation

The World Bank’s Irrigation and Development Support Project” (which is the most significant investment in Zambian in the irrigation sub sector) claims in its formulation document that the it will have a positive impact on women and female-headed households and that it will promote women’s inclusion using a participatory approach to land use planning. However, an independent assessment revealed that the project includes just one gender-specific indicator and that only one-third of targeted beneficiaries are women (Bibler, S. 2012).

“The Child Grant Program results support the proposition that cash transfers have the potential for long-term sustainable improvements in women’s financial position and household well-being by promoting savings and facilitating productive investments among low-income rural households’. UNICEF, 2016

Summary and conclusions

Gender mainstreaming is an official policy in Zambia, and this is well reflected in the Constitution, in the national strategies and development plans, as well as in specific gender acts and policies. There is also a Ministry of Gender and gender focal points across the governmental institutions.

Despite this recognition, most the State programs on agriculture fail to adequately mainstream gender: less than one third of the farmers targeted by FISP or by the extension services are women; and the irrigation programs do not include gender indicators.
Climate change resilience policies and the small-scale farmers

**International commitments**

Zambia ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1993, the Kyoto Protocol in 2006 and the Paris Agreement in 2016.

Zambia has also ratified the Convention on Biodiversity, the Convention to Combat Desertification and the Non-Legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forest, conventions that have synergies with efforts to address climate change.

**Main national policies**

Zambia has produced all the climate change-related basic policy instruments required to fulfil the country’s international commitments. These programmatic documents are, overall, coherent and well structured, albeit often not very detailed.

Zambian National Action Program (NAP-UNCCD) for the UNCCD was approved in 2002. The NAP aims to improve and restore productivity of the land resources and promote social economic development. NAP also emphasizes on community participation and gender.

As a Least Developed Country, Zambia produced in 2007 a National Adaptation Program of Action on Climate Change (NAPA). The NAPA ‘aims to contribute to the national objectives of poverty reduction through sustained economic growth, employment creation and enhancement of food security’. Agriculture is one of the key areas tackled in the NAPA.

Based on the NAPA, in 2010 Zambia elaborated a National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS), the vision of which is ‘a prosperous climate change resilient economy’. The NCCRS aims to harmonize national activities around climate change. It outlines a number of priority projects and programs for different sectors, identifying also the relevant organizations to lead them, and providing rough cost estimates and output timelines.

**REDD+ in Zambia**

The UNFCC is developing the REDD+ mechanism to provide financial incentives to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation as well as conservation of indigenous forests; sustainable management of forests; and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks. Zambia has approximately 50 million hectares of forest, with an estimated deforestation rate of 250,000 to 300,000 hectares per year. In recognition of the role REDD+ can play in reducing emissions and facilitating sustainable socio-economic development, the Zambian government is presently assessing, with the support of UNDP, the opportunities potentially delivered through REDD+.

Zambia’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) was submitted to the Secretariat of the UNFCCC in 2015. The INDC includes both mitigation and adaptation components up to 2030. Agriculture is predominantly featured in the INDC, both in terms of mitigation (with references to climate smart agriculture, biogas plants and biomass for electricity generation) and in terms of mitigation too (research on
agriculture adaptation scenarios, climate smart agriculture, extension and awareness, etc.)

The environment, including climate change adaptation and mitigation, is treated as a cross-cutting issue in the SNDP. The document explicitly states that the required improvements in agricultural productivity and diversification ‘must take climate change into account’ which is affecting negatively the performance of the agriculture sector’.

The current Constitution of Zambia, although it does not explicitly mention climate change, has strong provisions on environment and sustainable development. There are also several sectoral laws which address aspects of climate change albeit indirectly. They include the Water Act (1948); the Forest Act (1999); the Energy Regulation Act (1995); the Environmental Protection Act (1999) or the Disaster Management Act (2010).

Zambia does not have a stand-alone policy framework specifically referred to climate-smart agriculture (CSA). The NAPA, the NCCRS and the INDC make references to the effects on CC in agriculture and propose agriculture adaptation measures (as well as mitigation measures in agriculture), but these measures are outlined only in generalist terms, without much elaboration. Furthermore, and as we shall see later, the small-scale farmers are largely absent from the policy framework.

Institutional setup

In Zambia, the issue of lead institutional mandate for CC has been problematic; for many years, there have been disagreements about which Ministry should spearhead this agenda (Van Rooij, 2014).

The NCCRS states that, due to the lack of clear division of roles and responsibilities of different actors working on CC in Zambia, there was the need to establish a new institutional framework for overseeing CC activities nationally - the National Climate Change and Development Council (NCCDC). This body, however, was never created. In 2009 the Government with the facilitation of UNDP, established the Climate Change Facilitation Unit (CCFU) marking a turning point, because CC was for the first time separated from the broader environmental agenda to be pursued as a distinct policy issue. The CCFU was hosted in the Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Environmental Protection (MLNREP) and, during its short life, it was the body mandated to draft the climate policies.

Following the closure of the CCFU when donor funding came to an end in 2012, an interim structure attached to the Ministry of Finance was established - the Interim Inter-Ministerial Climate Change Secretariat (ICCS). The ICCS is a cross-ministry body, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and composed by the ministers of Environment, National Development Foreign Affairs, Finance, Trade, Industry, Transport, and Energy. (but, surprisingly, not by the minister of Agriculture) As of now, the ICCS is the main governmental mechanism...

‘There is a general lack of capacity in Zambia to respond to climate change challenges. And this situation runs across the Zambian bureaucracy. Lack of information on climate change that is suitable for different audiences is slowing down the pace for adoption of adaptation strategies and coping against climate change’.

Rosemary Fumpa-Makano
Climate change national consultant
coordinate the implementation of CC activities across sectors and projects and to facilitate access to climate funds (both domestic and global), although its ‘interim’ nature rise concerns on ICCS actual power and institutional sustainability.

The **Ministry of Water Protection, Sanitation and Environment** is mandated to formulate environmental policies, strategies and legislation, and to compile Zambia’s National Communications to the UNFCCC. It remains the national focal point for CC global topics, including for the **Global Environmental Fund (GEF)**, the **Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)**, and REDD+.

There have been various donor-funded efforts in Zambia to improve the institutional and individual capacities at national and local levels for a better multi-sectoral and multi-level response to CC, such as the UN funded (US$ 20 million) **Joint Program on Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction**, which run from 2012 to 2015. The MoF has also received support from GIZ to develop a climate-related project screening, appraisal and selection tool; and to conduct a capacity gap analysis of institutions that could seek **Green Climate Fund** accreditation. The MoA has been assisted with capacity building by FAO through SIDA’s funded project **Climate Smart Agriculture: Capturing the Synergies between Mitigation, Adaptation and Food Security**.

Despite these efforts, there are still considerable gaps and overlaps in the institutional architecture for managing the response to CC in Zambia (SARUA, 2014), as well as severe issues in terms of lack of skills by the policy makers and the relevant government officials.

### Budgetary commitments & expenditure

#### Budget commitments

The combined estimated cost of the activities planned in the NCCRS is US$ 6.6 billion. As the NCCRS recognizes, ‘compared to the potential climate change impacts on Zambia’s economy, this is a relatively small investment to make’. An assessment of the economic impacts of CC conducted by the MLNREP in 2011 estimated the economy-wide losses of CC in 10 years (2010 to 2020) in US$4.3/US$ 5.4 billion (equivalent to 0.9% - 1.5% of GDP), out of which, US$2.2/US$3.1 billion arise in agriculture.

The NCCRS lacks a periodization and sequencing and a financing plan so in fact it is impossible a proper monitoring of the planned disbursements.

#### Budget allocation and expenditure

Although precise data is unfortunately lacking, there are indications that Zambia is increasingly directing domestic finance towards its CC response. It has been estimated, for instance, that in the period 2008 to 2012, as part of the CC mainstreaming efforts in the various ministries, the Government allocated on average 7% of the National budget resources to CC activities (Mulenga, 2013) possibly one of the highest figures worldwide.

This was mainly thanks to a conscious effort for CC-mainstreaming across public-funded programs, although in some instances question marks raises on how the government labels a given investment as CC-related or not.

Only a small portion of the CC-related investments funded with the national budget (between 5 and 10%, depending on
the year) are oriented to agriculture-related activities. Disaster mitigating and response accounts for most the CC-related expenditure (between 57 and 91% of the CC expenditure, depending on the year). It is not possible to determine, with the available information, which percentage of the CC investments related to agriculture are actually focused on the needs of the small-scale farmers.

Another contributing factor to the relatively high funding for CC has been Zambia’s very successful access to the global funding mechanisms. This has been possible thanks to well-articulated efforts by the government (supported with capacity building and technical assistance by UNDP and other donors) and thanks also to the removal of a vast array of administrative barriers which has permitted to speed the accessing processes. A significant portion of the international climate finance to Zambia is oriented to agriculture adaptation (Oxfam, 2015), although the precise percentage is difficult to estimate.

**Access to climate funds**

As said, Zambia has successfully accessed resources from various CC funds and initiatives. As of January 2017, the country has been awarded with more than US$ 100 million climate funds, including US$ 76.5 million from the Climate Investment Fund (CIF), US$ 18 million from the LCDF, US$ 4.5 million from the UN Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and US$ 3 million from Germany’s International Climate Initiative (GiZ, 2013).

