

act:onaid

**Two Years On: Is the G8 Delivering on its
L'Aquila Hunger Pledge?**

May 2011

Executive Summary

Following the 2007-08 food crises, donors made an important 'Hunger Pledge' to the world's poor. At the 2009 G8 Summit in L'Aquila, Italy, donors launched the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative, backed by 27 countries and 14 international agencies. Within this, donors pledged to mobilise US \$22 billion over three years in support of country-led plans for agriculture, with a 'coordinated, comprehensive strategy'.

Two years on, with food prices reaching record levels, the world stands on the precipice of another food crisis. With only one year left to deliver, the G8 and other L'Aquila donors have launched their accountability report with a focus on progress towards goals set in L'Aquila on food security and on global health. This is *the* report where the G8 and other donors are to account for progress on their 'Hunger Pledge'. At face value, the report says that the G8 is broadly on track. However, an analysis of the data reveals that this is extremely difficult to justify with any certainty: because it is nearly impossible to rate countries' relative performance due to inconsistent and erratic reporting methods.

ActionAid believes that the accountability process is severely undermined by a lack of transparency on how much countries have spent and a lack of consistency in measuring progress and timelines. A few donors – the EU, Germany and Japan – are not even able to account on their expenditure to date and are still only reporting on what they have *committed* to doing. Moreover, the accountability report shows that around two-thirds through the pledge only 22 percent has actually been spent.

Meanwhile, some countries, such as Italy and Germany, are reporting against progress on projects and items which were outside of their original pledge. This suggests that governments are re-categorising commitments, in order to mask their lack of progress. Moving the goalposts halfway through the game is not fair play.

Accountability also involves transparency and reflection on failures, as well as on achievements. Few donors are openly admitting shortcomings. The US government is one of the few exceptions: not only is the US being clear in its reporting but they are also being transparent about their disbursement delays.

France, who this year is hosting the G8 and G20, appears to be trying to mask their poor performance behind some bad reporting. Following their moderately good L'Aquila pledge to agriculture, they are now failing to deliver it, with less than 50 percent of their commitments being spent two-thirds of the way into the pledge timeline. Not meeting these hunger commitments could undermine President Sarkozy's credibility in championing G20 action on food price volatility and food security this year.

But perhaps of greatest concern is the lack of concrete evidence of progress towards achieving several of the core components of the pledge: increasing aid to agriculture, through support of country-led agriculture plans that target the needs of small holder farmers. Progress on the pledges of aid to agriculture are by far the most off-track; with delivery being particularly slow compared to spending on other categories of aid for food security. For instance, Italy has actually had a cut of 56 percent in their agricultural aid spending since L'Aquila.

With the world just one bad harvest away from another food crisis, we need urgent injections of funding and donors to make good on their promises, not clever accounting.

Moreover, the effects of increasing food prices on poverty are extremely alarming. The World Bank estimates that high food prices have pushed 44 million people into extreme poverty in low-and-middle income countries, and warns that food prices are at 'dangerous levels'.

Indeed, the investment that donors *have* delivered on – while far from sufficient -- is helping to mitigate the impacts of the crisis. The evidence that increased investment in agriculture over the last few years has helped to minimise Africa's exposure to the recent surge in global food prices should spur greater action and ambition from donors. Countries such as Rwanda and Malawi, which have recently increased government support to smallholder-based agriculture, are reporting stable local food prices and abundant supplies.

Sadly, donor aid to agriculture is still woefully short of what is needed to meaningfully reduce hunger. And in spite of African countries' stepping up in response to the food crisis and drafting ambitious country plans through the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) process, donors are not living up to their end of the bargain. African countries have developed costed and peer reviewed plans, but donors are not keeping up through support to fund them. Huge gaps exist in the money needed. For just the 20 African countries that are an advanced stage of the CAADP process, there is a funding gap of \$36.3 billion that needs to be filled.

With the world teetering on the edge of another food crisis, the G8 must keep to their 'Hunger Pledge'. ActionAid is also urging the G8 and all donors to channel their aid behind country plans.