Funded by the CIF with US$ 76.5 million, the Pilot Program For Climate Resilience (PPCR) seeks to integrate climate resilience into Zambian core development policies and projects, as well as to strengthen the institutional coordination at the national level and improve the adaptive capacity of vulnerable communities in two pilot basins. The program is subdivided in two projects (each focused on one of the basins), administrated by the WB (Barotsese basin) and the AfDB (Kafue basin). Amongst other initiatives, the PPCR supports climate adaptation initiatives such as water harvesting infrastructure, conservation farming, farm-to-market roads, and small-scale irrigation. The ICCS is the coordinating agency of the PPCR at national level, while district authorities are engaged in overseen the actions at local level.

**Transparency and participation in policy making**

Although back in 2007, a multi-stakeholder consultation was used to prioritize and rank potential interventions for the NAPA, overall the public within Zambia have a limited understanding of how CC will potentially impact on socio-economics, livelihoods, resources and ecosystems. This dearth of awareness hinders public participation in shaping CC policy and legislation.

The Zambia Climate Change Network (ZCCN), which is the main civil society on CC, is represented in the ICCS, but beyond this, there is no established way for the participation of the farmers’ organizations in the climate change policy-related processes.

Local farmers’ cooperatives and associations are also not well-integrated in the CSA programs. The PPRC (the main CSA program in Zambia right now) was designed ‘to be primarily community driven’ (AfDB, 2013) but it is uncertain at this stage if this is actually the case.
In Zambia, there is also a lack of private sector involvement on issues related to CC (GRZ, 2006).

Place of small-scale farmers in the policy framework

Neither the NAPA, nor the NCCRS explicitly refers to the needs and circumstances of the Zambian small-scale farmers. In fact, all the references to agriculture in the policies are made to the sector as a whole. As we shall later see, sustainable agriculture, agroforestry and other CSA practices are consistently incorporated as priority topics in these documents, and, in fact, it could be assumed that, overall, these are climate adaptation tools are well-suited for the needs of the smallholders. However, the fact that the policy framework directly ignores the small-scale farmers, avoiding any reference to possible specific actions or projects to address their needs, seems, at least, bizarre. The NDC, while referring to CSA and also to the co-benefits of adaptation and mitigation (such as poverty reduction, food security, resilience and reduced vulnerability), it also misses to explicitly refers to the small-scale farmers

Allegedly the primary beneficiaries of the PPCR (which is, by far, the main ongoing program in the country on CSA) should be poor rural farmers and other vulnerable groups that depend on natural resources for their livelihoods. In practice, and as per the project document, only 300,000 out of the 800,000 targeted beneficiaries are people below the poverty line.

Thus, to sum-up, we can conclude that the needs and constrains of the small scale farmers are insufficiently addressed both in the agriculture adaptation framework and in its implementation.

---

**Zambia Climate Change Network**

The Zambia Climate Change Network (ZCCN), which was created in 2009, comprises 7 core organizations, and a network of another 50 working in the field of natural resource management and CC. It was established to create a platform for civil society to better organize themselves and coordinate their efforts in sharing information, engaging with stakeholders on issues related to climate change and undertaking advocacy-related activities.

---

**Impact of the policy implementation on the small-scale farmers**

**Vulnerability assessments**

The NAPA was formulated by a multidisciplinary assessment team, and community-level participatory vulnerability assessments were carried out in Eastern and Southern Province. Various others assessment of climate vulnerability on smallholders have been conducted, such as a CSA vulnerability assessment in the southern regions by the University of Zambia (SARUA, 2014).

**Weather forecast information**

‘[In Zambia] a lack of local expertise in regional climate processes and model interpretation, as well as limited access to existing climate information from external research organizations, generally increases uncertainty among local decision-makers and stakeholders, depressing the initiative to act upon projections’.

---

The Zambia Meteorological Department (ZMD) is mandated to coordinate climate change data. The
NCCRS includes under its priorities an increased support to the Government’s early warning systems to facilitate timely dissemination of weather information. In fact, some new weather stations have been opened in agricultural areas in recent years, funded by the EU (5 stations) and the UNDP (8 stations), augmenting the country total from 41 to 54 (Basics, 2013). Still, and as the ZMD recognizes, the stations’ network density is inadequate, the meteorological and telecommunication equipment in most stations is largely obsolete, there are limitations in skilled manpower. Furthermore, there is insufficient information on the farmers’ needs due to limited interaction with them and often the climate information does not reach the vulnerable communities (Imbawe, no date).

**Promotion of drought tolerant crops**

Enhanced support to extension services for the dissemination of crop varieties able to withstand adverse weather conditions is one of the priority topics foreseen in the NCCRS. Drought tolerant maize verities are becoming increasingly popular in Zambia. It is estimated that more than 50 maize hybrids and open pollinated varieties. Many of them are drought tolerant. They have been developed by the Drought Tolerant Maize for Africa project by CIMMYT, US-funded Feed the Future and other initiatives, and are provided to the farmers through seed companies and NGOs.

A 2014 survey found that in Zambia households with educated heads and/or more wealth are significantly more likely to adopt these improved varieties than poor and less educated farmers (Kalinda, 2014). Thus, the actual positive impact of this policy in the poor small-scale farmers is questionable.

**Conservation agriculture**

As elsewhere in Africa, Zambian farmers have traditionally practiced aspects of what is now called conservation agriculture. These practices are about using locally available resources in a way that sustains the resource base over long time periods. Farmers learned and shared these techniques amongst themselves, drawing on direct experience and experimentation.

The GRZ, with the support of donors and NGOs, have been trying, during the last decade, to promote the further use of conservation agriculture techniques to better adapt agriculture to CC, as well as to improve food security and promote environmental sustainability. The government claims that at least 300,000 households (37% of the total number of farmers) are now practicing conservation farming due to these initiatives (R-SNDP, 2014). However, independent studies give quite lower figures: An IAPRI research on the use of minimum tillage by farmers (which is one of the main conservation agriculture techniques) found that less than 5% of the interviewed farmers apply it (Ngoma, 2014).

The quality in the implementation of this policy seems unclear. A survey on the implementation of the agriculture conservation practices by small scale farmers in Chongwe district demonstrated that the potential to increase the adoption rate can only be tapped into if policies consider the behavioral aspects of the adoption of the technology—which is not always the case now (Chompolola A, and Kaonga, O., 2016). Another recent survey, this time in Manungu, found that the probability that a farmer will adopt conservation farming is 40% less if there is poor extension service delivery in the area—as it is the case right now in several
districts of Zambia, which lack proper extension coverage (Mwale, J.T., 2016).

**Improved soil and land management (ISLM)**

The NCCRS sets, amongst its agriculture-related priorities, the need to address soil and land degradation by promoting improved soil and land management practices. In fact, holistic approaches to managing soils for agricultural use have been promoted in Zambia for decades, both by NGOs and by the public extension system. The *Zambia Soil Health Consortium* project, funded by the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), has produced various manuals (Shitumbanuma, no date) although no data is available on the actual implementation of these practices by the small-scale farmers.

However, the massive promotion of subsidized synthetic fertilizer via FISP has probably undermined the efforts to promote ISLM practices by trapping the farmers in non-sustainable models: declining soil quality must be countered with a greater application of (subsidized) fertilizer, which in turn leads to a further decline in soil quality, and so on, in a vicious cycle (African Center for Biodiversity, 2015).

**Agroforestry**

Agroforestry have been promoted in Zambia for the past 20 years, as a potential tool for sustainable agriculture. The Eastern, Southern and Central Provinces adopted the practice on large scale. It has been claimed, however, just as in the case of ISLM and other CSA practices, the FISP has been steadily eroding the gains made over the years from these interventions, making many farmers to choose intensive agriculture against long term benefits from agroforestry practices.

---

**Measuring emissions mitigation in agriculture conservation in Zambia**

A recent analysis conducted by the FAO on the agricultural activities in the USAID funded Better Life Alliance (BLA) project (Nash, J. 2016) showed the potential high reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) by agriculture conservation activities in Zambia, mostly (85%) due to avoided savanna degradation and conversion. BLA promoted recycling farm organic resources, planting nitrogen-fixing trees, minimal tillage, and cover crops. The GHG impact due to BLA’s interventions was estimated by FAO at 900 thousand tones CO2e/year, equivalent to saving 2 million barrels of oil.

**Gender mainstreaming**

The NDC of Zambia is totally gender-blind. On the contrary, gender is well-mainstreamed in the NAPA. The GRZ is also in the process of developing a Climate Change Gender Access Plan, to ensure that Zambia’s climate change processes and projects mainstream gender considerations. In fact, the NCCRS stated that gender should be fully mainstreaming across all CC-relevant sectors by 2016, a goal that cannot be considered achieved.

Implementation is a very different story. The CCA activities that the GRZ promotes tend to pay little attention to women needs. For instance, only 30% of the direct beneficiaries (240,000 out of 800,000) of the Strengthening Climate Resilience in The Kafue Sub-basin project (which was designed by the GRZ, and funded by the CIF and implemented by the AfDB) are women or youth (no data available for women only). This, despite that according to a 2015 survey, in Zambia female title holders are significantly more likely to
make investments than male title holders for erosion control structures and inorganic fertilizer application (Hichaambwa et al, 20152).

**Policy monitoring and evaluation**

The NCCRS states that the ‘Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources (MTENR) shall be responsible for tracking, coordinating and overseeing the implementation of this strategic plan in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance and National Planning (MoFNP)’, but the document actually lacks a substantiated monitoring and evaluation plan. Therefore, it is uncertain to which extent the GRZ is currently ready to assess the impact of its CC policies and to ensure the participation of the stakeholders in such monitoring process.

**Summary and conclusions**

Zambia has produced the policy instruments required to fulfil the country’s international commitments on CC, including the adaptation program and the intended nationally determined contributions, but these documents are not very detailed. A comprehensive CC response strategy is also in place, but it lacks a detailed financing plan and a monitoring system.

The institutional leadership on CC has been problematic, and there is a general lack of institutional capacity to respond to CC.

Zambia has been very successful tapping the global funding mechanisms for cliCC, but only a small fraction of the climate funds are oriented to agriculture adaptation.

Although gender is mainstreamed in the policy documents, the CC adaptation activities that the GRZ promotes tend to give insufficient attention to the women needs.

The implementation of the agriculture adaptation policies leaves mix results. Draught tolerant maize varieties are no available, but poor farmers have limited access to them. The weather stations network has been expanded, but do not reach most of the farmers. The GRZ has been proactively promoting conservation agriculture practices, but the impact of the implementation is questionable.
**Nutrition Policies**

**International commitments**

**Nutrition broken promises**
Zambia has a very poor record in terms of fulfilling international commitments in nutrition. It badly missed the 1990 MDG commitment to halve the proportion of people undernourished by 2015 (the percentage augmented by 41%, the worst result worldwide) and the 1996 WHO commitment to halve the number of people undernourished (the number increased by 173%; again, the worst upshot in the entire world).

The country has endorsed the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), committing to eliminate hunger and malnutrition by 2030. Zambia is party as well of the World Health Assembly (WHA) Global Nutrition Targets (GNTs), which are to be fulfil by 2025, and has also signed the 1990 Innocenti Declaration, which set child survival targets related to breastfeeding.

In 2010, Zambia become an early signatory of the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN), a global movement that unites national leaders, civil society, bilateral and multilateral organizations, donors, businesses and researchers in a collective effort to improve nutrition and bring more coherence to the nutrition sector. DFID is the donor convener for SUN in Zambia.

Zambia joined the Committing to Child Survival in 2012, and pledged to reduce under-5 mortality to 20 or fewer deaths per 1,000 live births by 2035 by reducing the leading preventable causes of child mortality, including undernutrition.

In 2013, at the Nutrition for Growth (N4G) Summit in London, the GRZ committed to reduce stunting by 50% in the next ten years, as well as to increase GRZ expenditure on nutrition to reach the estimated additional US$30 per child under five and to increase budgetary allocations to nutrition by at least 20% annually for 10 years, through new and existing nutrition budget lines.

**Main national policies**

Zambia recognized the importance of nutrition more than 40 years ago. However, it was not until the 6th (2005–10) and 7th (2011–15) National Development Plans that the high levels of malnutrition in the country began to draw high-level attention and prompt concerted action. The country has developed a well-articulated nutrition-specific policy framework, with time bound nutrition targets. Multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder policy coordination mechanisms are also in place.

Although the active engagement of politicians, especially at the parliamentary level, helped raise the profile of nutrition in the country, it were the donors, NGOs and the UN Agencies the ones that played the biggest part in setting the nutrition policy agenda, bringing strategic leadership, and funding.

> ‘Zambia’s policy environment is fairly strong, with a sensible cascade of written nutrition policy and programs and some coherence in key sectoral policy on nutrition’.  
Stories in change in Nutrition  
Country case Zambia, 2016

Zambia joining SUN is widely recognized as ‘an important moment for multi-sector coordination for nutrition’ (Save the Children, 2016). Before SUN, there were no alliances or unified efforts across sectors dealing with nutrition matters, leading to irregular consultation, poor
coordination and “duplication and conflict of efforts’ (GoZ, 2012 2).

### NFNSP Strategic Directions

| SD 1: Prevention of stunting in children under-two years of age: First 1000 Most Critical Days |
| SD 2: Increasing micronutrient and macronutrient availability, Accessibility and utilization through improving food and nutrition security. |
| SD 3: Early identification, treatment, and follow-up of severe acute malnutrition |
| SD 4: Improving nutrition education and nutritious feeding through school |
| SD 5: Increase linkages among hygiene, sanitation, infection control, and nutrition |
| SD 6: Food and nutrition to mitigate HIV and AIDS |
| SD 7: Nutrition related control and prevention measures of diet related non-communicable diseases |
| SD 8: Food and nutrition preparedness and response to emergencies |
| SD 9: strengthening governance, capacity building and partnerships in support of food and nutrition interventions at all Levels |
| SD 10: Monitoring and evaluating food and nutrition situation, interventions and research to support their improvement and expansion |
| SD 11: Expanding and developing communication and advocacy support for food and nutrition interventions at various levels. |

### National Food and Nutrition Strategic Plan

Zambia’s first **National Food and Nutrition Policy** was adopted in 2006. The principal goal this policy is ‘to achieve sustainable food and nutrition security and to eliminate all forms of malnutrition in order to have a well-nourished and healthy population that can effectively contribute to national economic development’.

In 2013, the GRZ launched the **National Food and Nutrition Strategic Plan (NFNSP) 2011-2015**. The NFNSP built on in the National Food and Nutrition Policy, and it is fully aligned with the 6th National Development Plan 2013-2016 and with the global SUN movement call for emphasis on effective nutrition interventions. NFNSP first strategic priority is the prevention of stunting, with a focus on the First 1000 Most Critical Days of life Program (see below).

A new NFNSP is now under preparation, in a process funded by SUN and where CARE is strongly engaged.

### First 1000 Most Critical Days Program

The NFNSP led to the development of the **First 1000 Most Critical Days Program (MCDP)**, a collaboration between the GRZ and other partners which aims to scale up well proven, effective and low cost food and nutrition interventions, initially in 14 districts and, planned to be expanded, by 2018, to all the 114 districts in the country.

The MCDP is financed by the Scaling-Up Nutrition (SUN) Fund. This is a pooled financing system which aims to promote co-ordination and alignment between key Co-operating Partners and stakeholders.
Adopting this coordinated approach helps to avoid duplication of effort and reduces overall costs for all partners, including the GRZ.

CARE and its partners, Concern Worldwide and the Nutrition Association of Zambia, are the management agents for the SUN Fund. They support the NFNC and key line ministries to implement the MCDP.

Much of the work supported by the SUN Fund focuses on increasing capacity to provide nutrition services in the priority districts. The Fund focuses both nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive actions, although a 20016 study indicated that 'the profile of nutrition sensitive agriculture should be increased, including increasing dietary diversity (excluding bio-fortification of maize) to better align with partner’s strategic priorities' (Health Partners, 2016).

The NFNC enjoys good lines of communication with its major implementing partner and made tremendous strides in raising the profile of nutrition and in implementing the 1000 MCDs program. CARE is providing substantial capacity building and technical support to NFNC, including secondment of staff.

Still, NFNC placement within a single line ministry limits NFNC’s ability to coordinate across ministries. NFNC has no authority over the other ministries and must rely on co-operation and negotiation for any information gathering (Health Partners, 2016). Alternate options that have been proposed to place the NFNC include the Cabinet Secretariat, the Office of the Vice President, or the Office of the President. A draft Food and Nutrition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators in Zambia’s nutrition policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WHA Targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 40% stunted children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-30% low birth weight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-50% anemia women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+50% breastfeeding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-5% children wasting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Institutional set-up

National Food and Nutrition Commission

The National Food and Nutrition Commission (NFNC) is the designated convening body to coordinate action on nutrition. Currently based in the Ministry of Health (MoH), NFNC operates as SUN Focal Point. It receives technical and financial support from DFID, Irish Aid, SIDA and collaborates also with WFP, and WHO. In recent years, ‘NFNC has demonstrated organizational growth characterized by changes in thinking about its form and function, towards a strategizing and leadership function and a coordinating mechanism’ (CIFF/DFID, 2016).

The NFNC enjoys good lines of communication with its major implementing partner and made tremendous strides in raising the profile of nutrition and in implementing the 1000 MCDs program. CARE is providing substantial capacity building and technical support to NFNC, including secondment of staff.

Still, NFNC placement within a single line ministry limits NFNC’s ability to coordinate across ministries. NFNC has no authority over the other ministries and must rely on co-operation and negotiation for any information gathering (Health Partners, 2016). Alternate options that have been proposed to place the NFNC include the Cabinet Secretariat, the Office of the Vice President, or the Office of the President. A draft Food and Nutrition
Bill (that will redefine the role of NFNC) was developed during 2016, after a series of consultations with stakeholders. The bill has been approved by the Cabinet and awaits the endorsement by the Parliament.