Recommendations

- 1) The lack of full and transparent accounting for progress on the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative by donors to date must be addressed
- 2) It is vital that donors ensure their L'Aquila pledges are delivered within the 3 year timeframe, with shortfalls in commitments and disbursements of agricultural aid addressed as a matter of urgency by all donors.
- 3) In light of the food crisis and needs identified by the CAADP process, donors must increase overall agricultural aid beyond the L'Aquila Pledge, and they must align most of their aid in support of country-led plans. Specifically:
 - Donors should channel more money through GAFSP, which is delivering new money, transparently, in support of country led plans.
 - Donors need to take the next step and go beyond L'Aquila and ensure that all CAADP investment plans are fully funded.

Section 1: Two years on: Is the G8 delivering its hunger pledge?

In 2009, at the L'Aquila G8 Summit in Italy, the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative was launched. This was backed by 27 countries and 14 international agencies, and by donors pledging to mobilise US \$22 billion over three years in support of country-led plans for agriculture, with a 'coordinated, comprehensive strategy'.

The pledge to support smallholder agriculture was one of the most important the G8 has made. Two years on, and with only one year left to deliver, the G8 have launched their accountability report, with a strong focus on food security. This is the place where the G8 and other donors are accounting on their progress on their 'Hunger Pledge'. So how are the G8 and other donors to the doing?

At face value, the report finds that the G8 is broadly on track. However, an analysis of the data reveals that this is a conclusion which is extremely difficult to justify with any certainty. But the accountability report shows that around two-thirds through the pledge only 22 percent has actually been spent

ActionAid believes that the 'accountability' process is fundamentally flawed. ActionAid has analysed the G8 Accountability Report, and has found it close to impossible to rate countries' relative performance because of inconsistent and erratic reporting. The accountability process is undermined by a lack of transparency on how much countries have spent and on what, as well as a total lack of consistency in measures of progress and timelines.

A few donors – the EU, Germany and Japan – are not even able to account on their expenditure to date and are still only reporting on what they have *committed* to doing.

Meanwhile, some countries, such as Italy and Germany, are reporting against progress on projects and items which were outside of the original pledge. This suggests that governments are re-categorising other commitments, in order to mask their lack of progress on the original commitment. Moving the goalposts halfway through the game is not fair play.

Accountability involves transparency and reflection on failures, as well as achievements. Notably, few donors are openly admitting shortcomings. The US government is one of the few exceptions: not only are they being clear in their reporting but they are also being transparent about their disbursement delays.

But perhaps of greatest concern is the lack of tangible evidence to support the achievement of several of the core components of the pledge – to increase aid to agriculture and to support small holder famers and country-led investment plans. Our analysts can find little proof of significant increases in aid to agriculture. Progress on the disbursement of pledges of aid to agriculture are by far the most off-track; with delivery being particularly slow in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and the USA.

Table One: An evaluation of different donors L'Aquila pledge

	Initial L'Aquila Pledge – Level of Ambition? (How much new money?)	Delivering on Pledge? (Disbursements)	Transparency of commitments to date?	Reporting against original categories or cooking the books?
Australia	Good	Low	Good	Good
EU	Average	N/A <i>Notes: Did not provide information</i>	Low	N/A <i>Notes: Did not provide the information</i>
Canada	Good	Average	Good	Average
France	Low	Low	Low	Low
Germany	Average	Good	Average	Low <i>Notes: a very high level of 'other' aid being reported masks a poor track record on aid to agriculture.</i>
Italy	Low	Average	Low	Low
Japan	Low	N/A <i>Notes: Did not provide information</i>	Low <i>Notes: only information about commitments is available.</i>	N/A <i>Notes: the accounting is so poor we can't judge it.</i>
Netherlands	Low	Good	Average	Low <i>Notes: a very high level of 'other' aid being reported masks a poor track record on aid to agriculture.</i>
Spain	Good	Good	Good	Average
Sweden	Low	Low	Low	Low <i>Notes: Reporting is poor making it hard to judge</i>
United Kingdom	Average	Good	Good	Average
United States	Good	Low <i>Notes: Congressional budget challenges have slowed progress.</i>	Good	Good

Table 1 describes the differences between how the various donors who committed funds in L'Aquila are doing. We assess progress according to key criteria, such as commitments, disbursements, and clarity and transparency of data and information available. Clarity and transparency of data are summarised in terms of how easy or difficult it is to draw conclusions from the data supplied individual countries.

Box 1. Explaining the L'Aquila Pledge

According to official figures, the total pledge amounted to US \$22.2bn. Of this original pledge, only around US \$6bn was 'additional' funds – i.e. new commitments, rather than commitments donors had already made in their aid plans. Less than half of the pledged funds (only around US \$9bn) were said to be targeted at the agricultural sector.