Ministries and agencies

Given its multidisciplinary nature, in Zambia, as elsewhere, nutrition-related programs are distributed across different line ministries. The Ministry of Health is the main entity responsible for implementing the food and nutrition policy; the MoA deals with agriculture dimension in nutrition, the Ministry of Water Protection, Sanitation and Environment is responsible for water, hygiene and sanitation policies and projects. The Ministry of Health also delivers health and nutrition services at community level. The Ministry of General Education (MoGE), implements the School Health and Nutrition (SHN) program for adolescent girls in some schools.

A Special Committee of Permanent Secretaries on Nutrition, comprising all these line ministries implementing nutrition programs was established in 2014. The Committee is chaired by the Secretary to Cabinet.

Other public entities with responsibilities in nutrition are the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (the statutory body established to ensure competition and protect consumers); the Food and Drugs Control Laboratory (responsible to monitor food quality, safety, labeling, and marketing) and the Tropical Diseases Research Centre a parastatal unit under the Ministry of Health.

Although collaboration amongst all these bodies has improved in the recent times, there is still the need for them to further internalize the multi-sectoral approach that the nutrition sector requires.

Multi-stakeholders’ platforms

The Civil Society Organization of SUN (CSOSUN) is an alliance of NGOs working on nutrition, although it remains inactive in recent times.

The Nutrition Association of Zambia (NAZ) is the membership professional organization of nutritionists; it is still weak organization, which CARE is currently supporting.

A 2016 research by DFID found that ‘despite the broadly strong bond between nutrition actors in Zambia, there are many unfulfilled expectations in the Zambian nutrition community’. These include tensions between expectations of the NFNC’s role, and what their own reading of their mandate. The study also argued that ‘these tensions need to be acknowledged and discussed if they are to be resolved’ (DFID, 2016).

The Cooperating Partner Nutrition Group includes development partners and UN agencies that support for nutrition-related programming and keeps close coordination with the GRZ and civil society stakeholders.

Sub-national level

District and Sub-District Nutrition Coordinating Committees have been established with the financial support of CARE in recent years in the pilot areas of the MCDP where examples of how to address nutrition at field level have emerged. This experiential learning has altered national government planning and international funding focus, which in turn have influenced a funded implementation
model led by inter-sectoral committees in other pilot districts. It remains to be seen how the local-level initiatives can be scaled up to cover the whole country, ‘without losing the depth that was key to the process’ (DFID, 2016). Provincial Coordinating Committees started to be formed since late 2016.

**Budgetary commitments and expenditure**

Overall funding for nutrition has increased significantly in the last few years. Most of the funds for the ongoing initiatives are coming from donors. The State funded allocations for nutrition-specific activities are extremely limited.

It is difficult to keep an exact track of nutrition budgetary investment in Zambia and to determine of the country has fulfilled the NAIP commitment. In fact, a 2013 research by the Accountability & Transparency for Human Rights (AT4HR) Foundation on budget transparency and child nutrition, scored Zambia’s with the lowest rating amongst the 5 African countries which were surveyed (AT4HR, 2013). There are various reasons to explain this budget obscurity. On the one hand, the nutrition-related expenditure is not well identified in the budget structure, and there is no single comprehensive mechanism to track financial flows for nutrition. The nutrition interventions are spread-out along six key line ministries, and the nutrition targets and commitments foreseen in the policy documents are not mirrored in the various budget cycle processes. Finally, from the approved budget, is difficult to ascertain how much is reaching the communities.

Despite these difficulties, CARE has been able to track and nutrition expenditure according to which, the percentage of the State budget for nutrition activities (specific and sensitive) in the period 2012 to 2017 has been always never above 0,2% of the total budget, with the maximum percentage reached in 2015 (0,2%) and the minimum in 2017 (0,05%).

Also according to CARE, for the period 2015 to 2016, 41% of the State nutrition funding is allocated to the MoA, 28% by the Ministry of Health, 20% by the Ministry of Community Development and the remaining 11% by other ministries.

**Donors funding**

The SUN Donor Network has advocated for an increased number of donors to fund nutrition activities via the in-country SUN fund mechanism, resulting in more ODA supporting SUN priority interventions. Currently, DFID, Irish Aid and SIDA are contributing to the SUN fund. Until the end of 2016, total disbursed of the SUN fund was US$ 19 million. As of September 2016, 61% this amount was already disbursed at district level.
Given the current levels of funding, only certain sections of the comprehensive group of nutrition specific policies that have been outlined in Zambia, are being taken forward. Hence, nutrition services’ coverage is patchy. Only 13% of the districts (14 out of 104) have so far been targeted by the SUN Fund.

US$ 200 million (half for it under the SUN Fund second phase, and the other half by USAID, outside the SUN Fund) has been committed so far for the expansion of the program to the rest of the country.

**Participatory approaches in nutrition interventions**

CARE’s now concluded Nutrition at the Center project (funded by the Sall Foundation; US$ 1.8 allocated for Zambia) was aiming to reduce anemia and stunting.

The project brought important lessons in terms of the importance participatory approaches, for the project success:

- Active participation by partners in the implementation of project activities, allows them to see immediate results of interventions which leads to increased advocacy for adoption of such interventions/approaches.

- The use of community facilitators helps to reinforce messages and correct misinformation around nutrition messages as these facilitators are well known and respected by their communities.

- Participatory approaches to identify community problems enhances adoption of health behaviors.

**Transparency and participation in policy making**

In the last years CSOSUN has been widely recognized as a key driver in securing nutrition’s current profile in Zambia’s national development agenda. (Saved the Children, 2016) but now the alliance is almost derelict.

There is a still a huge lack of awareness and access to information on nutrition in the population. Most citizens appear unconcerned about nutritional issues. (Chilufya, W., 2015).

**Policy monitoring and evaluation mechanisms**

Several data, monitoring and evaluation initiatives exist for nutrition in Zambia, but there is lacking a coherent well-functioning multi-sectoral nutrition management information system to facilitate investment tracking and decision-making. (Mulenga-Kwofie, R, 2015). Efforts are underway, such as through the First 1000 Most Critical Days, which has developed its own database for monitoring and evaluation purposes, but problems in data collection and accuracy persist. Deficiencies in terms of reporting by some SUN Fund partners seems also to be a challenge.

The monitoring and evaluation of micronutrient initiatives involves many actors. Typically, donors finance local research institutes to conduct baseline and monitoring surveys of major micro-nutrient deficiencies. This feed into NFNC and ongoing consultative processes to review, assess and modify policies in response (Haggblade, 2016).

There is a lack updated good statistical data on nutrition in Zambia. Although the DHS, conducted in 2012/2014 contained some nutrition related information, it has...
a general health survey. The last nutrition survey was conducted in 2009.

Zambia’s priority choices in the menu of potential nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive policies

Food-related nutrition policies

Food-based nutrition education

The MCDP Has been working with the NFNC and the Ministry of General Education to develop nutrition-focused educational materials for use in schools. The process included a workshop to review and improve school health and nutrition guidelines. CSOSUN was noted that ‘there should be more focus on nutrition messages in early childhood education’, as well as more promotion of nutritious indigenous foods including vegetables and insects (SUN, 2016).

The GRZ is also integrating nutrition education in within the agriculture extension service. MoA-led workshops with key stakeholders have been organized since 2015 to share experiences on nutrition-sensitive extension and work toward better harmonized messages across NGO and government-led efforts. The Ministry is partnering with the EU GIZ and USAID on various initiatives on to promote dietary diversity.

Food diversification

‘Part of the reason for the lack of dietary diversity in Zambia relates to long-standing policies that were intended to improve food security and to support the production of maize. (...) We suggest particular emphasis is given to addressing the bias towards maize production through nutrition-sensitive agriculture.’

Save the Children, 2016

As we saw, agriculture development is a top priority in Zambia’s policies. This could provide a good opportunity to highlight the nutrition agenda, promoting the production of diverse food crops and emphasizing the importance of different foods in the diet (CIFF/DFID, 2016). Recent international discussions have focused on nutrition-sensitive agriculture as one of the required responses against malnutrition. International studies have demonstrated that agricultural diversification can provide alternative strategies to improve diets in rural areas (Khandker, S.R. and Mahmud, W. 2012).

But, as we saw, Zambia’s agriculture policies have been, for many years, over focused on maize, leading to an imbalanced intake of nutrients (Hichaambwa M, 2015) and have hampered food diversification (Kumar, 2014). Furthermore, as we also described in previous chapters, the policies are not particularly focused on the needs of the poorest small-scale food producers. According to a 2016 research, an increase
in FRA community maize purchases of 100,000 MT is associated with a decrease in diversification of 25% and a 100,000-metric increase in FISP fertilizer received by the community decreases diversification by 0.1% (Hichaambwa, 2016). A study conducted in 2015 on 1,120 children found that agricultural diversification and commercialization are critical for improving the nutrition status of children in Zambia. (Kuhlgatz, 2015). It has also been estimated that smallholder horticultural market participation increases household income by 157% compared to 22% for maize (IAPRI, 2014).