A significant amount of money in the pledge was also committed to other objectives, which, despite having overlap with food security, may include a significantly wider range of unrelated objectives.

Depending on the country concerned, there are differing amounts committed to categories such as: "transport & storage" (US\$ 3.8bn), "development food aid/food security assistance" (US\$ 1.5bn), "rural development" (US\$ 912m), "social/welfare services" (US\$ 623m), etc. Another, amount was classified as 'other bilateral', which may include school feeding programmes, rural water supply and sanitation, land mine clearance, rural energy supply and environmental protection in rural areas.

For the money '*pledged*' by each country to be made a reality first they must make more firm *commitments* towards specific areas and countries, and then they must *disburse* the funds committed. Only the finally disbursed funds can be a true assessment of whether L'Aquila donors have met their pledges.

How are donors doing?

The **Australian** government made a high-quality pledge at the L'Aquila Summit, with purely new money committed, the lion's share earmarked for agriculture. Since the L'Aquila Summit, the Australian government has also given \$46 million to the Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (see Box 3 for more information on 'GAFSP') and so is helping to support country-led plans for agriculture.

The Australian government's record on L'Aquila reporting is also good; they and Spain are the only two countries to report purely on the additional funds. However, at the halfway mark the figures show that they are slow to deliver on their commitments. Their performance is particularly bad in the case of spending on the commitments made in aid to agriculture. To keep up a good record, it is essential that the Australian government speeds-up delivery of their hunger pledge.

It is hard to judge the progress made by the **European Union and Japan**, as they have no information on what they have actually spent so far. Both start their pledge period in 2010 (rather than 2009) and the only data available at present tells us what they committed in that

year – but not what they have actually delivered. Admittedly, if the European Union spends what they planned they will have done well. But at present, it is next to impossible to assess progress.

About half of Canada’s L’Aquila pledge was new money. They have also supported GAFSP pledging and are already delivering \$229 million via this fund -- and so are giving money in support of country plans. However, with Canada’s pledge period already coming to an end – as they committed to shorter delivery period – they have only managed to disburse 80 percent of the money they committed to agriculture.

Given France’s Presidency of the G8 and G20 this year, their L’Aquila progress and reporting is embarrassing. Following their moderately good L’Aquila pledge to agriculture (though with quite little in new funds), they are now failing to deliver it. With only one year to go, based on current performance, France is highly unlikely to meet their commitments – with less than 50 percent delivered so far. France’s performance is particularly dire in the case of their spending on agriculture. The French government also appears to be trying to mask their poor performance behind some bad reporting. They are claiming expenditure within categories which were not even included in their original pledge. Meanwhile, they are inflating the amount of money reported as ‘other bilateral’ aid, which offers no opportunity to trace the impact of this money on hunger eradication. President Sarkozy’s credibility in championing food price volatility and food security as host of the G20 this year could be undermined if France does not urgently address fulfilment of its own hunger commitments.

Meanwhile, **Germany** pledged US \$3bn for food security, representing US \$1bn in new money. On first glance Germany appears to be on track to meet its commitments. However, good performance in some categories and a very high level of ‘other’ aid being reported, mask a poor track record on aid to agriculture. Moreover, if current trends continue, Germany would have disbursed only half the money it committed to agriculture at the end of the pledge period.

Italy made an un-ambitious initial pledge to L’Aquila which, paradoxically, has resulted in a cut of 56 percent to their agricultural aid spending. Only around US\$180 million has been additional funds (of the \$480 million committed), which means that less than \$100 million is available for 2010 and 2011. And with only one year to go before the end of the original pledge period, Italy seems to be on track to meet these mediocre commitments. However, this seemingly ‘good performance’ is mainly the consequence of a reprint in categories which were not included in the original pledge. Furthermore, Italy spent around 55 percent of its aid on emergency funding - a sector that shouldn’t be included in L’Aquila commitments – and have shifted their reporting timelines from the original 2009-2011 to 2009-2012.

The UK and the Netherlands is on track to deliver its modest L’Aquila pledge to build a more solid foundation of support to agriculture.

Spain is also a good all-round performer. Having made a pledge of all new funds they have put in money to the GAFSP and appear to have delivered nearly all of it – 90 percent – already. However, **Sweden** is clearly failing to deliver on its commitments, with Swedish aid to agriculture actually decreasing in 2008 and 2009.

Finally, the **United States** was a star performer in terms of pledges of new resources at L’Aquila, with a US \$3.5bn pledge, of which more than half was new money. Unlike many other

of their donor colleagues, who have counted a variety of programmes such as food aid, etc in their pledges, the US explicitly excluded food aid. The US has become a champion of supporting country-led agricultural development plans and has given substantial support to GAFSP. The one major shortcoming of the US' performance has been speed of delivery, which has been very slow. But the main reason for the delays in disbursements are: (1) congressional budget debates and delays which are outside of the US administration's control and (2) efforts by USAID to work with countries to develop well-considered country investment plans before disbursing funds. While these are mitigating factors, the US should make efforts to urgently speed up delivery so that it can get back on track to meeting its pledge.

Section 2: The need for urgent action to deliver the Hunger

Pledge

With global food prices once again on the rise, threatening to push even larger numbers of the world's poor into poverty and hunger, it is essential that the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative is delivered in full and within the agreed timelines. ActionAid is also calling on donors to urgently address the shortfalls in the quality of their spending on the agricultural sector in the L'Aquila pledge. Donors must channel funds behind country-led agricultural plans and in support of smallholders and the poorest.

Investing in smallholder agriculture in the developing world can help to mitigate the worst of food price rises on the poorest and can also work to decrease poverty, drive economic growth, and reduce under-nutrition: this will enable millions of children to be on a better path towards success. Agricultural aid must be a priority over the long-term; the world cannot keep falling back on providing emergency aid as a temporary stop-gap.

Food price volatility: the impact on hunger and poverty

Global food prices reached the highest level on record in February 2011, surpassing levels seen at the height of the 2007/8 food crisis and the highest since the inception of FAO's food-price index in January 1990. Overall, food prices have risen alarmingly, and at a much faster pace than in 2007-8, according to FAOⁱ. FAO's food-price indexⁱⁱ – a basket tracking the wholesale cost of commodities such as wheat, maize, rice, oilseeds, dairy products, sugar and meats – jumped to 236 points in February 2011, passing a previous peak of 220 in July 2008.

As of April 2011, the FAO's food-price index was still 36 percent higher than the same time the year before. Worryingly, grain prices – which make up staple foods for many of the world's poor – climbed sharply in April, with global food prices overall being offset by reductions in sugars and other commodities.

These food price rises are likely to push even more people into hunger. The number of undernourished and hungry people in the world in 2010 was approximately 925 million people, which is set to increase with the new food price risesⁱⁱⁱ.

The effects on poverty are already extremely alarming. The World Bank estimates that high food prices have pushed 44 million people into extreme poverty in low-and-middle income countries, and warn that food prices are at 'dangerous levels'^{iv}.

ActionAid country surveys indicate that poor families are once again beginning to cut back to one meal a day, selling cattle, sending children out to work, migrating, and eating vegetables only once a week because of rising food prices (see box two)^v. All this is particularly worrying for child malnutrition which is the cause of an estimated 2.2 million under-5 child annual deaths worldwide^{vi}.

One bad harvest away from a full-blown food crisis

What is causing these price rises? On the demand side: the causes are population growth, rising affluence, changing diets and the increasing use of grain to fuel cars and trucks. On the supply side: loss of cropland to non-farm uses, such as biofuels, plateauing crop yields and the growing impact of climate change are all squeezing supplies, while steadily rising oil prices have increased transport and fertiliser costs. A weak dollar, loose monetary policies, and an explosion of speculative activity on commodity futures markets may also be amplifying price movements.

World Bank President Robert Zoellick recently announced that the world's poor are 'one shock' away from a food crisis^{vii}. For example, weather related production shocks could tip this food price shock into a food price crisis. These weather related production shocks could possibly be linked to the La Niña weather phenomenon – which could spark off subsequent export bans, hoarding, and market related panics.^{viii} Further food speculation could escalate the shock into a crisis, as was seen in 2007/8.

Increasing oil prices, which result in increasing fertilizer prices, may also become a tipping point for a food crisis in 2011. And with oil prices currently on the rise, there are grave concerns.

The continued 'renewal and repair process' from the financial crisis in Asia, Africa and parts of Europe can result in greater demand for commodities, which might further escalate prices and combined with other factors tip this shock into a crisis.