The positive impact of agriculture diversification in reducing stunting has been already proven in Zambia on pilot-size basis. The Realigning Agriculture to Improve Nutrition (RAIN) project aimed at preventing child stunting through interventions mainly focusing on agriculture in Mumbwa District (Concern Worldwide, 2011). Concern Worldwide and the IFPRI collaborated to design and implemented this project. According to the final evaluation, RAIN reduced the prevalence of stunting from over 40% to 30% thanks to agriculture diversification.

Now agriculture diversification is becoming more predominant in the nutrition programming in Zambia. The shift of the FISP program to e-vouchers is designed also to promote diversification at farm level, albeit the impact is limited. The SUN Fund is also covering agricultural diversification, allocating US$ 80,000 to each of the 14 targeted districts per year to nutrition sensitive agriculture interventions, beyond maize. Work has started to incorporate nutrition indicators into agricultural planning but progress has slowed Health Partners, 2016).

Various other NGOs, as well as WFP and USAID are also supporting agriculture diversification initiatives. USAID-funded Zambia Economic Resilience for Improved Food Security Sustainability project (or MAWA) aims at increasing diversified agricultural production for nutrition and market and economic security of smallholder households. However, the impact is rather limited: The project operates only in two districts (Chipata and Lundazi).

Policies to facilitate the development of strategically located and appropriate horticultural wholesale markets to act as demand points in the supply chains and to link the country to regional markets are still missing. (Hichaambwa, 2015).

Biofortification

Zambian sweet potato breeders received pro-vitamin A rich breeding lines from the International Potato Center in the early 2000s. In the following years, Zambian research teams, have developed and distributed further varieties of sweet potato and cassava with pro-vitamin A characteristics (Haggblade, 2016). Zambian maize breeders have likewise become engaged in biofortification efforts, by 2012, the Zambia Agriculture Research Institute (ZARI) released three varieties of vitamin A fortified “orange” maize, one to each of three different seed companies. Because these varieties are hybrids, farmers need to purchase seeds annually from the seed companies. Early results suggest strong farmer interest (SPHI, 2012).

In the late 2000s, ZARI began incorporating high-iron traits into bean breeding lines. In 2013, ZARI released its high-iron bean variety (Haggblade, 2016). Zambian maize breeders have likewise become engaged in biofortification efforts. In 2012, ZARI released three varieties of vitamin A fortified “orange” maize. The new maize initially conjured considerable consumer resistance. To avoid that
problem, ZARI conducted extensive tasting trials with farmers, consumers and millers and worked to help brand the new maize, which nowadays is very well appreciated by the consumers (Haggblade, 2016).

Several stakeholders, including the MOA, are working on bio-fortification activities. The focus is on vitamin A rich maize, however this crop contributes little to the promotion of dietary diversity in a heavily maize dependent country such as Zambia, and may be detrimental to the 1000 MCD objectives by undermining dietary diversity messaging in the longer term (Health Partners, 2016).

Fortification

In 1994 Zambia started enforcing the iodine fortification of all imported salt into Zambia, specifying fortification levels at the factory (in Botswana mainly), at the border and at the retail level. UNICEF and other donors strongly supported these fortification efforts through baseline studies, training, education and test kits. These efforts led to a rapid decline in iodine deficiency disorders (Ministry of Health, 2012), which fell from 72% in 1993 to 14% in 2011, prompting the NFNC to conclude that “iodine deficiency is no longer a problem of public health significance in Zambia.”

In recent years, excessive iodine intake has become a concern following reports of over-iodization. These concerns led to a reduction of the mandated fortification levels by two-thirds.

Drawing inspiration from experiences in Central America, in the mid-90’s Zambia enforced vitamin-A fortification sugar, a policy that probably no other African country has followed. The GRZ argued that since sugar is a staple commodity, it is a good medium through which to provide vitamin A to the people.

Though, many stakeholders outside the GRZ and the sugar industry consider the fortification to be a mechanism for protecting the Zambian sugar market from foreign competition (Ellis et al, 2010).

In fact, many nutrition and public health specialists are concerned about the efficacy of the sugar fortification mandate, given the low reported vitamin A levels in household sugar (NFNC 2005), the possible exclusion of vulnerable groups as a result of Zambia’s high sugar prices (Haggblade, 2016) and the fact that sugar itself is not a key element of a healthy diet.

Since 1978, Zambia has mandated vitamin D fortification of margarine, a measure which seems totally unnecessary given an absence of vitamin D deficiency and 5 to 8 hours of sunshine per day. This accidental micronutrient policy appears to have been modeled based on standards in force Europe and replicated without critical thinking.

To sum-up, food fortification has delivered excellent results in Zambia in terms of reducing iodine deficiency, but, although well intentioned, it has not been much evidence based in the case of vitamins A and D.

Health-related nutrition policies

Although there is a slight growing interest for nutrition-sensitive actions through other sectors, such as agriculture, in fact the Zambian nutrition agenda remains largely driven and supported by the cooperating partners active in the health sector (EU, 2016).

Currently, the MCDP, financed by the SUN Fund is, by all accounts, the main
trigger of the nutrition health-related policies in Zambia. The program, which is handled by a Management Unit, provides sub-grants to different kinds of nutrition activities in the priority districts. The MCDP population targets are pregnant and lactating women and children below 2 years old..

**Women of reproductive age**

An important driver of poor nutritional outcomes in newborn babies in Zambia is early pregnancy (save the Children, 2016). The legal minimum age for marriage is 18, yet 17% of women aged 15–19 are married or living with a partner (DHS, 2015). However, non-pregnant and/or non-lactating women in reproductive age are neither targeted by MCDP nor by other major nutrition-related public initiatives.

Adolescents girls, which are a vulnerable group, are not specifically addressed in the current priority interventions neither. (Mwanamwenge, 2016).

**Pregnant and lactating women**

**Iron supplementation**

Zambia’s ante-natal clinics have routinely provided iron supplements, since at least the 1970s to reduce the risk of anemia. The latest monitoring data, from 2013-14 DHS, indicate that 59% of pregnant women took iron tablets daily for 90 or more days. However, there is still work to be done: A NFNC survey in 2012 found iron deficiency in 19% of pregnant women and anemia in 42% (NFNC, 2012). MCDP has been providing iron supplementation to at least 40,000 women in the targeted districts,

**Breastfeeding**

‘Promoting exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months of life is important for all countries but is especially important in Zambia given its high prevalence of malnutrition as well as HIV and other infectious diseases. Lack of access to clean water in Zambia makes formula an unsafe alternative to breastmilk for children’.

Katie Leach-Kemon
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation US

Zambian’ breastfeeding policies have been amongst the most successful in the entire African continent.

Exclusive breastfeeding rates in the country rose dramatically since the mid-90s thanks to the efforts conducted by the authorities to increase the number of births in health facilities and the number
of facilities promoting breastfeeding. In the mid-2000s’ the Ministry of Health launched media campaigns, training of health workers and volunteers, and mentoring of health workers.

Now, more than 94% of babies in Zambia are breastfed within one day of birth. A 2014 survey found that the rates of exclusive breastfeeding have increased in virtually all districts. (Fulman, 2014).

However, progress is still required in relation to exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months. 73% of babies aged less than six months were exclusively breastfed, with the very high levels of breastfeeding from birth falling to 45% at age 4–5 months.

**Complementary feeding**

Complementary feeding is considered by MCDP the type of interventions which have the greatest impact and are most cost-effective. Almost 60,000 women are getting this type of assistance in the frame of the program.

**Nutrition specific messages**

Nutrition-specific messages are a core element of the MCDP. The SUN Fund has been also working with the NFNC to establish Radio Listening Groups in all 14 SUN districts. These groups have been provided with wind-up radios with pre-loaded nutrition-related programs. SUN is conducting communication activities on the MCDP, via billboards and TV.

**Infant and children**

Civil registration rates are weak in Zambia (11.3% in 2014) and potentially hold back children’s access to health public services. In the infant and young children nutrition sphere, besides the MCDP, another main intervention is the EU funded (€50 million) **Program to Improve Maternal and Child Health** (2013-2019). Is a maternal health program with some work on nutrition activity, mainly on capacity building and awareness raising at community level to improve infant and young child feeding (including deworming). In 2016 SIDA has started funding a similar project, also on child and nutrition health.

**Vitamin A supplementation**

In 2013 Zambia achieved a 93% rate vitamin A supplementation for children (HANCI, 2014). However, despite increasing coverage, the impact of the vitamin A supplementation program has proven difficult to establish (NFNC, 2004). Statistical analysis of the 2003 Vitamin A survey results found no significant link between vitamin A supplementation and vitamin A deficiency levels, as already mentioned. Recent concerns have likewise emerged over possible over-dosing on vitamin A. (Haggblade, 2016). There is a real risk of vitamin A toxicity in Zambia with its multiple forms of vitamin A provision (Health Partners, 2016).

Despite the above, vitamin A supplementation is still widely promoted, mainly by UNICEF, and by some projects. MCDP has covered at least 180,000 children and EU’s Program to Improve Maternal and Child Health is also currently delivering very substantial support to children’s vitamin A supplementation.

**Disease Prevention & Management**

National programs in the health sector, are partially explaining a fall in stunting of around one percent per year between 2002 and 2014 though rates are still unacceptably high (Harris, 2016)
In Zambia, as in other countries in the region, the picture of malnutrition is exacerbated by the HIV/AIDS pandemic: when the condition of being HIV-positive coexists with malnutrition, the risk of growth failure and morbidity increases, and children delay recoveries and suffer relapses of malnutrition events (Heiken, 2008). The main program dealing with nutritional care in HIV is probably the US-funded Thrive project (2012-2017), which provides therapeutic and supplemental feeding to severely and moderately malnourished HIV clients, pregnant women and children under two (USAID, 2014 2). USAID new SAFE project, which also deals with HIV, includes also a nutrition component.

Management of Acute Malnutrition

One of the goals of the NFNSP is that, ‘by 2015, access to timely and effective management of severe acute malnutrition cases through health facility and community therapeutic care will be expanded’. Three main activities were foreseen to this aim: The finalization and implementation of national guidelines for Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition (IMAN); to strengthen community groups (e.g. community health workers, nutrition groups etc.) roles regarding IMAN and to increase resources to support IMAN at community level. In the past, WB project Provision of Community based Therapeutic Care for Severe Acute Malnutrition established a system of treating severely malnourished children, and attained a cure rate of more than 97% (WB, no date). SUN is providing training on IMAN in the 14 targeted districts.

Water, Sanitation & Hygiene

Vision 2030 ambition at the water supply and sanitation level is: “Clean and safe water supply and sanitation for all by 2030”.

The key guiding policy for the water and sanitation sector is the National Water Policy (2010), which aims at increasing accessibility to safe drinking water and sanitation facilities for the rural population of Zambia.

‘In most areas households are asked to pay a tariff for water point maintenance and repair. However not all households can afford to pay the agreed tariff, and in difficult years (when floods or droughts occur) no-one pays the agreed tariff’. WaterAid

The National Food and Nutrition Strategic Plan recognizes that water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) is critical in addressing under-nutrition. However, the National Water Policy does not include any reference to nutrition -not even as a cross-cutting them for the country’s water management policies (GRZ, 2010 2).

The Water Supply and Sanitation Act of 1997 Act provides for the establishment, by local authorities, of water supply and sanitation utilities. This Act is now under revision with the aim to strengthen the implementation of water supply and sanitation programs in the country. The possibility of establishing a new Water Ministry is also under consideration.

The Strategic Gender Plan of Action and the National Gender Policy have specifically highlighted access to rural water supply and sanitation as decisive issues in reducing women and children’s workload.

The Ministry of Water Protection, Sanitation and Environment is the main governmental agency for the WASH sector. All functions related to provision of
water supply and sanitation services are the responsibility of the Local Authorities under the overall supervision and support of the MLGH. Local Authorities outsource the management of the water and sanitation services to private enterprises.

According to the WB, the planning capacity of the Ministry is weak. The Ministry, has no clear mechanism to coordinate with the local authorities that own and manage the utilities nor does it have a clear role in enforcing regulations (WB, 2016).

The WASH sector regulator is National Water Supply & Sanitation Council (NWASCO)

Community-led management of water supply in rural parts of Zambia is implemented through the Village Water Sanitation and Hygiene Education Committees who in turn are coordinated and supported by the District Committees, which are part of the formal district level planning process. They are constituted by representatives of government departments and institutions.

Through the National Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Program and National Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Program, the GRZ has been implementing interventions aimed at providing safe water supply and sanitation and hygiene in both rural and urban communities. For water supply this includes drilling boreholes with community involvement to ensure ownership of facilities in rural areas and commercial utilities provide water supply in urban areas (NFNC, no date).

Nevertheless, and despite these initiatives, the results have been modest, and provision of water and sanitation in the Zambia remains a challenge. The proportion of rural population with access to safe water supply is only 40% (R-SNDP, 2014) and to improved sanitation facility is close to 43% (HANCI, 2014).

There are various reasons to explain these poor improvements on WASH in Zambia: On the one hand, the Government’s budget for water and sanitation remains relatively small, and therefore the impact can only be expected to be modest (De Kemp, 2011); on the other hand, there is a major shortage of skilled staff in GRZ and civil society organizations with the ability and experience to lead and drive the sector (WaterAid, 2009). Coordination amongst donors and alignment with GRZ in the WASH sector is also poor.

Furthermore, there is a severe problem of unsustainability of the supply systems. A recent survey found that majority of water points for household consumption developed by the National Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Program in the surveyed areas were no longer working. Lack of maintenance was the main reason. In most of the cases, communities, which are responsible to maintain the local water supply infrastructures, failed to raise funds for this purpose. (Kambole, 2016). WB performance assessment report on its main support project in the sector also found deterioration in the project outcomes since project closure (WB, 2016) due to lack of funding at community level to keep the systems running.

CARE’s Schools Promoting Learning Advancement through Sanitation and Hygiene (SPLASH), which run from 2010 to 2016, improved WASH facilities (boreholes, latrines) and to promoted healthy habits in 375 primary schools in four districts (Chipata, Mambwe, Chadiza and Lundazi), reaching 240,000 students. SPLASH was implemented in coordination with the

Germany, who is funding aEUR 97.5 million technical and financial cooperation grant for WASH governance improvement programs for 2017–2018 (Zambia Invest, 2016), and AfDB, who has approved a US$ 135 million loan to finance WASH supply to benefit 650,000 people in 12 towns located in four provinces. Improvement in nutrition is not among the benefits of the intervention identified in the AfDB program document.

Social protection policies and nutrition

The 2014 National Social Protection Policy (NSSP) is the framework strategy for social protection in Zambia. It contains important aspects related to nutrition-sensitive social protection.

Allocations to social protection interventions have consistently increased over the past five years. The social protection sector now accounts for 2.4% of the total budget in 2016.

Zambia’s national social protection system is, at least in theory, coordinated by the Sector Advisory Group on Social Protection (SP-SAG), created in 2003. It comprises stakeholders from relevant ministries, civil society and is chaired by the Ministry of Community Development, Mother and Child Health (Ministry of Health, 2014) and is responsible for working on policy and implementation issues, including mainstreaming social protection into the work of other actors (WB, 2005).

There are over 15 different social protection programs in Zambia, leading to lack of clarity and coherence and poor coordination. Often, the ministries responsible for their implementation, do not share information (Kumitz, 2016).

The SUN Fund is collaborating with the Ministry of Health to produce a work plan based around the connection between social protection and nutrition and try to address the shortcomings existing right now.

A Technical Working Group on Nutrition and Social protection has been recently established with the support of CARE and Save the Children.

Social cash transfers

The Social Cash Transfer (SCT) is the largest social protection program in the country. It was originally piloted by CARE, then scaled up by donors and, from 2010 the GRZ took full ownership and started financing part of its cost. Now only 17% of the social cash transfer program budget is funded by cooperating partners, while 83% is funded by the GRZ (UNICEF, 2016). In 2017 budget for the program has augmented by 82% (IAPRI, 2017 2), with the aim to expand it to cover the whole country.

The SCT targets below a certain welfare level (Save the Children, 2016). The
transfer is not adjusted to the size of the household (CSO, 2015).

The SCT coverage has been steadily growing, expanding its geographical scope. Now it assists more than 240,000 households (UNICEF, 2016), covering 78 districts (see map above).

To determine the impact of the SCT in relation to nutrition it is important to consider how the transfer relates to the minimum food basket. Save the Children estimates that the current transfer covers 72% of the average household food basket and points out that it is insufficient to feel the food cost of the family (Save the Children, 2016), although it has to be said that he program was not designed to cover all food purchases.

The SCT is not conditional to any nutrition-related behavior, and the program does not include, neither, behavior change communication initiatives.

Child Grant Program

The already mentioned Child Grant Program was an experimental targeted modality of the SCT, and has now finished. It provided unconditional cash targeted to women in households with young children.

According to external surveys, the program has successfully improved women’s financial position and household well-being by promoting savings and facilitating productive investments. Though, and like the SCT, this program is not aligned with nutrition priorities. In fact, the impacts of the Program on nutrition have been mixed. The impact evaluation of the program found that by 24 months of implementation there was an increase in weight-for-height among children ages 3 to 5 years (Health Partners, 2016). Another assessment, however, (Handa, S., 2014) found that less-educated mothers benefiting from the program saw little, if any, improvement in their children’s nutrition status.

School feeding

With WFP support, Zambia is transitioning its school feeding program to a national home-grown school feeding model, that is fully integrated into the Education Sector Policy. The program aims to of reach 1 million school children. The GRZ provides all cereals and covers secondary transport costs, while WFP supplements this with fortified vegetable oil and pulses procured locally from smallholder farmers through its Purchase for Progress (P4P) initiative.

Food security pack

The Food Security Pack (FSP) is a Government-funded social safety net program, which assists vulnerable small-scale farming households, from certain categories (including female headed household, the disabled and victims of natural disasters) selected by the local Community Welfare Assistance Committees.