In April, the FAO warned that weather problems in some of the world's top grain exporters could keep prices high well into next year. And with world cereals stocks forecast to fall to their lowest level since the food crisis of 2008 this year, markets will be vulnerable to any supply shocks.^{ix}

Box Two: Food price increases and the impacts on communities: Views from the field

A recent ActionAid survey, which took place in January 2011 across 20 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, underscores important price trends at the local level and how they are impacting communities on the ground.

Smallholder farmers, labourers and artisans, such as those in the Purulia, India, are suffering from increased food insecurity due to low availability of jobs in their communities owing to drought.

Besides hunger, rising food prices and climate change are negatively affecting poor people's tiny assets. The survey found that in many countries, there have been dramatic increases in the selling of animals at very low prices. In Kenya, for instance, the price of a mature bull was below Ksh 10,000 (about US\$116) compared to the normal price of Ksh 20,000. In Ghana, people are selling their land due to prolonged lack of food availability, while increased indebtedness is becoming a common reality for most countries surveyed. Moreover in many countries, the struggle to feed hungry stomachs has taken precedence over other basic needs such as health and education.

The survey also confirmed that production at the local level is the key variable which enables communities to minimise or escape increasing food prices. In fact, local production is an important determinant for local food prices and food security—i.e. prices may rise in one area and decline in another depending on the status of production. For instance in Kenya, local people of Cheptais witnessed a drop in maize prices from Ksh 30 per kilo in July 2010 to Ksh 11 in January 2011, while those in Khwisero rose from Ksh 13 to KSh 18 during the same period due to low crop yields.

The survey highlights the significant role of the state in minimising the impact of high food prices. Government support for agricultural inputs and cash for work programmes in Brazil, Ethiopia and Rwanda have provided some relief to farmers against the rising cost of agricultural production. Similarly, social protection programmes such as food distribution and mid-day school meals in Brazil, India and Vietnam have helped to build community resilience against price shocks. Moreover, increasing minimum wage rates in Bangladesh and Vietnam has helped poor people to adjust themselves to rising prices

It doesn't have to be this way: the unnecessary story of hunger

As yet, these price rises haven't had as severe an effect on the poor as the 2007-08 food crisis, which saw similar price rises. This is, in part, because harvests have largely been good. African countries have been somewhat cushioned from global food prices due to increased investment in local and national agriculture. The World Bank states that Africa is in a better situation now than in the 2007-2008 food crisis because of this investment^x which has helped to minimise Africa's exposure to recent global price prices^{xi}.

Countries such as Rwanda and Malawi, which have recently increased government support to smallholder-based agriculture, are reporting stable local food prices and abundant supplies^{xii}.


UNICEF has also predicted that gradual increases in food production in Africa had a 'protective' effect on the rise of under-five mortality rates during the food and financial crisis of 2008-09.^{xiii}

Section 3. Moving forward: What needs to happen?

Aid to agriculture is still woefully insufficient to significantly reduce hunger. African countries are increasingly meeting their side of the bargain via the CAADP progress, and have developed costed and peer reviewed plans, but donors are not keeping up.

The individual performance of L'Aquila donors in increasing aid over the period from 2002-2009 to agriculture does show some progress but almost all this progress is a consequence of significant advances by a handful of donors. Among the largest donors (see graph 1), best performers include the USA, the EU and Japan. All these three countries have more than doubled aid to agriculture since 2002. France, however, has made significant cuts in aid to agriculture in the last couple of years and the aid provided by Germany remains fairly stable. Among smaller donors (see graph 2), Spain has made remarkable progress. Canada has also managed to double aid to agriculture since 2002.

Graph 1. Aid to agriculture in larger donors countries. Gross disbursements in USDm constant 2009 dollars



Mind the funding gap: how African countries are being let down by donors

The Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) aims to revitalise African farming in order to reduce rural poverty and hunger. CAADP was conceived by the African Union in 2003 as an ambitious and comprehensive attempt to help African countries reach higher economic growth through agriculture-led development, with the ultimate goal of

eliminating hunger and reducing poverty. Since then, CAADP can be credited with changing the way in which national governments and donors approach agricultural development, while shifting focus back onto African agriculture as a key development pathway. Signatory countries also made important commitments through CAADP to increase spending on agriculture to 10 percent of their overall budget and reach an agriculture growth rate of 6 percent per annum.

Box 3: What's working about L'Aquila? A case study of GAFSP support in Rwanda

The Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) is a multilateral mechanism to assist in the implementation of pledges made by the G8++ at the L'Aquila Summit in July 2009 and was set up in response to a request from the G20 in Pittsburgh in September 2009. Financial contributions to the GAFSP to date have been provided by or pledged by: Australia, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Canada, Ireland, South Korea, Spain and the United States. Total commitments to date equal about US\$ 925 million, pledged over three years. More funds are urgently needed to meet strong demand from countries.

Rwanda provides a case study of the positive impacts of GAFSP funding. Rwanda was the first country to conduct a CAADP Roundtable Meeting and to sign a CAADP Compact in March 2007 and is now committing 10 percent of its budget to agriculture. Since the signing of the Compact, Rwanda has worked closely with CAADP and its Development Partners in the preparation of a detailed and costed investment plan.

The GAFSP Steering Committee approved a grant of \$50 million to Rwanda in June 2010 to fund activities identified in Rwanda's investment plan to help farmers transform hillside agriculture to reduce erosion and bolster productivity in an environmentally sustainable manner. GAFSP support will increase production of high-valued horticultural crops on irrigated portions of hillsides by smallholders, and improve productivity and commercialization of rain-fed food and export crops on the non-irrigated portions. Support will be provided to develop the capacity of individuals and institutions for improved hillside land husbandry through research and extension, water and land management, stronger agricultural value chains, and expanded access to finance. A pilot project funded by the Rwandan government which is scaling up this summer with support from GAFSP is already showing results.

As Vedaste, the leader of a local farmers group in Karongi, Rwanda, and one of the project beneficiaries told ActionAid:

"Before the project came, this land was marginal and unproductive. The project put in terraces, and provided us with seeds, lime and fertilizers that we pay for after harvest. We got a subsidy for the wheat seeds from the government...Now we are working all together. We didn't have groups before – we were isolated as individuals".

The leader of another farmer group benefiting from the same project on a nearby hillside, Damasini, added: *"Before we were just isolated, scattered, not organized. We planted all kinds of crops. We were not organized at all. Now we cultivate together and promote one crop and make a big production and bring it to the market. We are also cultivating fodder on the slopes. For those with cows, they will benefit. Others need cows. Before the project came here, farmers didn't have bank accounts. Now, all the farmers are paid through accounts. We have savings cards, not just cash."*

To date, 23 countries have completed the CAADP roundtable process - a country-led process that defines a strategy for reducing hunger and improving agricultural productivity through policy reform, as well as more and better investment in public resources. The aim is that these country-level processes lead to national compacts and ultimately to investment plans that are jointly owned by governments, donors, civil society organizations, the private sector and regional economic communities.

Despite African countries stepping up in response to the food crisis, donors are not living up to their end of the bargain. Huge gaps exist in the money needed (see table two below). For just the 20 African countries that are an advanced stage of the CAADP process, there is a funding gap of \$36.3 billion that needs to be filled.

Graph 2. Aid to agriculture in smaller donor countries. Gross disbursements in USDm constant 2009




Table Two: Government Agricultural National Investment Plans: Overall Costs and Funding Gaps in US\$ million

COUNTRY	OVERALL COST	FUNDING GAP	% OF FUNDING GAP
Benin*	982.5	706.6	72%
Burkina Faso**			
Cape Verde	96.4	79.8	83%
Cote d'Ivoire**			
The Gambia	296.7	233.7	79%
Ghana	8880.9	7092.7	80%
Guinea	2217.0	1604.0	72%

Guinea Bissau**			
Liberia	947.7	772.3	81%
Mali*	717.7	462.7	64%
Niger*	3844.8	2745.8	71%
Nigeria	7535.4	1567.0	21%
Senegal*	2617.7	1948.2	74%
Sierra Leone	402.6	256.3	64%
Togo*	1138.3	957.5	84%
Ethiopia	18039	15499	86%
Kenya***	3.09	1.07	35%
Malawi	1752	1003	57%
Rwanda	848	325	38%
Uganda	1365		
Total	54.8	36.3	67%

(*) Figures are converted from amounts stated in CFAF, using US\$ 1 = CFAF 500.

(**) Investment plans are under preparation in these countries.