Each beneficiary household is entitled to a food security pack consisting of seeds, training in conservation farming and food-processing, technology transfers and marketing assistance provided seasonally over a two-year period, with the average annual benefit package valued at around US $38 per household. Following the harvests, beneficiaries are required to pay back a portion of their produce, (between 10 and 20% of the value of inputs provided) which is then allocated to communal seed reserves. The original
The concept was to attain a beneficiary level of 200,000 households each year, most of these ‘graduating’ out of the scheme after two years. However, actual beneficiary numbers have been constantly decreasing, to a few thousands now.

An external study on the FSP found that the Unpredictable and often late funding create serious logistical problems for the delivery of the inputs. The pack composition has been also being criticized for not being sufficiently nutritious. Cassava and sweet potato planting materials are not including in the pack anymore. The legume (pulses) component has been at lower than stipulated levels, or entirely absent (Ellis, 2009). CARE is now working in support to improve the nutrition composition of the pack.

### Summary and conclusions

Joining SUN has been the main trigger of the Zambia’s current high commitment towards promoting nutrition-specific policies. The country now has a well-articulated policy framework, with time bound targets and multi-sectorial and multi-stakeholder policy coordination mechanisms. However, and although some efforts are underway, a coherent well-functioning nutrition management information system is still lacking.

Zambia’s first strategic priority in nutrition is the prevention of stunting, and the flagship initiative is the SUN-funded “First 1,000 most critical days” program, implemented in pilot districts, where nutrition coordinating committees have been stablished.

Fortification and biofortification programs has also been implemented, with mix results.

Zambia’s breastfeeding policies have been amongst the most successful in the entire African continent.

Nutrition-sensitive policy alternatives are getting more attention in Zambia now. Food diversification, which was largely neglected in the past, is now promoted by SUN, the new FIS vouchers modality and other programs. However, most WASH programs are not explicitly aligned with nutrition targets, and the national social protection system is not yet nutrition-sensitive.
## NS-CCR global policy framework
### Zambia’s performance and ownership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Global and regional FNS-CCR main commitments</th>
<th>Performance (source, year)</th>
<th>Adoption/ownership Government and CSOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Past commitments</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG#1 (1990) By 2015...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halve poverty</td>
<td>Poverty declined -not halve</td>
<td>Gov. focus on growth, not so much on poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halve proportion of people with hunger</td>
<td>Augmented 41% (FAO, 2015)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>World Food Summit (1996) By 2015...</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halve number of people with hunger</td>
<td>Augment. 173% (FAO 2015)</td>
<td>Gov. focus on growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maputo Declaration/NEPAP/CAADP (2003)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPACT signed /NAIP produced</td>
<td>Yes (NEPAP, 2013)</td>
<td>Adequate ownership/adoption by Gov. Limited follow-up by CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAIP technical review conducted</td>
<td>Yes (NEPAP, 2013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6% annual agriculture GDP growth</td>
<td>8% (IAPRI, 2016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10% budget for agriculture</td>
<td>Most yrs. above 10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan. By 2015...</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase cereal yield to 2 Tons/hectare</td>
<td>7 T/h (FAO, 2000/2010)</td>
<td>Gov./ CSOs not aware of these targets. No consistent follow-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily per capita dietary 2,700 kcal</td>
<td>? (no data after 2009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halve proportion of people with hunger</td>
<td>Augmented 41% (FAO, 2015)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>On-going commitments</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDG #2 (2015) By 2030...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End hunger and malnutrition</td>
<td>Too early to asses</td>
<td>Little adoption by Gov. Limited follow-up/engagement by CSOs. Not consistent follow-up up to now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%+ productivity small-scale farmers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double income small-scale farmers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure sustainable production systems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain genetic diversity of seeds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>World Health Assembly Global Nutrition Targets (2012). By 2025...</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40% reduction stunted children</td>
<td>Off course,(GNR, 2016)</td>
<td>Strong commitment and ownership drive by SUN. Focus on stunting. Poor funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% reduction anemia women</td>
<td>Off course (GNR, 2016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% increase breastfeeding rate</td>
<td>On course (GNR, 2016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5% reduction childhood wasting</td>
<td>Off course (GNR, 2016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scaling Up Nutrition -SUN. By 2020...</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bringing people together</td>
<td>69% (SUN, 2016)</td>
<td>Strong commitment and ownership drive by SUN. Focus on stunting. Poor funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coherent policy and legal framework</td>
<td>58% ( SUN , 2016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Results Framework</td>
<td>63% (SUN, 2016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial tracking /resource mobilization</td>
<td>54% (SUN, 2016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Committing to Child Survival By 2035...</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To reduce under 5 mortality to 20/1,000</td>
<td>148/1000 (FAO, 2015)</td>
<td>More ownership needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nutrition for Growth (N4G) London Summit. By 2023...</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40% reduction stunted children</td>
<td>Off course (GNR, 2016)</td>
<td>Strong commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30/child nutrition budget increase</td>
<td>$ 0.5/child (CSOSUN, 2016)</td>
<td>Very poor funding, and not augmenting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20% annual increase nutrition budget</td>
<td>Off course (no increase)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Malabo Declaration (2014). By 2025...</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100% agriculture productivity increase</td>
<td>On course (IAPRI, 2016)</td>
<td>Commitment by Gov./CSOs on nutrition-related indicators, mainly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% post-harvest loses decrease</td>
<td>Not tracked</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10% reduction stunted children</td>
<td>Off course(GNR, 2016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5% underweight reduction</td>
<td>Off course (GNR, 2016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision Date</td>
<td>Document Produced</td>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi COP 11 Decision (2005)</td>
<td>Produced in 2010</td>
<td>Strong ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris Agreement (2016)</td>
<td>On track</td>
<td>Strong ownership but little focus on small-scale farmers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Nairobi COP 11 Decision (2005)**: Produced NAPA
- **Cancun Adaptation Framework (2010)**: Adaptation to be addressed as priority
- **Paris Agreement (2016)**: Promote greater resilience, Produce INDC
Main conclusions

1. For the last decades, Zambia has been one of the worst performing countries in terms of tackling undernourishment and gender inequality.

2. Despite substantial investments, the agricultural policies in Zambia have not significantly contributed to poverty reduction or improvements in gender equality. Overall, the food security of the country has improved, but not so much the living conditions of the small-scale farmers.

3. Most of the policy and budgetary efforts (inputs and production subsidies, trade bans) are oriented towards the maize sector, as well as to support commercially oriented farmers, and to attract investment to large scale agriculture, with little impact in in empowering the small-scale farmers, particularly women, or improving the diets.

4. Policies on irrigation and agriculture credit are neither well suited to improve the living conditions (livelihoods) of the small-scale farmers, particularly women.

5. Zambian extension policy on the contrary, can be praised for its large coverage and remarkable quality, although women farmers still have less access to it than men.

6. Zambia has been successful in tapping global funding for climate change but lacks an adequate agriculture adaptation framework. On-going efforts in conservation agriculture are insufficient.

7. Gender equality is enshrined in the constitution and different certain protections are afforded women through different pieces of legislation.

8. Most of the State-funded agriculture programs (on extension, access to inputs, irrigation, access to finance) fail to adequately address the needs of women.

9. Zambia has a well-articulated policy framework for nutrition, aligned with the best international practices, and a vibrant partnership of public institutions, donors and civil society originations in place, triggered by the SUN movement.

10. State funding for nutrition is limited. Donors’ support is mainly focus on the MCDP.

11. Nutrition is not yet well integrated as a cross cutting issue in other relevant policies: Agriculture diversification has started to be promoted, albeit maize remains the main target of the agriculture policies, WASH policies do not take nutrition into account and the social protection system is not nutrition-sensitive.
**Recommendations: Possible themes for CARE advocacy**

This set of recommendations is not intended to be implemented in full; it aims to provide a range of options from which priorities can be drawn, based on technical and financial resources’ availability, alignment with ongoing programing processes, and after consultation with key stakeholders and partners. **It is recommended not to expand too much the scope of the advocacy efforts, to ensure effectiveness and impact.**

**Nutrition**

Given the strong focus, background and capacities of CARE working on nutrition sector, we will emphasize this sector in our recommendations.

CARE in Zambia is positively contributing to improve nutrition, and more specifically to reduce infant stunting, via its critical role as the main implementing organization of the SUN Fund. As said, Zambia’s nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive policy framework and its institutional articulation is aligned with the best international practices and, overall, it is delivering well. In this regard, CARE simply needs to keep engaged with the sector as priorities are altered and adapted based on lessons learned in Zambia. (eg the revised MCDP 2 and the second NFNSP).

What is still needed in Zambia is to translate those policies into more and better results, and, to do so, to,

- to continue the ongoing efforts that CARE, in the frame of SUN, is undertaking on constant basis to

- strengthen the national capacities to implement the nutrition policies.

- to ensure that more financial resources will be available for expanding the First 1,000 Day program all over the country.

- to continue advocating (together with NFNC and WHO) for a proper management information system in place.

However, the dimension of malnutrition in Zambia is such, that unless a more comprehensive response is promoted, Zambia risks missing, again, its international commitment towards fighting undernourishment. Therefore, we are referring here also to advocacy efforts on nutrition-specific and nutrition sensitive policies and implementation frameworks which are both required for sustained impact on stunting.