(***) Gap after government commitments for development expenditures

(*) Figures are converted from amounts stated in CFAF, using US\$ 1 = CFAF 500.

Source: Country investment plans, compiled by IFPRI staff.

Section 4. Conclusions and recommendations

With the world teetering on the edge of another food crisis, the G8 must keep to their 'Hunger Pledge'. It is simply not acceptable that they are unable to give a full and transparent account of progress to date. In so doing, the G8 is severely undermining the 'accountability' process by a lack of transparency.

The figures suggest, despite some outstanding exceptions, that there is a lag in progress on the key elements of the pledge: aid to agriculture, and in support for country-led plans and small holder farmers.

ActionAid is urging the G8 and all donors to channel their aid behind country plans. This is particularly important in light of evidence which shows that increased African government support to agriculture is helping to cushion countries and poor communities against the current global price spikes.

In particular, investments channeled via the GAFSP are proving to be an effective and transparent vehicle for moving funds to support country led plans, but not enough donors are supporting it. All details about country plans, financial disbursements and commitments about GAFSP are available publicly on the web – all L'Aquila bilateral donors should follow this model.

Recommendations

1. **The lack of full and transparent accounting for progress on the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative by donors to date must be addressed.** Key issues to be addressed by donors in order to improve accountability and transparency include:
 - Ensure that all available data is published and that donors report on their disbursements to developing countries on a country-by country basis
 - Ensure that the underlying data on 2010 disbursements is publicly released by all donors and is reported on according to the original commitments made, with no re-classification of funds.
2. It is vital that donors ensure that their **L'Aquila Pledges are delivered within the 3 year timeframe:**
 - Ensure the full delivery of the L'Aquila pledge and transparently spell out how and when the money will be delivered.
 - It is important that the shortfalls in the progress on commitments and disbursements of aid to agriculture are addressed as a matter of urgency by all donors.
 - In light of the food crisis and needs identified by the CAADP process, donors must increase overall agricultural aid beyond the L'Aquila Pledge, and they must align most of their aid in support of country-led plans. Specifically:
 - Donors should channel more money through GAFSP, which is delivering new money, transparently, in support of country led plans.
 - Donors need to take next step and go beyond L'Aquila and ensure that all CAADP investment plans are fully funded.

Endnotes

ⁱ FAO (2010) *Food outlook*, November, (p0), Rome: FAO, see:

<http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/al969e/al969e00.pdf>

ⁱⁱ FAO (2011) *Food price index*, February, Rome: FAO, see:

<http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/FoodPricesIndex/en/>

ⁱⁱⁱ FAO (2010) Addressing food insecurity in protracted crisis, see: <http://www.fao.org/publications/sofi/en/>

^{iv} World Bank (2011) *Food price watch*, February, (p5), Washington: World Bank, see:

http://www.worldbank.org/foodcrisis/food_price_watch_report_feb2011.html

^v ActionAid surveyed colleagues about the impact of rising food prices in 28 countries that we work in, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, between mid January to mid February 2011. Further survey details available on request.

^{vi} UNICEF, Innocenti Working Paper, May 2011: The Impact of the Food and Financial Crises on Child Mortality: The case of Sub-Saharan Africa. Cornia, Rosignoli, Tibertii

^{vii} <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-16/zoellick-says-world-economy-one-shock-away-from-food-crisis-1-.html>

^{viii} FAO (2010) *Crop prospects and food situation*, 13 December, (p19), Rome: FAO, see:

<http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/al972e/al972e00.pdf>

^{ix} <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-16/zoellick-says-world-economy-one-shock-away-from-food-crisis-1-.html>

^x World Bank, (10 February 2011), African Agriculture Rediscovered Courtesy of the Food Crisis, see:

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:22830744~pagePK:146736~piPK:226340~theSitePK:258644,00.html?cid=3001_2

^{xi} UN High Level Task Force, "African Agriculture Partners Focus on Mitigating Rise in Food Prices, Supporting Farmers," 3 Feb 2011, <http://un-foodsecurity.org/node/984>

^{xii} See FAO Global information and early warning system (GIEWS) country briefs on Malawi and Rwanda here: <http://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/index.jsp>

^{xiii} UNICEF, Innocenti Working Paper, May 2011: The Impact of the Food and Financial Crises on Child Mortality: The case of Sub-Saharan Africa. Cornia, Rosignoli, Tibertii