**Strengthen the key nutrition institutions**

CARE should continue to work in strengthening the key institutions implementing actions in line with the Food and Nutrition Strategic Plan and aligning their respective roles – strategy, professional support, and advocacy – as well as to focus on enhancing the capacities for cross ministry collaboration. To do so, CARE should continue housing technical staff within the NFNC (such as SUN Fund staff and the Leyland Hunger Fellow) and providing nutritionists to line ministries, supporting their strategic plans and co-financing cross-visits to expose them to best international practices.
**Increase public funding for nutrition specific policies**

The GRZ made significant commitments to increase its funding allocations for nutrition, which have not been fulfilled. The ongoing donors’ support for tackling stunting, via the SUN Fund, are remarkable, but insufficient. In order to scale up the current program to the rest of the country, national resources should also be allocated, alongside ODA funding. Cuts in the expensive and non-pro poor maize-related programs could make available funding that could be directly allocated to improve women’s and children’s nutrition in the districts not yet targeted by the SUN Fund. Given the high political nature of this topic, advocating for this would be above CARE’s mandate and weight. CARE can continue to work with other CSOs and help NFNC make the case to argue with the Ministry of National Planning and Ministry of Finance that increased resources (from wherever) are required to scale the MCDP nationally and sustain the gains made while lobbying MoA, MWDSEP and MCDSW that large programs such as FSP, FISP and SCT become more inclusive of nutrition sensitive activities.

**Review the micronutrient fortification policies**

Zambia needs a micronutrient survey and, based on its findings, the micronutrient policy will probably require to be revisited, including a decision on the viability and use of micronutrients powders for children, and re-visit the food fortification policy. CARE is very well placed to advocate for the need of the survey and has been lobbying with NFNC for funds to be made available for several years already and funds maybe available in 2018 from Sida.

**Promote nutrition sensitive agriculture**

Crop diversification is a proven strategy to stabilize, diversify and enhance farm households’ nutrition security but Zambia’s sectoral policy focus on maize input and outputs suggests a need to realign public expenditure to other agriculture key growth drivers. Poor smallholder farmers in Zambia need well-targeted assistance with farm working capital, and better technologies to increase crop diversification. CARE may assist by using its global presence and resources to provide evidence-based experiences from specific projects outside Zambia; by undertaking studies on the impact of diversification in the diets’ improvement, and by conveying the message with key global donors and stakeholders. To this aim, CARE should partner with leading sector players (such as IFPRI), to provide the technical imputes and evidences required to regulate specific policy proposals.

It is also important in Zambia to leverage agriculture programs to deliver nutrition education, increase knowledge of nutrition and increase demand for diversified food, as detailed in the newly developed nutrition sensitive framework.

Given the relative strength of the extension system in Zambia, CARE is building the capacity of the GRZ extension system as a platform for nutrition work, by promoting coherence between the various extension systems and ensuring community engagement across ministries develops coordinated nutrition approaches.
Promote nutrition-sensitive WASH

CARE will advocate for, mainstreaming nutrition across WASH investments in line with the nutrition sensitive framework. CARE will continue facilitating the dialogue between NFNC and the WASH-related institutions, to integrate behavior change communication and other nutrition-related actions within these programs.

Promote nutrition-sensitive social protection

The GRZ is working with various stakeholders to improve nutrition-sensitive social protection, and support it with the necessary human and financial resources. For example, cash transfers could be more nutrition targeted, food packs can include diverse seeds, school feeding should be nutritious, HIV support groups should know about nutrition and behavior change communication should be introduced to inform households receiving safety net support on components of a nutritious diet to impact on consumption behavior, particularly for young children.

CARE has already started playing an active role in setting up the Social Protection and Nutrition Technical Working group which promotes nutrition-sensitive social protection, in dialogue with the key players donors (NFNC, MCDSW, ILO, WFP) and will continue working to improve this area.

Gender equality in nutrition policy

As we saw, despite Zambia having endorsed all the relevant international gender commitments, and incorporated gender mainstreaming in the key advocacy frameworks, gender inequality prevails.

CARE could facilitate the creation of a Gender in Nutrition multi-stakeholders’ platform, which would bring together women and nutrition organizations, the NFNC, Ministry of Gender and other relevant public bodies and academia. The platform could identify policy implementation gaps and raise commitment, funds and expertise to face selected priorities, such as augmenting the capacities of the gender focal points in nutrition and advocating to raise their decision-making profile, advocating and providing capacity building for the introduction of nutrition budgeting in the Ministry of Gender,

Small-scale farmers’ climate change resilience

CARE Zambia value-added in CCR is not as prominent as in nutrition. For this reason and to augment the impact, we do recommend CARE to channel its advocacy efforts on CCR mainly through the Alliance for CSA in Africa (ACSAA). CARE is a founder member of this global platform and can provide the nutrition (and gender) lens for the local chapter of this forum. Additional funding would be required to be effective in this response and to ensure the focus on CSA in Zambia does not forget about nutrition and nutrition sensitive interventions.
Bibliography consulted


CARE Zambia (2014) *One Stop Model of Support for Survivors of Gender-Based Violence: Lessons Learned from Care Zambia.*


Collection September 2014. Institute of Development Studies, Sussex


Conservation Farming Unit (no date). The Promotion and Adoption of CF/CA in Zambia. Experience Gained and Future Perspectives. Power Point Presentation.

Conservation Farming Unit (2013). Electronic Vouchers and Fertilizer Subsidies, the Way Forward


De Souza, Sabrina, Katherine Pittore and Lloyd Handongwe (2014) Nutrition Advocacy in Zambia: Challenges and Opportunities, Results UK.


FAO (2012). Trends and Impacts of Foreign Investment in Developing Country Agriculture.


FAO (2017) Zambia- FIWES Country Brief

FAO, UNEP, UNDP (no date). UN-REDD Program – Zambia Quick Start Initiative


Feed the Future Zambia (2015). Integrating Gender and Nutrition within Agricultural Extension Services. USAID


GIZ (2013). Understanding Climate Finance Readiness Needs in Zambia


Government of Zambia (2002 2). National Action Program (NAP) for the UNCCD.


Government of Zambia (2006 2) National Food and Nutrition Policy


Harris, J, Haddad, L. and Grütz, S, (2014) Turning Rapid Growth into Meaningful Growth: Sustaining the Commitment to Nutrition in Zambia, IDS

Harris, J. et al. (2016) Stories of Change in Nutrition- Country brief Zambia. CIFF and DFID


Health Partners International Ltd. (2016) Development of a scale up plan for the 1000 Most Critical Days program in Zambia


Imbwae, F. (no date) Zambia Meteorological Department- Power Point Presentation.


Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute (IAPRI) (2017 2) Budget: The case of the agriculture sector. PowerPoint Presentation,


Kaunda, Danstan. 2010. Fortified sweet potatoes developed in Zambia.


Namonje-Kapembwa, T., Chapoto, A. Improved Agricultural Technology Adoption in Zambia: Are Women Farmers Being Left Behind . IAPRI.

Nash J. et all (2016). Better Life Alliance in Zambia: Climate change mitigation as a co-benefit of improved landscape, agroforestry, soil, and fertilizer management. Info Note. FAO and USAID.


NFNC (no date). Improving water supply, Sanitation and Hygiene: A prerequisite to Improving child nutrition. The National Food and Nutrition Commission of Zambia


Shitumbanuma, V. et al. (no date) Integrated Soil Fertility Management in Zambia. Zambia Agricultural Research Institute.

SIDA (2008), SIDA Gender Country Profile-Zambia.

SIDA (2014) Mid Term Evaluation of Climate Smart Agriculture: Capturing the Synergies between Mitigation, Adaptation and Food Security in Malawi, Vietnam and Zambia.


Sitko N.J. et al (2014) Analysis of the Effects of Maize Trade Restrictions in the COMESA Region on Food Prices and Market Development. IAPRI.


SUN (No date) Experience in Setting National Nutrition Targets and Commitments to Actions: The Case for Zambia- PowerPoint presentation


Sweet Potato Profit and Health Initiative (SPHI). (2012). Integrating orange: combatting vitamin A deficiency in maize-based food systems in Zambia. USAID.


University of Gothenburg (2010). Zambia Environmental and Climate Change Policy Brief


USAID (2014 2) Zambia: Nutrition Profile


World Bank (no date). Nutrition at a glance: Zambia. Produced with support from the Japan Trust Fund for Scaling Up Nutrition

World Bank (2010). *Small-holder Agriculture in East Africa*

World Bank, (2013) *Zambia's Jobs Challenge: Realities on the Ground*


World Bank (2015). *Zambia Cashew Infrastructure Development Project*


Zambia Agriculture Research Institute (ZARI), International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), and Michigan State University, (2014). *Assessing access and adoption of common bean improved varieties in Zambia.*

Zambia Meteorology Department (2013). *Rainfall and temperature Data (1950-2010).*
Founded in 1945 with the creation of the CARE Package®, CARE is a leading humanitarian organization fighting global poverty. CARE places special focus on working alongside poor girls and women because, equipped with the proper resources, they have the power to lift whole families and entire communities out of poverty. Last year CARE worked in 90 countries and reached more than 72 million people around the world. To learn more, visit www.care.org.